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We have developed a systems approach to describe infrastructure-building 
scenarios in flood-prone coastal communities. These scenarios are complex because of the 
interaction between individual homeowner and community-level activities, and because of 
the need to consider short- and long-term effects. We incorporate several systems methods 
to enable us to examine these processes: The Unified Modeling Language (UML) is used 
to develop a conceptual model that includes the principle actors of the system, including 
homeowners, the community government and a not-for-profit insurer, and the sequences 
of events associated with community resilience. An agent-based model (ABM) is 
developed to simulate the scenarios of the conceptual model, and to clarify how the system 
works by quantifying the processes of the conceptual model. The mathematical 
relationships that describe the emergent economic behavior of the agents were explained 
with level plots. System dynamics (SD) and linear systems theory from sociology are used 
to investigate the interactions between individual and community-level behaviors. This 
combination of approaches helps us better understand the individual homeowner decisions 
that lead to the best possible outcome for community resilience.  
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We have also developed a probabilistic surge response model for rapid assessment 
of hurricane wave and surge risks in the mid-Atlantic region. This model uses the 
maximum likelihood principle to predict flood elevations of future potential hurricanes. 
For the training and verification data sets, we used 1,380 simulated surge heights generated 
by the US Army Corps of Engineers. Our model computes flood elevation predictions in 
much less time than the high-fidelity models, with similar level of accuracy. This model is 
parsimonious in that it only uses the primary parameters of each synthetic storm: hurricane 
landfall location (xo), heading direction (θ), central pressure deficit (ΔP), radius of 
maximum winds (Rmax), and translational speed (Vt). There have been other similar rapid-
assessment approaches; our model builds on previous work while expanding the range of 
storm parameters and improving accuracy. 
Primary Reader: Professor Takeru Igusa 







The legal information provided in this thesis about government regulations and the 
national flood insurance program policies are only an example and have been simplified 
for the purpose of our modeling efforts. This information may not be accurate or up-to-
date and must not be used as a legal reference. Readers should refer to appropriate sources 
to get accurate information regarding legal issues about flood insurance policies and 







During my time at Johns Hopkins University, I had the privilege of working under 
the supervision of two brilliant professors to whom I would like to express my sincere 
gratitude: my wonderful advisor Professor Takeru Igusa for his endless support and 
encouragement, whose genius expertise and infinitely positive attitude will always be an 
inspiration to me; and, my former advisor Professor Robert A. Dalrymple whose deep 
knowledge and great enthusiasm towards coastal engineering has guided me through my 
career as a coastal engineer. 
I am also grateful to Mr. Sidney O. Dewberry, emeritus chairman and founder of 
Dewberry LLC, for encouraging me to finish graduate school, along with my colleagues at 
Dewberry who filled in for me while I was working part time. I owe special gratitude to 
my amazing manager and mentor Mr. Jeffrey Gangai for his understanding, support, and 
unconventional instructive guidance towards this research. I also must express thanks to 
my lab mate Mr. Zhaohao Fu for all his help and support. This work would have not been 
possible without his extremely helpful insight. Further, I appreciate the support of all my 
 
vi 
dear friends specially Dr. Majid Maleki without whose help and guidance it would not have 
been possible for me to apply to an American graduate school and immigrate to the U.S. 
Finally, I would like to recognize Professors Lian Shen, Seth Guikema, Celso Ferreira, 
Lingxin Hao, and my thesis committee: Professors Benjamin Schafer and Benjamin 
Zaitchik. 
Last but not least, I would like to thank my incredible amazing husband Michael 
for his never ending love and support, who also took the time to edit this thesis, my adored 
daughter Rosa, and my parents and siblings whom I miss dearly. I would also like to thank 
my wonderful child care provider Mrs. Mahvash Behdinan for working on weekends and 
providing my beloved daughter with love and care while I was working on my thesis.  
This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation 
under Grant No. 1331399. The support of the sponsor is gratefully acknowledged. Any 
opinions, findings, conclusions or recommendations presented in this thesis are those of 
the authors and do not necessarily reflect the view of the National Science Foundation. 
This work received additional financial support from the civil engineering department of 







This thesis is dedicated to my wonderful husband, Michael, for his unconditional 
love and support; my beloved daughter, Rosa, for always reminding me how to be a real 
scientist with her endless curiosity and creative imagination; and to the memory of my 








Abstract .......................................................................................................................... ii 
Disclaimer ..................................................................................................................... iv 
Acknowledgements .........................................................................................................v 
Dedication .................................................................................................................... vii 
Contents ...................................................................................................................... viii 
Notation ..................................................................................................................... xvii 
Chapter 1: Introduction ....................................................................................................1 
1.1 Motivation and Background .................................................................................1 
1.2 Objective .............................................................................................................4 
1.3 Study area ............................................................................................................6 
1.4 Thesis overview ...................................................................................................6 
Chapter 2: Probabilistic Method for Rapid Assessment of Storm Surge Heights ..............8 
2.1 Introduction .........................................................................................................8 
2.2 Review of the North Atlantic Coast Comprehensive Study (NACCS) ................ 12 
2.2.1 Hurricane Parameters ................................................................................... 12 
2.2.2 Development of Synthetic Storms ................................................................ 14 
2.3 Proposed Methodology ...................................................................................... 18 
2.4 Model Calibration and Verification Results ........................................................ 22 
Chapter 3: Systems Model for Storm Damage and Community Response Scenarios ...... 25 
3.1 Motivation and Background ............................................................................... 25 
 
ix 
3.2 Introduction to Unified Modeling Language (UML) ........................................... 28 
3.2.1 Activity diagrams ......................................................................................... 29 
3.2.2 Class diagrams ............................................................................................. 29 
3.2.3 State diagrams .............................................................................................. 29 
3.3 Development of UML Diagrams and Concepts for Storm Hazards at the Household 
and Community Levels .............................................................................................. 30 
3.3.1 Short-term Scale Events ............................................................................... 30 
3.3.1.1 Activity Diagram for Short-term Event ...................................................... 30 
3.3.1.2 Block Definition Diagram for Short-term Event ........................................ 36 
3.3.1.3 State Diagram for Short-term Event ........................................................... 41 
3.3.2 Long-term Scale Events ............................................................................... 42 
3.3.2.1 Activity Diagram for Long-term Events .................................................... 43 
3.3.2.2 Block Definition Diagram for Long-term Event......................................... 51 
3.3.2.3 State Diagrams for Long-term Event ......................................................... 55 
3.4 Flood Control Measures ..................................................................................... 59 
3.4.1 Structural Measures ...................................................................................... 59 
3.4.2 Non-structural Measures .............................................................................. 60 
3.4.3 Natural and Nature-Based Features (NNBF) ................................................. 61 
3.4.4 Measure Applicability by Shoreline Type ..................................................... 61 
3.5 Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 63 
Chapter 4: Conceptual Agent-Based Model for Coastal Flood Hazard Mitigation Plans . 64 
4.1 Objective ........................................................................................................... 64 
4.2 Agent-Centric Perspectives ................................................................................ 66 
4.2.1 Property ....................................................................................................... 67 
4.2.2 Owner .......................................................................................................... 67 
4.2.3 Owner (homeowner) .................................................................................... 70 
4.2.4 Repair fund .................................................................................................. 71 
4.2.5 Repair Fund (NFIP) ...................................................................................... 73 
4.2.6 Risk Map...................................................................................................... 73 
4.3 ABM Controller Parameters ............................................................................... 74 
4.3.1 Storm Intensity ............................................................................................. 75 
4.3.2 Insurance fees............................................................................................... 76 
4.3.3 Insurance Discount ....................................................................................... 77 
4.3.4 Pre-disaster Mitigating Grant (PDM) ............................................................ 78 
 
x 
4.3.5 Flood Control Measure ................................................................................. 79 
4.3.6 Homeowner upgrade strategy ....................................................................... 80 
4.3.7 Other Possible Controller Parameters ........................................................... 81 
4.4 ABM User Needs ............................................................................................... 82 
4.4.1 Homeowner .................................................................................................. 82 
4.4.2 Local community ......................................................................................... 84 
4.4.3 Insurer .......................................................................................................... 86 
4.4.4 Federal government ...................................................................................... 88 
Chapter 5: Computational Agent-Based Model for Storm-Surge Resilience ................... 93 
5.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 93 
5.2 Model Simplifying Assumptions and Aggregations ............................................ 96 
5.3 Homeowner’s Decision Tree ............................................................................ 100 
5.4 Rational Homeowners ...................................................................................... 105 
5.5 Effects of Risk Aversion .................................................................................. 108 
5.5.1 Decision Tree for Risk Averse Owners ....................................................... 108 
5.5.2 Effects of the Cost of Risk on Insurance Discounts ..................................... 111 
5.6 Effects of the Affordability Constraint ............................................................. 115 
5.7 Optimal Flood Insurance Discount ................................................................... 118 
5.8 Time Series ...................................................................................................... 120 
5.9 Community Upgrade: Flood Control Measure .................................................. 124 
5.9.1 Cost of Community Upgrade ...................................................................... 125 
5.10 Utility of the Measure at the Homeowner and Community Levels .................... 126 
5.11 Summary ......................................................................................................... 128 
Chapter 6: Parameter Study of Storm-Surge Resilience................................................ 129 
6.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................... 129 
6.2 Baseline without the community measure......................................................... 131 
6.3 Baseline with community measure ................................................................... 144 
6.4 Less Costly Property Upgrades ........................................................................ 156 
6.5 Less Costly and More Effective Property Upgrades .......................................... 161 
6.6 Less Costly and More Effective Property Upgrades Combined with Higher Cost of 
Measure  ........................................................................................................... 167 
6.7 More Effective Measure ................................................................................... 173 
6.8 Higher Cost of Repair ...................................................................................... 175 
6.9 Higher Cost of Suffering .................................................................................. 177 
 
xi 
6.10 Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 179 
Chapter 7: Integration of Linear Systems Concepts from Sociology ............................. 180 
7.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................... 180 
7.2 Application of Linear Systems Theory to Community Resilience ..................... 182 
7.3 Resource Exchange Equations .......................................................................... 188 
7.4 Deciding on the Community Measure .............................................................. 196 
7.5 Incorporating System Dynamics Concepts into the Linear Systems Framework ....  
   ........................................................................................................... 207 
Chapter 8: Concluding Remarks .................................................................................. 222 
8.1 Summary and Conclusion ................................................................................ 222 
8.2 Recommendations for Future Research ............................................................ 226 
Appendix A: NACCS Synthetic TC Parameters ........................................................... 230 
Bibliography ................................................................................................................ 240 








List of Tables  
Table (2-1): Discrete values of synthetic storm parameter marginal distributions [NACCS 
2015]. ............................................................................................................................ 14 
Table (3-1): Structural and NNBF measure applicability by shoreline type [Adopted from 
the Planning Analyses report of the NACCS study. USACE 2015]. ............................... 62 
Table (6-1): Parameter values for the baseline case. ..................................................... 133 
Table (6-2): ABM results for the baseline case without community measure................ 136 
Table (6-3): ABM results for the baseline case with community measure. ................... 144 
Table (6-4): Summary of ABM output for less costly house upgrades. ......................... 156 
Table (6-5): Summary of ABM output for more effective and less costly house upgrades.
 .................................................................................................................................... 161 
Table (6-6): Summary of ABM output for more effective and less costly house upgrades 
and more costly flood control measure. ........................................................................ 168 
Table (6-7): Summary of ABM output for stronger measure. ....................................... 173 
Table (6-8): Summary of ABM output for higher cost of repair. .................................. 175 
Table (6-9): Summary of ABM output for higher cost of suffering. ............................. 177 







List of Figures  
Fig. (2-1): Characterization of a storm as it approaches the coast [Toro 2008]................ 13 
Fig. (2-2): Landfalling -60° master tracks for the NACCS region [NACCS 2015]. ......... 15 
Fig. (2-3): Landfalling 0° master tracks for the NACCS region [NACCS 2015]. ............ 15 
Fig. (2-4): Landfalling +40° master tracks for the NACCS region [NACCS 2015]. ........ 16 
Fig. (2-5): Master tracks (landfalling and bypassing) for the NACCS region [NACCS 
2015]. ............................................................................................................................ 16 
Fig. (2-6): Relationship between storm surge height and distance from storm landfall 
location.......................................................................................................................... 20 
Fig. (2-7): Comparison of the rapid estimate from equation (2-6) with the NACCS results 
for surge height using 10 out-of-sample synthetic storms. .............................................. 23 
Fig. (2-8): Comparison of the rapid estimate from equation (2-6) with the NACCS results 
for surge height using out-of-sample stations (along the coast of Northern Virginia). ..... 24 
Fig. (3-1): Activity diagram of a single storm event on an individual property. .............. 31 
Fig. (3-2): Activity diagram of a single storm event on an individual private property (e.g. 
a house). ........................................................................................................................ 33 
Fig. (3-3): Activity diagram of a single storm event on an entire community. ................ 35 
Fig. (3-4): Block definition diagrams for a single storm event on a community. ............. 37 
Fig. (3-5): State diagram for a single storm event on a community. ................................ 42 
Fig. (3-6): Activity diagram of repeated storm events on a community (continued on next 
page). ............................................................................................................................ 44 
Fig. (3-6): Activity diagram of repeated storm events on a community (continued). ....... 45 
Fig. (3-6): Activity diagram of repeated storm events on a community (continued). ....... 46 
 
xiv 
Fig. (3-7): Block definition diagrams of repeated storm events on a community. ........... 54 
Fig. (3-8): State diagrams of repeated storm events on a community. ............................. 58 
Fig. (4-1): Diagram of the insurer’s expected costs with respect to discounts. The diagram 
implicitly includes homeowners’ behavior as described in the main text. ....................... 87 
Fig. (4-2): Diagram of the federal government’s expected costs with respect to the number 
of PDM grants. The diagram implicitly includes the behavior of the communities as 
described in the main text. ............................................................................................. 90 
Fig. (5-1): Rational homeowner’s decision tree. ........................................................... 101 
Fig. (5-2): Rational homeowner’s behavior in response to the rate of insurance discount.
 .................................................................................................................................... 107 
Fig. (5-3): Risk averse homeowners’ decision tree. ...................................................... 110 
Fig. (5-4): Cumulative distribution function (CDF) of cost of risk for risk-averse 
homeowners. ............................................................................................................... 112 
Fig. (5-5): Risk-averse homeowner’s behavior in response to the rate of insurance discount.
 .................................................................................................................................... 115 
Fig. (5-6): Cumulative distribution function (CDF) of homeowners’ affordability to 
upgrade........................................................................................................................ 116 
Fig. (5-7): Complementary cumulative distribution function (CCFD) of homeowners’ 
affordability to upgrade. .............................................................................................. 117 
Fig. (5-8): Risk-averse homeowner behavior in response to the rate of insurance discount 
and accounting for upgrade affordability. ..................................................................... 118 
Fig. (5-9): Insurance losses and the optimal discount rate. ........................................... 120 
Fig. (5-10): Time series of the insurance company reserves, and the associated fees and 
discount rates. .............................................................................................................. 123 
Fig. (6-1): PDF and CDF of the homeowners’ cost of risk. .......................................... 135 
Fig. (6-2): PDF and CCDF of homeowners’ affordability to upgrade as a function of 
insurance discount. ...................................................................................................... 137 
Fig. (6-3): Proportion of homeowners who cannot afford to upgrade as a function of the 
insurance discount, plotted along with the rational discount rate. ................................. 138 
Fig. (6-4): Indifference curve and contour plot of the insurer’s costs for the baseline case.
 .................................................................................................................................... 139 
Fig. (6-5): Relationship between insurer profit and premium, with optimal insurance 
premium rate leading to no profit or loss indicated by the red circle. ............................ 142 
Fig. (6-6): Average time series of the reserve, cumulative premium and cumulative costs 
for the insurer per household........................................................................................ 143 
Fig. (6-7): Proportion of homeowners who cannot afford to upgrade as a function of the 
insurance discount in a community with the measure. .................................................. 146 
 
xv 
Fig. (6-8): Indifference curve and contour plot of the insurer’s costs for the baseline case 
with community measure. ............................................................................................ 147 
Fig. (6-9): ABM results for a variable measure (baseline case); K = 1000 USD per 
household. ................................................................................................................... 149 
Fig. (6-10): Available resource for each household in a community (baseline conditions).
 .................................................................................................................................... 154 
Fig. (6-11): Average community utilities before and after adding a measure (baseline 
conditions). .................................................................................................................. 155 
Fig. (6-12): ABM results for a variable measure (less costly property upgrades). ......... 157 
Fig. (6-13): Available resource for each household in a community (less costly property 
upgrades). .................................................................................................................... 159 
Fig. (6-14): Average community utilities before and after adding a measure (less costly 
property upgrades). ...................................................................................................... 160 
Fig. (6-15): ABM results for a variable measure (more effective and less costly property 
upgrades). .................................................................................................................... 163 
Fig. (6-16): Available resource for each household in a community (more effective and less 
costly property upgrades). ............................................................................................ 165 
Fig. (6-17): Average community utilities before and after adding a measure (more effective 
and less costly property upgrades). .............................................................................. 166 
Fig. (6-18): ABM results for a variable measure (more effective and less costly property 
upgrades+ more costly measure). ................................................................................. 169 
Fig. (6-19): Available resource for each household in a community (more effective and less 
costly property upgrades+ more costly measure). ......................................................... 171 
Fig. (6-20): Average community utilities before and after adding a measure (more effective 
and less costly property upgrades + more costly measure). .......................................... 172 
Fig. (6-21): Average community utilities before and after adding a measure (more 
effective). .................................................................................................................... 174 
Fig. (6-22): Average community utilities before and after adding a measure (costly repairs).
 .................................................................................................................................... 176 
Fig. (6-23): Average community utilities before and after adding a measure (higher cost of 
suffering). .................................................................................................................... 178 
Fig. (7-1): Four basic relationships in describing macro- and micro-level system behavior.
 .................................................................................................................................... 182 
Fig. (7-2): Macro- and micro-level relationships for the engineering infrastructure layer.
 .................................................................................................................................... 184 
Fig. (7-3): Macro- and micro-level relationships for the social cohesion layer. ............. 186 
Fig. (7-4): Macro- and micro-level relationships for the economics layer. .................... 187 
 
xvi 
Fig. (7-5): Key relationships in the social cohesion, economic and infrastructure layers.
 .................................................................................................................................... 189 
Fig. (7-6): Scattergram of household utilities with and without a community measure. 198 
Fig. (7-7): Groups of households in the utility scattergram. .......................................... 200 
Fig. (7-8): Scattergrams of household budgets and expected costs with respect to upgrades 
and measure. ................................................................................................................ 201 
Fig. (7-9): Schematic diagram showing a representative household for each of the 5 groups 
indicated in Figure (7-7) plotted with respect to the horizontal dashed lines from Figure (7-
8). ................................................................................................................................ 202 
Fig. (7-10): Total expected cost given upgrade or no upgrade, plotted with respect to the 
measure, with household groups indicated in circles. ................................................... 204 
Fig. (7-11): Representative points for each of the 5 groups of households. ................... 205 
Fig. (7-12): Stock-and-flow diagram of the infrastructure layer. ................................... 210 
Fig. (7-13): Stock-and-flow diagram of the infrastructure and economics layers showing 
only the reinforcing loop. ............................................................................................. 213 
Fig. (7-14): Stock-and-flow diagram of the infrastructure and economic layers with the 
reinforcing and balancing loops. .................................................................................. 214 
Fig. (7-15): Stock-and-flow diagram of the infrastructure and economics layers showing 
only the reinforcing loop. ............................................................................................. 215 
Fig. (7-16): Stock-and-flow diagram showing the addition of the social cohesion layer.
 .................................................................................................................................... 218 
Fig. (7-17): Complete stock-and-flow diagram for community resilience showing, in a 
simplified representation, the social cohesion layer at the top, the infrastructure layer in the 
middle and the economic layer at the bottom. .............................................................. 219 
Fig. (7-18): Complete stock-and-flow diagram for community resilience showing, in a 
simplified representation, the social cohesion layer at the top, the infrastructure layer in the 








ΔP  central pressure deficit of tropical cyclone, computed as the difference 
between a far-field atmospheric pressure of 1,013 hPa and central pressure 
(hPa)  
θ   heading direction of tropical cyclone (deg)  
Vt   translational speed of tropical cyclone (km/h)  
xo   tropical cyclone landfall location 
ABM  agent based model 
ADCIRC advanced circulation model 
AEP   annual exceedance probability (yr-1)  
CCDF   complementary cumulative distribution function  
CDF   cumulative distribution function  
CHS   coastal hazards system  
 
xviii 
CLOMR  conditional letter of map revision 
CRS   community rating system 
DFIRMs digital flood insurance rate maps  
EMV   expected monetary value 
FEMA  federal emergency management agency 
GKF   Gaussian kernel function 
GUI  graphical user interface 
HMGP  hazard mitigation grant program 
JPA   joint probability analysis  
JPM   joint probability method  
JPM-OS  joint probability method with optimal sampling  
LOMR  letter of map revision 
NACCS north Atlantic coast comprehensive study 
NSF national science foundation 
NOAA  national oceanic and atmospheric administration 
PBL   planetary boundary layer numerical model  
PDF   probability density function 
PDM  pre-disaster mitigation grant program  
 
xix 
RL  repetitive loss properties 
Rmax   radius of maximum winds of tropical cyclone (km)  
SEES   science, engineering and education for sustainability 
SFHA  special flood hazard area 
SLC   sea level change (m)  
SWAN simulating waves nearshore 
TC   tropical cyclone  
USACE United States army corps of engineers 








1.1 Motivation and Background 
Historically, compared with all other types of natural disasters, coastal flooding has 
been responsible for the most property damage and the largest number of lives lost in the 
United States [Hayat et al. 2015]. The U.S. Atlantic coast is subject to repeated hurricane 
hazards. Tropical storms (e.g. Hurricanes) and extra tropical storms (e.g. Noreaster’s) hit 
the east coast of the U.S. frequently, often causing severe damage to this politically and 
economically critical area because of its dense population. According to the National 
Ocean and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), nearly 40% of the U.S. population lives 
near the coast. 52% of the total U.S. population lives in coastal watershed counties. The 
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coastal population is expected to increase by 10% by the year 2020 [Burkett et al. 2012]. 
NOAA lists surge vulnerability facts as the following: 
 “From 1990-2008, population density increased by 32% in Gulf coastal 
counties, 17% in Atlantic coastal counties, and 16% in Hawaii [U.S. Census 
Bureau 2010].  
 Much of the United States' densely populated Atlantic and Gulf Coast coastlines 
lie less than 10 feet above mean sea level.  
 Over half of the Nation's economic productivity is located within coastal zones.  
 72% of ports, 27% of major roads, and 9% of rail lines within the Gulf Coast 
region are at or below 4 feet elevation [CCSP SAP 4-7].  
 A storm surge of 23 feet has the ability to inundate 67% of interstates, 57% of 
arterials, almost half of rail miles, 29 airports, and virtually all ports in the Gulf 
Coast area [CCSP SAP 4-7]” [NOAA].  
Storm surge, coastal inundation, erosion, and wind damage caused by hurricanes 
impose devastating impacts on the nation’s economy, security and coastal ecosystems. 
Blake et al. (2011) estimated the direct cost of the top seven most damaging hurricanes, six 
of which have occurred since 2004, to be over $400 billion. The vulnerability of the coastal 
communities is intensifying by sea-level changes (SLC) and increasing storminess 
[NACCS 2015]. In addition to rainfall, storm surge, and waves, which are primarily 
accountable for coastal flooding, tides can also have a significant influence on the degree 
of flooding and the extent of the flooded region because of their large amplitude. In October 
2012, Hurricane Sandy hit the east coast of the US during a high tide, which enormously 
amplified the storm surge generated by Hurricane Sandy [NACCS 2015]. Reportedly, 
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when Sandy made landfall on the coast of New Jersey, the full moon increased the tide 
levels 20% higher than normal; in turn, this increased the total inundation water levels even 
higher, and caused a major natural catastrophe. 
For decision makers and authorities, it would be extremely valuable to be able to 
predict the possible storm surge elevations and potential imminent disasters before they 
actually occur, to have ample time for storm preparedness and pre- and post-disaster 
efforts. In addition to storm surge predictions, increasing coastal resiliency and 
preparedness for hurricane hazards are of significant importance to reduce the losses 
caused by coastal storms. To increase coastal resiliency, several involved organizations 
and agents need to work parallel to one another and collaborate to reach the mutual goal of 
having more resilient coastal communities. Although these collaborations are already 
happening in many settings, prior to the current research, no study had been conducted on 
the nature of these agents’ collaborations and their direct- and indirect- relations. We 
discerned the lack of such system and the importance of studying these agents and their 
relations as a whole system, which also includes evaluating these agents’ socio-economic 
relations, in a mathematical manner. More details on this matter is provided in the next 




The current study is part of a hazards science, engineering and education for 
sustainability (SEES) project with the title of: “Modeling to Promote Regional Resilience 
to Repeated Heat Waves and Hurricanes,” funded by the National Science Foundation 
(NSF). In the present research effort, we have created an agent-based model (ABM) to 
contemplate the different agents involved in the process as a system and classified different 
decision makers individually and as separate groups to study how they interact, and how 
each agent’s decisions and behaviors impact other agents. 
In our analysis, we consider two levels of decision-making: the most basic is at the 
individual level in which each homeowner decides on upgrading the flood resistance of 
their home. The other level is at the community level in which the members of the 
community must decide to build a measure that would provide community-wide flood 
protection. There is a natural tension between the individual and community levels since 
at the community level, each individual homeowner would need to give resources, typically 
in the form of taxes, to build infrastructure for the benefit of other homeowners. This 
tension is not unique to flood mitigation or civil engineering, but is also present in almost 
any decision-making and policy in community building and strengthening. In this thesis, 
we briefly examine the interplay between community and individual actions using a theory 
of multi-level interactions from sociology. It is shown how this theory can be applied to 
community resilience and integrated with agent-based modeling. In this process, it is 
shown how this may lead to integration with an entirely separate system dynamics 
approach towards modeling of community resilience. 
 
5 
It is noted that there are two general approaches towards the development of agent-
based models. One is to use agents with simple behaviors embedded in an environment 
with simple properties so that the fundamental interactions can be understood; the other 
approach is to use agents with complex behaviors in an environment that is characterized 
by detailed spatial-temporal-societal information in an attempt to simulate a real system. 
The thesis addresses both approaches in the following manner. A systems modeling 
technique is used to define, through a series of closely related diagrams, the primary 
objects, behaviors, states and activities associated with building resilience and reacting to 
flood hazards. A conceptual ABM is then developed using these systems constructs. The 
results at this point can then be used to proceed towards a highly detailed or a simpler, 
fundamental agent-based model. The remainder of the thesis follows the latter approach, 
because there is a research need to further understand the fundamentals, particularly at the 
individual versus the community levels as described above. While the ABM involves 
multiple players – the homeowners and insurer – the underlying analysis is simpler than 
what is used in economic equilibrium models [Arrow and Hahn, 1971]. The conceptual 
ABM presented in this thesis will still be used to inform the development of detailed 
models in separate, complementary efforts of the NSF project. 
This study also focuses on finding rapid methods to predict and assess the 
magnitude and uncertainty of future flood hazards in the mid-Atlantic region. This 
knowledge is used to prepare for the negative impacts of those hazards, increase coastal 
resiliency by proper coastal planning, and implementing appropriate flood control 
measures. Our probabilistic surge response model predicts flood elevations for potential 
future hurricanes using a maximum likelihood estimation method, and is fed by previously 
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computed surge heights generated by numerical simulations of hundreds of ADCIRC and 
SWAN runs of the North Atlantic Coast Comprehensive Study (NACCS) conducted by the 
United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) in 2015. 
1.3 Study area 
Our storm surge predictor model has been trained with the pre-computed storm 
surge data from ADCIRC and SWAN runs of the NACCS study in the mid-Atlantic region, 
more specifically, the open coasts of Anne Arundel County, Maryland. The prediction 
methodology however, is quite general for coastal areas and can be used at any open coast 
where surge simulations and synthetic storm data are available.  
The agent-based model also is applicable to any coastal community in the United 
States; with minor modifications, it may also be applicable to coastal communities in other 
nations with similar flood risk vulnerabilities and flood insurance programs.  
1.4 Thesis overview 
In Chapter 2 we present our probabilistic model for rapid assessment of storm surge 
heights. The storm surge simulation data that was used to train the prediction model is also 
described in chapter two. Chapter 3 introduces the conceptual system model for storm 
damage and community response scenarios through a series of unified modeling language 
(UML) diagrams. In Chapter 4 we develop a conceptual agent-based model (ABM) 
corresponding to the system model in chapter three for coastal flood hazard mitigation 
 
7 
plans. In Chapter 5 it is shown how decision theory with uncertainties can be incorporated 
into the concepts of the preceding two chapters to develop a simplified computational 
ABM. A parameter study in Chapter 6 demonstrates the visual aspects of the ABM, with 
graphs that provide insights into the behaviors of the agents of the model. In Chapter 7, it 
is shown how linear systems theory from sociology can be used to examine the roles of 
homeowners as individuals protecting their homes and as members of a community with a 
shared goal of improving resistance to flood hazards in the entire community. Concluding 
remarks and recommendation for future research are provided in Chapter 8. Appendix A 
summarizes the synthetic tropical storm parameters data of the subset of the NACCS study 







Probabilistic Method for Rapid Assessment 
of Storm Surge Heights 
2.1 Introduction 
During a hurricane, storm surge, depth, and tide are the primary factors responsible 
for coastal flooding. Storm surge, especially when combined with a high tide, causes 
increased water levels that can lead to the inundation of coastal areas. From the flood-
management perspective, it is of extreme importance to know, and be able to predict, the 
potential surge levels before the storm makes landfall and flooding occurs. This 
information can help decision makers to plan for flood protection, and if necessary, 
evacuation of the area before the hurricane hits the shoreline.  
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With today’s technology, a storm’s surge height can be calculated quite accurately 
by numerical simulations of high-resolution models, such as the Advanced Circulation 
Model for Oceanic, Coastal and Estuarine Waters (ADCIRC) and the Simulating Waves 
Nearshore (SWAN), using supercomputers. Nonetheless, these models can take several 
hours or days to run. Flood managers do not always have the luxury of waiting this long 
before the storm makes landfall, particularly in hurricane forecasting cases. Hence, it is 
crucial to be able to predict storm surge heights accurately, and in a timely manner. 
As a complement to computationally intensive approaches for estimating storm 
surge, other researchers have tried to develop more rapid and simpler approaches to achieve 
similar results [Irish et al., 2008, 2009, 2011; Taflanidis et al., 2012, 2013, 2016]. These 
methods involve using simulated storm surge data calculated by the numerical models 
mentioned above, and the application of statistical methodologies for rapid storm surge 
prediction to assess flood risks. This approach is of particular interest for real-time 
forecasting. These models, while extremely useful, also come with limitations. For 
instance, many of these models are only applicable to a single value for the angle of the 
storm track (track direction, or heading), and/or a specific value of the translation speed of 
the storm. Thus, if a storm has a different heading direction than the default values of the 
model, these models cannot be used to predict the surge heights for that specific storm. 
These models typically are trained by simulated surge heights from hundreds of previously 
computed ADCIRC and SWAN runs in the area of interest.  
In this chapter, we introduce a probabilistic surge response model for rapid 
assessment of hurricane wave and surge risks in the mid-Atlantic region that uses the 
maximum likelihood method for flood elevation predictions, with fewer limitations 
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compared to the previous studies. This probabilistic model is trained by the simulated surge 
height data generated by numerical simulation of hundreds of ADCIRC and SWAN runs 
in the recent north Atlantic coast comprehensive study (NACCS) of the USACE.  
Our model makes these flood elevation predictions in a matter of minutes versus 
the high-fidelity models that take hours to run, to provide rapid, rough estimates that can 
serve two purposes: These estimates can help decision makers more quickly understand 
the extent of potential hazards from each storm. They can also be used as a filter, in the 
form of a statistical classifier, to determine which storm should be analyzed in more depth. 
The model predicts the risk of coastal flooding based on the following primary 
parameters of the synthetic storms developed by NACCS: hurricane landfall location (xo), 
heading direction (θ), central pressure deficit (ΔP), radius of maximum winds (Rmax), and 
translational speed (Vt). These parameters are defined in more detail later in this chapter. 
In addition to the simulated storm surge data available from the NACCS, there are 
thousands of other simulated data available from numerical simulations of high-fidelity 
model runs for the majority of coastal regions in the U.S. that can be used to train the 
prediction model for the region of interest. These runs were performed by the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), USACE, and other project partners during the 
storm surge studies within FEMA’s mandate of the analysis of U.S. coastal hazards. FEMA 
is in charge of preparing Federal Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMs); these maps show the 
locations of the flood hazard zones in coastal and inland watershed communities in the 
U.S. In the past few years, with the assistance of USACE and project partners, FEMA has 
developed and applied a state-of-the art storm surge risk assessment program to update the 
flood maps to reflect up-to-date, and more accurate floodplain levels. The historical records 
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of the storm events that impacted the region are used in these storm surge studies to develop 
a synthetic suite of storms and the storm characteristics, and also reconstruct pressure and 
wind fields to be used as the boundary conditions in the hydrodynamic models [Vickery 
2013]. NACCS storm surge studies followed a similar methodology to produce a set of 
synthetic storms that we have utilized for training our storm surge prediction model. More 
details on these studies are provided in the next section.  
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2.2 Review of the North Atlantic Coast 
Comprehensive Study (NACCS) 
Motivated by the catastrophic consequences of Hurricane Sandy, the North Atlantic 
Coast Comprehensive Study (NACCS) was performed by the US Army Corps of Engineers 
as a coastal storm hazard and vulnerability risk assessment program for the coastal regions 
from Virginia to Maine. The water level and wave modeling goals of NACCS was to create 
a comprehensive reference database required for hazard evaluations to inform future risk 
reduction projects and contribute to increased coastal resiliency. This reference database 
was generated by simulating 1,050 synthetic storms, covering a wide range of storm 
parameters that covers the possible future hurricanes that can impact the study area 
[NACCS 2015], as explained below. 
 
2.2.1 Hurricane Parameters 
Storms are normally described in terms of their primary forcing parameters that 
affect the storm surge, including the following:  
 Track location/landfall location (or, equivalently, the minimum distance from the 
track to a reference point along the coast): xo 
 Heading direction: θ 
 Central pressure deficit (representing hurricane intensity): ΔP* 
 Radius of maximum winds (representing hurricane size): Rmax  
 
13 
 Translational speed/forward velocity: Vt  
*ΔP is the difference between the central pressure CP and the far-field atmospheric 
pressure, which in most cases is assumed to be 1,013 hPa (i.e., ΔP = 1,013 − CP). 
These parameters are illustrated in Figure (2-1). The storm parameters are treated 
as random variables in the joint probability method (JPM) and are used to generate 
synthetic storms as explained in the next section. The magnitude of the storm surge is 
predominantly a function of storm intensity, size, and the along-shore distance from the 
storm center [NACCS 2015]. 
 
 
Fig. (2-1): Characterization of a storm as it approaches the coast [Toro 2008]. 
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2.2.2 Development of Synthetic Storms 
A joint probability method with optimal sampling (JPM-OS) was used to develop 
the synthetic storm suite in which the storms were created by a probabilistic model of the 
storms’ primary parameters. Optimal sampling of the joint distribution of the storm 
parameters generated 1,050 unique synthetic storms. These 1,050 storms covered the 
region spatially and consist of a wide range of practical hazards by including a wide range 
of storm return periods [Good 2001, Haan 2002, Hawkes 2002 & 2005, NACCS 2015]. 
The NACCS study used the NOAA national hurricane center HURricane 
DATabase (HURDAT2) for the storm parameters of historical storm events that impacted 
the study area from 1938 to 2013. The values of the storm parameters were marginally 
discretized as listed in Table (2-1). Some of the storm tracks are shown in Figures (2-2) 
through (2-5) borrowed from the NACCS “Coastal storm hazards from Virginia to Maine: 
ERDC/CHL TR-15-5” report [NACCS 2015].  
Table (2-1): Discrete values of synthetic storm parameter marginal distributions [NACCS 2015]. 
Storm Parameters NACCS Sub-region 3 NACCS Sub-region 2 NACCS Sub-region 1 
Heading direction (θ) 
-60°, -40°, -20°, 
0°, +20°, +40° 
-60°, -40°, -20°, 
0°, +20°, +40° 
-60°, -40°, -20°, 
0°, +20°, +40° 
Central pressure 
deficit (ΔP) 
From 28 to 98 hPa 
At 5 hPa intervals 
From 28 to 88 hPa 
At 5 hPa intervals 
From 28 to 78 hPa 
At 5 hPa intervals 
Radius of maximum 
winds (Rmax)  
From 25 to 145 km, 
median of 54 km 
From 25 to 158 km, 
median of 62 km 
From 26 to 174 km, 
median of 74 km 
Translational speed 
(Vt) 
From 12 to 59 km/h, 
median of 27 km/h 
From 14 to 88 km/h, 
median of 45 km/h 
From 16 to 83 km/h, 




Fig. (2-2): Landfalling -60° master tracks for the NACCS region [NACCS 2015]. 
 




Fig. (2-4): Landfalling +40° master tracks for the NACCS region [NACCS 2015]. 
 
Fig. (2-5): Master tracks (landfalling and bypassing) for the NACCS region [NACCS 2015]. 
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These synthetic storms were then numerically simulated on a high-resolution mesh 
grid with dense spatial coverage of the near-shore areas using high-fidelity hydrodynamic 
and climate models. The minimum size of the mesh grid at the near-shore regions was of 
order of 10 meters. The NACCS project also evaluated the effects of future sea-level 
changes (SLC) on hurricane hazards. More information about the generation of the TCs 
can be found in the NACCS “Coastal storm hazards from Virginia to Maine: ERDC/CHL 
TR-15-5” report [NACCS 2015]. The results of high-fidelity numerical models and 
computed storm response are stored on the coastal hazard system (CHS) website 
(https://chs.erdc.dren.mil). These results include storm surge, storm climatology, water 
level, waves, etc. 
CHS provides a storm hazard data storage and mining system, where the data can 
be easily accessed publicly through a user-friendly graphical interface. The simulated 
results provided on CHS include the storm response values on nearly 18,000 station 
locations in the NACCS study region from Virginia to Maine.  
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2.3 Proposed Methodology 
Here, we extend the general framework described in Irish, et al., (2008) to a 
classification algorithm suited for the Mid-Atlantic states. For the storm characteristics, we 
use central pressure deficit, ΔP, radius of maximum wind speed, Rmax, forward speed of 
the storm, Vt, Holland’s B as a measure of the peakedness of the distribution of the storm 
wind speed (Holland, 1980), and the storm heading direction, θ. These are the primary 
inputs to planetary boundary layer models that are needed in the computation of wind and 
pressure fields that were consequently used as input into hydrodynamic models such as the 
ADCIRC long-wave hydrodynamic computational tool (Luettich, et al., 1992; Westerink, 
et al. 1992). 
We use a spatial profile of the coastal surge that is dependent on the distance, xo, 
from a location on the coast that is offset from storm landfall location. We find that the 
residuals obtained by subtracting the profiles with storm surge are approximately Gaussian 
with significant spatial correlation. The spatial correlation was found to follow an 
exponential model. We used maximum likelihood to determine the parameters for the 
mean spatial profile and spatial correlation. 
We began with the following general form for the storm surge , represented as a 
mean or expected value with an additive Gaussian error term: 
 = [] +           (2-1) 
~(0, )          
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Following Irish et al. (2008), we separated the functional form for the mean into two 
components. The first component is a spatial profile that depended on the distance from 
landfall, x, and the radius of maximum wind speed, . This component had a maximum 
non-dimensional amplitude of 1. The second component was simply a coefficient, giving 
the maximum amplitude of the storm surges at all points on the coast. This component was 
a function of the remaining parameters, the central pressure, , forward speed of the 
storm, Vt, Holland’s B, and the storm heading direction, θ. In summary, the mean storm 
surge, expressed as a function of the distance from landfall, x, had the following form: 
[()] = ,  , , (, )      (2-2) 
To obtain the explicit functional forms for  and  and to estimate the model 
parameters, we began with 348 synthetic storms that impact the open coast shoreline in the 
mid-Atlantic region, selected from the 1,050 storms generated in the NACSS study. The 
parameters of these 348 storms are provided in Appendix A. We then considered only a 
subset of 20 storms that crossed the open coast shoreline in Northern Virginia or the 
Delmarva Peninsula. There are 69 stations along this portion of the mid-Atlantic region, 
leading to a total of 1,380 surge heights for 20 storms at these stations. 
It was found that the surge height, as a function of the distance parameter x, 
generally exhibited a peak near landfall, as expected. Some samples of this relationship 
between surge height and distance can be seen in Figure (2-6) below. We follow Irish et 
al. (2009) and use non-dimensional analysis along with an inspection of the surge height – 
distance relationship observed in the synthetic storms to arrive at the following explicit 
form for the spatial component, : 
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(, ) = 1 −  


      (2-3) 
 
Fig. (2-6): Relationship between storm surge height and distance from storm landfall location. 
 
For the amplitude component, we considered a wide range of polynomials of the 
parameters ,  , ,  and found that only the terms associated with the central pressure 
 and the storm velocity  were significant. The final form for the amplitude component 
is: 
(, ) = ( + )( + )     (2-4) 
Which leads to the expression for the mean surge height: 
































[] = ( + )( + ) 1 −  


    (2-5) 
We used the maximum likelihood principle to determine the parameters and arrived 
at the result. 
[] = 0.920 + 0.0227(0.000582 + 0.120) 1 − 20.0 


  (2-6) 
With an error term with RMS of  = 0.320m.  
We also tried a more complex model for the error term to account for spatial 
correlation. The model for surge height was expressed in terms of a mean surge height with 
two additive noise terms, a term () that was dependent on the distance from landfall 
variable x, and a non-spatially dependent noise term . Both noise terms were Gaussian 
with zero mean and constant variances; the first noise term was also autocorrelated, with 
correlation that was a function only of the distance | − | between two surge-height 
locations. The basic functional forms are as follows: 
() = [()] + () +        (2-7) 
(), ()~0, (| − |)       
~(0, )          
We experimented with several forms for the spatial correlation. An example is the 
commonly used exponentially decaying correlation 
() = /         (2-8) 







⎡  + 
 /










    (2-9) 
For points x1, x2, . . ., xn, in which dij =  − . The corresponding likelihood function is: 





( − [])TΣ( − [])  (2-10) 
Although several candidate forms were used to model the spatial correlation, these 
relatively complex models produced similar prediction errors as the simple one-term error 
model. Hence, the model in equation (2-6) is our proposed model for storm surge heights 
along the open coast shoreline in the mid-Atlantic region. 
2.4 Model Calibration and Verification 
Results 
Here we provide a summary of the calibration and verification results of the model 
shown in equation (2-6). The 1,380 storms surge heights for 20 storms at the 69 stations 
along Northern Virginia and the Delmarva Peninsula were divided into two sets of 690 data 
points each, where each set corresponded to 10 randomly selected storms. The results for 
the surge heights, as a function of the distance to landfall, x, are shown in the top plot of 
Figure (2-7) with the original synthetically generated data in blue and the rapid estimate in 
equation (2-6) in red. An alternate comparison between the data and rapid estimate is 
shown in the bottom plot of the figure, in which the horizontal axis is the original 
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synthetically generated data and the vertical axis is the estimate in equation (2-6). In both 
plots, it can be seen that the estimate closely tracks the data. 
 
Fig. (2-7): Comparison of the rapid estimate from equation (2-6) with the NACCS results for 
surge height using 10 out-of-sample synthetic storms. 
 
In a more challenging test of the rapid surge height estimate, we used the data from 
the Delmarva stations for training and the data from the Northern Virginia stations for 
validation. The results, shown in Figure (2-8), indicate less accuracy in using out-of-sample 
stations as compared to using out-of-sample storms that were used in Figure  
(2-7). Nevertheless, for the out-of-sample stations, the estimates corresponding to surge 
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heights that were above 1.5 meters tended to be conservative, with predicted surge that 
were generally higher than the NACCS simulated surge. 
 
 
Fig. (2-8): Comparison of the rapid estimate from equation (2-6) with the NACCS results for 







Systems Model for Storm Damage and 
Community Response Scenarios 
3.1 Motivation and Background 
In this chapter we develop a conceptual systems model that can be used to describe 
the scenario that develops in a community that is subject to storm hazards. Our interest is 
on examining the interactions between the major actors in the community, beginning with 
homeowners and extending to community government, insurers, planning engineers, and 
businesses. We are also interested in long durations, where repeated storms can occur, and 
where both short-term and long-term behaviors must be included. 
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There are a variety of conceptual systems modeling techniques that can be used. 
For instance, causal loop diagrams have often been used for showing interactions and 
influences between players/stakeholders of a system. This type of model has been 
particularly useful for public health investigations, in which it is necessary to trace the 
cause of undesirable or unhealthy behaviors. Such causal loop diagrams can then be used 
to develop programs to intervene at strategic points of the system to reduce or stop these 
behaviors. The primary motivation for developing causal loop diagrams is to gain a clear 
understanding of the root causes of unwanted behavior. 
For the storm hazard scenario, the behavioral aspects are straightforward and well 
understood. For instance, there are physics-based models that can be used to explain why 
a home will suffer damage from a storm surge or high winds. Also, processes such as 
insurance reimbursement for damage to insurance-covered properties are straightforward. 
Benefits of physical interventions in the form of upgrades at the residence or community 
levels are relatively easy to assess. 
Nevertheless, the combined short- and long-term scenarios of community response 
to a hazardous environment is complex because of the many interacting sequences of 
actions that are generated by the storms. For instance, there is a trade-off between 
individual expenditures on interventions at the residence level versus collective 
expenditures on interventions to protect entire communities. There are also unintended 
consequences on some interventions, such as insurance that make it feasible for 
homeowners to stay in residences in hazardous but desirable seaside sites. 
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There has been very limited work on systems models for this type of scenario. 
Studies in this field are usually focused on predicting the outcomes of planning and rescue 
programs for flood events [Birkland  1997, and Hawe 2012]. 
This study, however, is focused on the civil engineering point-of-view, including 
the modeling of a series of actions in mitigation plans towards coastal resiliency, e.g. 
implementing structural or non-structural flood control measures, and the process of repair 
and upgrade of private and public properties after flood damage.  
Here, we will be developing a conceptual systems model based on the Unified 
Modeling Language (UML). This type of model is highly expressive, giving multiple 
perspectives of system interactions in terms of: 
 The major actors and components of the system, 
 The processes that develop over time, 
 The states of the components, which change due to the hazards and the actions 
of the major actors, and 
 The internal processes within each of the decision makers in response to 
changes in state of the system components. 
It is noted that the last property of UML has some similarities to the causal loop 
diagram, where the causal relationships are between the states of the system components 
and the decisions made by the decision-making actors. 
While the UML diagrams are useful in themselves in producing multiple, 
complementary views of system operation, their primary purpose is to build object-oriented 
computational models. In this chapter, we will be introducing some of the major concepts 
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in UML and will develop, in a progressive manner, a systems model for coastal storm 
resilience. As may be expected from the modelers’ perspective, the construction of a UML 
is far easier than the development of the associated computational model. As noted in the 
introduction, this thesis will be presenting simple agent-based models so that the 
fundamentals of the interactions, particularly between the individual homeowners and 
community can be better understood. Hence, while the model will include a number of 
detailed features that can be used in the development of quite complex ABMs, only a subset 
of these features will be used in the ABMs in this thesis. 
3.2 Introduction to Unified Modeling 
Language (UML) 
The Unified Modeling Language was first established in 1994-95 by Gary Booch 
and his team as a general purpose modeling language in the software engineering field. 
Since then, UML has been revised several times. The main goal of UML is to simplify and 
facilitate system modeling by better visualizing of the system through a series of diagrams 
[Booch, 2005]. It has been used extensively in computer science for developing large 
software systems. It has also been expanded into the Systems Modeling Language (SysML) 
to incorporate concepts needed for developing other types of technologies that go beyond 
software and that require the use of systems concepts. These include aerospace, national 
defense, and other large-scale systems, as well as much smaller, highly complex systems 
such as cell phones. 
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In this chapter, we only use the following subsets of UML diagrams and associated 
concepts that are needed to develop the computation model of the next chapter: 
3.2.1 Activity diagrams  
These are used to describe the sequence of events that occur in the system. They 
show the actions or events that are required to change the states of the system components. 
3.2.2 Class diagrams  
Also known as “block definition diagrams,” these define the components of the 
system and are composed of the following elements: 
 Classes: representations of the components and actors of the system. 
 Properties: internal characteristics of the classes. 
 Methods: also known as “verbs,” are actions that are performed by the class on itself 
or on other classes. 
3.2.3 State diagrams 
State diagrams demonstrate different states that a component of the system may 
have during each stage of the process. For instance, after a flood event occurs, a property 
that is located in the flood hazard area might be at a “damaged” or “undamaged” state. 
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3.3 Development of UML Diagrams and 
Concepts for Storm Hazards at the Household 
and Community Levels 
We develop our UML progressively, beginning with the simplest model, and 
adding features as needed to describe the temporal and homeowner- versus community-
level interactions that are needed to characterize coastal storm resilience. 
3.3.1 Short-term Scale Events 
Our simplest, most abstract scenario operates at the short-time scale for one single 
storm event on an individual property. UML diagrams for this case are provided in this 
section. We gradually add more parameters to this simple scenario to build up our model 
for more complex and detailed scenarios. 
3.3.1.1 Activity Diagram for Short-term Event 
The activity diagram for the short-term event is shown below, in Figure (3-1). Here 
we begin at the left, where the filled dot designates the start of the sequence of activities. 
We then follow the horizontal sequence shown in grey boxes connected by dashed arrows, 
which is at the heart of this activity diagram. We will subsequently examine the unshaded 




Fig. (3-1): Activity diagram of a single storm event on an individual property. 
 
Following the dashed arrows, we come to the first action, which is the flood event. 
Continuing on this horizontal sequence of activities, the dashed arrow leads to the decision 
block in which the property is damaged, or not damaged. If the property is not damaged, 
no further action is required. Hence, the dashed arrow leads to the terminal point where the 
activity sequence ends. If the property is damaged, the next action is some sort of payment, 
which then leads to repair before terminating at the end point of the sequence of activities. 
The upper two unshaded boxes represent the states of the property that are directly 
influenced by the sequence of activities in grey. The initial state of the property is 
undamaged, as shown in the upper left. After the event, the decision block indicates that 
the state of the property may change to the damaged state. If this state occurs, then the 
payment will lead to repairs, which then returns the property back to the undamaged state. 
This activity diagram shown in Figure (3-1) is for an abstract property and payment. 
In the next two activity diagrams, we show how the sequence of events would appear for 
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the special, but obviously important cases where the property is a house or an entire 
community. 
When the property is a house, then, as shown in the next diagram (Figure 3-2), the 
only difference with the previous, more abstract, activity diagram is in the labels. For 
instance, the payment is now relabeled as “NFIP payment” which represents the payment 
from the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) to the homeowners towards the repair 
of the damaged house, assuming the house is covered by flood insurance. It should be noted 
that homeowners whose properties are located in areas prone to repeated flood damage, 
known as repetitive loss properties (RL), are required by the NFIP to repair and upgrade 
their houses to the 100-year flood event protection level [King 2005, and Dixon 2006]. 
This is embedded in the “repair” box in the activity diagram in Figure (3-2). We will 
elaborate on this in the next section where repeated events are discussed. Here, by contrast, 




Fig. (3-2): Activity diagram of a single storm event on an individual private property (e.g. a 
house). 
 
When the property is an entire community, then there are two pathways for the 
activity diagram that begin at the vertical bar immediately to the right of the flood event 
(see Figure 3-3). The top pathway is similar to the activity diagram for the house (see 
Figure 3-2), except that all of the houses in the community are represented. There will be 
some houses with damage and subsequent NFIP payments, and others with no damage. As 
before, the “repair” box includes repair and upgrade to a 100-year flood event protection 
level. The bottom pathway is new, and designates the sequence of activities associated with 
public areas (including infrastructure). The major difference in the bottom pathway is the 
type of payment, which is in the form of a post-disaster mitigation grant through the Hazard 
Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) from a federal government agency. Normally, local 
communities are in charge of taking action towards the repair and restoration of damaged 
public areas and infrastructure after a flood event. It is common that local governments or 
communities receive funds from the federal government for such repairs through programs 
like HMGP [FEMA 1999].  
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There are other important differences between the upper and lower activity pathways in 
Figure (3-3), and these will be addressed in the other UML diagrams. The block definition 
diagrams and the state diagrams for the case of one single storm event on a community are 







Fig. (3-3): Activity diagram of a single storm event on an entire community. 
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3.3.1.2 Block Definition Diagram for Short-term 
Event 
The block definition diagram (class diagram) for the short-term event shown in 
Figure (3-4) represents the model agents and the interactions between the model agents. 
Each block in the block definition diagram consists of three cells. The top cell contains the 
name of the agent/class. The middle cell shows the features and properties of the agent. 
The bottom cell includes the agent’s behavior, which are referred to either as verbs, or as 
methods or actions that the agent performs on itself or other agents. The dashed arrows 
connecting the locks shows which agents are directly interacting with one another and 
specifies the relations between the blocks. These connecting arrows/lines are of different 
pre-defined shapes in SysML, depending on the nature of the connection between the 
blocks. For instance,  is used to show an “inheritance” relation between two blocks; 
and  shows “aggregation” [Booch, 2005]. In our model, we only use the dashed 
arrow  to connect the blocks to indicate which agents “affect” other agents as 
described in more detail below. We begin by describing each class/block in the block 











This agent represents the flood event, which has the following features. 
Properties: Return period 
Shows the strength of the storm event; larger, more severe events are less frequent. 
For instance, a 500-year flood is a flood with a magnitude that has a 0.2% chance of 
occurrence each year and which, on average, occurs once every 500 years; it is larger than 
a 100-year flood which has a 1% chance of occurrence each year. 
Verbs: Damage 
This is the action of the hazard on the “Property” agent. 
Property 
This agent may represent a private residential “house” or a “public area” in different 
parts of the model. Both private and public properties share the following features and 
verbs; therefore, they are classified here as one agent called “Property.” 
Properties/features: Location, flood risk zone (according to the flood maps), 
condition (damaged or undamaged), resistance (degree of resistance against flood) 
Verbs: Ages (an action on itself that causes gradual degradation), gets risk (another 




This agent may represent the owner of a private property who is a “homeowner” or 
the “local community” who is responsible for the public areas and the community as a 
whole. The following features and verbs are shared between homeowners and local 
communities and they are classified in this model as the “Owner” agent. 
Properties: Funds. 
A representation of the available funds of the owner, e.g. the savings or 
discretionary funds of a homeowner. 
Verbs: Checks condition (of the property), collects funds (from the “Repair Fund” 
agent after a flood damage), and repairs (the Property after flood damage). 
Repair Fund 
This agent denotes the agent responsible for providing funds to the “owners” to 
repair damaged “properties” after a flood event. In the case where the “Property” is a house 
and the “Owner” agent is the homeowner, the “Repair fund” stands for the national flood 
insurance program (NFIP) which pays repair funds to its policyholders via insurance 
claims. Similarly, when the “Owner” is the local community and the “Property” is a public 
area, the “Repair fund” will be the federal government which provides local communities 
with repair funds through the hazard mitigation grant program (HMGP) to repair damaged 
public areas and infrastructure. The following features and verbs are shared between the 




Properties: Funds, fees. 
The Repair fund agent has some available funds, and a set rate for fees to be 
collected from the “Owner” agent. These fees are in the form of flood insurance premiums 
collected form the homeowners when the “Repair fund” agent is the NFIP and are in the 
form of taxes collected from local communities and the residents when the “Repair fund” 
is the federal government. 
Verbs: Sets fees (for the “Owner” agent, using the “Risk Map” agent which shows 
the flood risk of the “Property”), collects fees (from the “Owner”), and reads maps (using 
the “Risk Map” agent, to define the fee rates for the “Owner”). 
Risk Map 
This agent helps the “Repair fund” agent to set the appropriate fees for the “Owner” 
by showing the risk of flooding of each “Property.” For instance, properties located in flood 
zones with higher risk of flooding pay higher flood insurance premiums.  
The “Risk Map” agent may represent the digital flood insurance rate maps 
(DFIRMs) which divide the community map into different flood zones with different risks 
of flooding, or are criteria for defining reduced premiums for upgraded “Properties” 
depending on the level of upgrade. The latter is addressed later under the long-term event 
block definition diagram (Figure 3-7) where we cover the subject of the upgrade of the 
properties. The reduced premiums for upgraded “Properties” also include the reduced 
premiums offered to participating communities in the community rating system program 
(CRS) which is described in chapter 4.  
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Properties: DFIRM flood risk maps 
Flood insurance rate maps define the flood zone for each property. 
 
3.3.1.3 State Diagram for Short-term Event 
The state diagram (Figure 3-5) for the short-term event includes the states that the 
classes may have during the course of actions shown in the activity diagrams above 
(Figures 3-2 and 3-3). While the state diagram shows the possible states of the classes, it 
does not imply that the class will necessarily go through all of the states shown. It is also 
noted that each class may be in only one state during each step of the activity diagram.  
As mentioned in the previous section, a house may be in one of two states: 
“undamaged” before the flood occurs or “damaged” after being flooded. It may remain in 
the “undamaged” state after a flood event. If the house gets damaged during a flood event, 
it may move back to the “undamaged” state by getting repaired by the home owner. 
Similarly, public areas may be in the “undamaged” state before the flood happens, move 
to the “damaged” state after a flood event, and move back to the “undamaged” state after 
being repaired by the local community. The house or public area may stay in the 




Fig. (3-5): State diagram for a single storm event on a community. 
 
3.3.2 Long-term Scale Events 
The UML diagrams presented in this section model community responses to 
repeated storm events. These diagrams are in part similar to the previous diagrams which 
model one single storm event. In addition to what was shown in the short-term event model 
diagrams in the previous section, the long-term event diagrams in this section also include 
actions that different model components may take to make the community more resilient 
towards future storm events. These actions can be on a small scale at the level of an 
individual private property (e.g., a small upgrading project) or on a larger scale to protect 




3.3.2.1 Activity Diagram for Long-term Events 
Figure (3-6) demonstrates the sequence of activities for the case of repeated storm 
events in a community, including the addition of a flood protection measure by a local 
community to mitigate flooding hazard from future storm events. Such a measure protects 
a community against storm surge.  
We begin from the starting point on the left-hand side and move horizontally to the 
right. The first section of this diagram shows the sequence of activities for one single storm 
and is almost identical to the previous activity diagram shown in Figure (3-3). There are 
two pathways. The top pathway refers to actions related to private property (e.g., houses) 
and the bottom pathway shows the activities associated with public areas. Up to this point, 
the only difference between this activity diagram (Figure 3-6) and the previous activity 
diagram (shown in Figure 3-3) is that the present diagram does not end after one single 
storm event where the two pathways merge in Figure (3-3). Here, we are interested in the 
long-term events and the actions the residents (homeowners) and the local 
government/community would potentially take to prepare the community for future flood 





















Fig. (3-6): Activity diagram of repeated storm events on a community (continued). 
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In the top pathway, the last action block at the end of the “one single flood event” 
box is slightly different from the same block in Figure (3-3). This block has been replaced 
by “Repair and upgrade of the houses” to include the upgrade of damaged houses to the 
100-year flood protection level according to National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) 
requirements for repetitive loss properties (RL). This action was embedded but not shown 
in Figure (3-3) because the upgrade to the 100-year flood protection level regulations refers 
to repetitive loss as a result of multiple storm events; in the short-term activity diagram we 
are interested in only one single storm event.  
Following the dashed line on the top pathway, there is a decision block which 
determines whether or not the homeowner is willing to upgrade their house to the next level 
of protection, which means enough protection to qualify for a reduction in flood insurance 
premiums. If the answer is no, the activity diagram ends. If the answer is yes, the diagram 
continues to the third page.  
Following the dashed line on the bottom pathway in Figure (3-6), there are two 
consecutive decision blocks. The first decision block determines whether or not the local 
community decides to apply to receive funds from a federal government agency through a 
Pre-Disaster Mitigation grant program (PDM) or a similar grant program, in order to add a 
flood protection measure to the community. If the answer is “yes” we move to the second 
decision block which establishes whether or not the application gets approved by the 
government and the community receives the grant. The PDM grant program is an annual 
program with limited resources. Every year different communities that are located in 
hazardous areas compete over this grant. If the community decides not to apply for the 
PDM grant, or the application does not get approved, the activity diagram comes to an end, 
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meaning that the vulnerability of the community towards future flood damage will not 
change.  
If the grant application gets approved however, the bottom pathway of the diagram 
continues horizontally to the next action block shaded in grey, which is the design of the 
flood protection measure. At this stage of the activity diagram, engineers and planners help 
the community with the design of several structural or non-structural options for flood 
protection measures. The various design options consider the needs and budget of the 
community, as well as the physical characteristics of the community site (e.g. shore type, 
topography, etc.). While each of these design measures offers a certain level of protection, 
they also have limitations. Some may be socially less desirable for various reasons, for 
instance removal of a sandy beach or blocking a scenic view of the ocean are not socially 
desirable. Between different designs for a flood protection measure, the community needs 
to choose one final option to be implemented. This final option must offer the desired level 
of protection (e.g., protection against the 100-, or 500- year flood event), be feasible, 
socially desirable, and most importantly, be cost effective.  
Sometimes there are two or more options with similar cost that offer similar levels 
of protection. The differences could include location, type, or some other feature. Where 
there are multiple feasible options, the community residents normally get to vote for their 
preferred option. Thus, next in the activity diagram shown in Figure (3-6) is a decision 
block, which asks whether there are two or more similar design measure options available. 
If the answer is “No,” the community selects the best option, which is normally the most 
cost effective one, and it gets implemented. If the answer is “yes,” then the next action 
block will be “Vote” – when the community residents get to vote for their desired option. 
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Typically, the local government holds meetings with the residents, generally through 
outreach programs and open house meetings, to educate them about the community flood 
risks, and the potential flood protection options. After this outreach, the residents vote for 
their preferred option. The outcome of the vote establishes which measures to implement. 
This is shown in the upper blocks in the diagram, which transfers the community from an 
“indecisive” state to a “decided” state.  
Following the dashed arrows to the right, after the two pathways merge, comes the 
“upgrade” box in grey. This action block refers to an upgraded property, whether an 
upgraded house or an upgrade of the entire community after adding the flood protection 
measure, which causes a change of state of the property from the state of “at high risk” to 
the new state of “at low risk” as illustrated in the upper blocks in the activity diagram in 
Figure (3-6). For the top pathway of the activity diagram, this means there is an upgrade in 
the house condition (e.g. elevating, flood-proofing, or retrofitting of the house), and for the 
bottom pathway, the “upgrade” box means that the flood control measures is in place, (e.g. 
the addition of any structural measure); and as a result, the community moves from a state 
of “at high risk” to the new state of “at low risk.” If the community participates in the 
community rating system program (CRS) and takes mitigation actions, those actions are 
classified as a non-structural flood control measure in this model and are included in the 
“upgrade” action block.  
The last action block in this activity diagram before reaching the end point is the 
“update of risk maps” block. This could be a result of one of the two following cases:  
(A) The Digital Flood Insurance Rate Maps (DFIRMs) get updated to include the 
latest changes in the community flood zones caused by (a) adding any recent 
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flood protection measures, or (b) any upgrade in the individual properties. In 
this case, the property is assigned to a flood zone with less flood risk.  
(B) The community participates in the CRS program and takes mitigation actions 
towards a higher degree of resiliency for the entire community. This action 
may not necessarily change the flood zones and an update of the DFIRMs; 
nevertheless, it will potentially change the flood insurance premiums through 
the CRS program and thus is classified here as an update in the “Risk map” 
agent. 
Both of the actions mentioned above (A and B) reduce the residents’ flood risk, and 
therefore, their flood insurance premium rates. In the activity diagram shown in 
Figure (3-6), this is captured in the upper blocks where the state of the insurance premiums 
changes from “High” to “Low.”  
This concludes the series of actions leading to a more resilient community. It should 
be noted that the procedure of “Upgrade” and “Update of Risk maps,” on the last page of 
the activity diagram also occur after the last box on the top pathway at the end of “one 
single flood event,” when a repetitive loss property (RL) gets upgraded to the 100-year 
flood protection level.  
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3.3.2.2 Block Definition Diagram for Long-term 
Event 
The block definition diagram (class diagram) for the long-term event is illustrated 
in Figure (3-7). This diagram is very similar to the class diagram for the short-term event 
with minor differences in the roles and properties of some of the agents as stated below. 
Owner 
In the long-term scenario, in addition to the verbs mentioned in the short-term 
event, the “Owner” agent may decide to upgrade the “Property” and apply for reduced 
insurance premium rates by submitting a letter of map revision (LOMR) or conditional 
letter of map revision (CLOMR) to a “Repair fund” agent-NFIP in this case. For the 
simplicity of our model, we model both application types as one (LOMR). “Homeowners” 
may upgrade their properties by elevating, flood-proofing, or retrofitting. “Local 
communities” may add a flood control measure to the community to upgrade it and make 
it more flood resilient. 
Verbs: Upgrade (the “Property”), submit LOMR (to the “Repair fund” agent)  
The “Upgrade” method is a complex verb which includes three of the action blocks 
represented earlier in the activity diagram in Figure (3-6). These three blocks are: “Design,” 




This agent, in addition to its short-term roles mentioned earlier in the Figure (3-4) 
description, takes the role of updating the “Risk map” agent after the upgrade of the 
“Property” agent. This occurs after the “Owner” requests an update in the flood maps via 
a LOMR or when a community participates in the community rating system program (CRS) 
and takes action towards having a more resilient community. The main goal of modifying 
the “Risk map” agent is to modify the insurance premium rates according to the level of 
resiliency of the “Property” agent.  
Verbs: Modifies the map (“Risk map” agent) after an upgrade of the “Property” 
Risk Map 
As mentioned earlier, this agent shows the risk of flooding of each “Property” and 
helps the “Repair fund” agent to set the appropriate fees for the “Owner.” The “Risk Map” 
agent may represent the digital flood insurance rate maps (DFIRMs) or be a criteria for 
defining reduced premiums for upgraded “Properties” depending on the level of upgrade. 
When an “Owner” upgrades the “Property” due to an increase in the resiliency of the 
“Property” they can request a reduction in their flood insurance premiums by submitting a 
LOMR. Another way that a community’s residents can receive premium reductions is if 
the community participates in the CRS program, which does not necessarily involve a flood 
risk map revision. In other words, the mitigation actions taken by the local community 
under the CRS program, although increasing the general resiliency of the community 
setting, may not be great enough to change the “Property” flood zones to the next lower 
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risk flood zone. The community rating system program (CRS) is described further in 
chapter 4. 







Fig. (3-7): Block definition diagrams of repeated storm events on a community.  
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3.3.2.3 State Diagrams for Long-term Event 
Figure (3-8) demonstrates different states that each class may have in the case of 
repeated storm events. Some of these diagrams are similar to the state diagrams for short-
term events shown in Figure (3-5).  
Private property (House) 
As mentioned in the description of the state diagram for the short-term event 
(Figure 3-5), a house may be either in the “undamaged” state before the flood occurs or 
“damaged” after being flooded. It may remain in the “undamaged” state after a flood event. 
If the house gets damaged during a flood event, it may move back to the “undamaged” 
state by getting repaired by the homeowner. If the owner decides to upgrade the house 
(elevate, flood-proof, or retrofit), the house will move to the “upgraded” state. 
Community site 
A community site located in a special flood hazard area (SFHA) is “at high risk” of 
flooding. This state can change to the “resilient” state by adding flood control measures to 
the community site and/or by upgrading the individual houses in the community. It should 
be noted that “resilient” is a relative term. Coastal communities are always subject to 




Local communities may be in many different states, two of which are of importance 
to us in our model: (1) the state of being “indecisive” about which one of the designed 
flood protection measures to implement to make the community more resilient and (2) the 
state of being “decided” after the community residents cast their votes and a final option is 
chosen. This, of course, assumes that the community decides to apply for, and wins the 
pre-disaster mitigation grant (PDM), and there are several similar options for the proposed 
flood control measures amongst those designed by the engineers and planners.  
Public areas/infrastructure 
Similar to houses, public areas may be in the “undamaged” state before the flood 
happens, move to the “damaged” state after a flood event, and move back to the 
“undamaged” state after being repaired by the local community. Alternatively, they may 
stay in the “undamaged” state after a flood event if the storm is not too strong. 
Risk Map 
The “Risk Map” agent can be in the state of “current” or “effective,” which are 
flood maps that are in effect before an upgrade in the property, or in the state of getting 
updated after an upgrade. In this study, we have addressed these two states as the “old Risk 
Maps” and “new Risk Maps,” respectively. Noticeably, this could mean the update of the 
effective digital flood insurance rate maps (DFIRMs) when the upgrade is sufficiently 
protective to change the flood zone of the property (whether individual private properties 
or the entire community), or a change in the state of the “community upgrade map” which 
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does not lead to a change in the flood zone, but is sufficient to receive discounted rates on 
flood insurance premiums for the community residents through the community rating 







Fig. (3-8): State diagrams of repeated storm events on a community. 
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3.4 Flood Control Measures 
Coastal flood control measures are employed to protect the coasts from flooding by 
reducing the flood risk, and increasing coastal resiliency. These measures are generally 
divided into three different categories: structural measures, non-structural measures, and 
natural and nature-based features (NNBF). Each type of measure is appropriate for a 
specific shore type, site location, and specific application. Each one of these measures 
provides a degree of protection and risk reduction through reduction of flooding, waves, or 
coastal erosion. A combination of these measure types may be used to enhance coastal 
resilience over the long-term and improve robustness of the coastal flood protection plan.  
 
3.4.1 Structural Measures 
Some of the most common structural measures are listed below. A number of these 
measures are a combination of structural and NNBF types as indicated in parenthesis. 
(a) Deployable floodwall 
(b) Floodwalls and levees 
(c) Shoreline stabilization (seawalls, revetments, bulkheads) 
(d) Storm surge barriers 
(e) Barrier Island preservation and beach restoration (beach fill, dune creation) 
(Structural/NNBF) 
(f) Beach restoration and breakwaters (Structural/NNBF) 
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(g) Beach restoration and groins (Structural/NNBF) 
(h) Drainage improvements (e.g., channel restoration, water storage/retention 
features) (Structural/NNBF) 
(i) Living shorelines (Structural/NNBF) 
 
3.4.2 Non-structural Measures 
The list below includes some of the most common non-structural measures.  
(a) Acquisition (building removal) and relocation 
(b) Building retrofit (e.g., flood-proofing, elevating structures, relocating 
structures, ringwalls) 
(c) Enhanced flood warning and evacuation planning (early warning systems, 
emergency response systems, emergency access routes) 
(d) Land use management/conservation and preservation of undeveloped land, 
zoning and flood insurance 
(e) Community rating system program (CRS)* 
* In this study, we have categorized the community rating systems program (CRS) 
as a non-structural flood control measure.  
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3.4.3 Natural and Nature-Based Features 
(NNBF) 
Some of most common NNBFs are listed below. Additional NNBFs are listed under 
Structural measures. 
(a) Overwash fans (e.g., back bay tidal flats/fans) 
(b) Reefs 
(c) Submerged aquatic vegetation 
(d) Wetlands 
 
3.4.4 Measure Applicability by Shoreline Type 
The NACCS study conducted by USACE in 2015, has categorized measures based 
on the shoreline type in their Planning Analyses report. This classification provides an 
engineering judgment on identifying which type of measure is best suited in a given 
geographic location, considering the application and limitations of that type of measure. 
[USACE 2015]. Table (3-1) shows this measure classification and is adopted from the 
Planning Analyses report of the NACCS study.  
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Table (3-1): Structural and NNBF measure applicability by shoreline type [Adopted from the 








































































































































Structural           
Storm surge barrier1   x        
Barrier Island Preservation and 
Beach Restoration (beach fill, 
dune creation)2 
  x        
Beach Restoration and 
Breakwaters2   x        
Beach Restoration and Groins2           
Shoreline stabilization      x x x   
Deployable Floodwalls     x      
Floodwalls and Levees  x   x   x   
Drainage Improvements x x x X x x x x x x 
Natural and Nature-Based 
Features (NNBF)           
Living shoreline      x x x  x 
Wetlands       x   x 
Reefs x x    x    x 
Submerged Aquatic Vegetation3          x 
Overwash Fans4           
Drainage Improvements x x x X x x x x x x 
1 The applicability of storm surge barriers cannot be determined based on shoreline type. It depends on 
other factors such as coastal geography. 
2 Beaches and dunes are also considered NNBF. 
3 Submerged aquatic vegetation is not associated with any particular shoreline type. It is initially 
assumed to apply to wetland shorelines. 
4 Overwash fans may apply to the back side of barrier islands, which are not explicitly identified in the 




This completes the introduction of the systems model for storm damage and 
community response scenarios. In the next chapter it is shown how the model can be 
developed into a conceptual agent-based model (ABM) to simulate coastal flood hazard 







Conceptual Agent-Based Model for Coastal 
Flood Hazard Mitigation Plans 
4.1 Objective 
In the previous chapter we introduced a systems model for coastal flood hazard and 
community response scenarios. The model introduced different agents and decision makers 
that play a role in the system, their individual properties, the interactions among those 
agents, and the sequence of actions. In this chapter we develop a conceptual agent-based 
model (ABM) to simulate the scenarios discussed in the previous chapter. This model will 
clarify how the system works by quantifying the concepts discussed in the conceptual 
model. In the following chapters a subset of the ABM constructs will be used to develop a 
simple, but theoretically informative computational model. 
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As defined in the systems model, there are multiple stakeholders interacting with 
each other and with their environment. Each one of them makes decisions individually and 
independently from other agents. However, all these agents interact with each other and 
each is affected by its own decisions, as well as the decisions made by other agents. Agent-
based modeling is a powerful tool that provides analysts with an understanding of how 
multiple components of a system are affected by interactions with other components. For 
instance, the outcome of this model can help homeowners decide whether it is more 
financially beneficial for them to upgrade their house, or move to a new location that is out 
of the special flood hazard area (SFHA). On the other hand, local communities may benefit 
from this ABM model in order to decide how to make their community more resilient 
against coastal flooding. At the same time, this model can provide insurers with valuable 
information that helps them find more financially sensible ways to offer insurance plans to 
homeowners; for example, they can encourage homeowners to retrofit their houses or move 
to a lower risk flood zone area by offering subsidized flood insurance premium rates or 
other incentives to those homeowners who do so.  
The ABM model also shows the flow of funds in the system between different 
agents which may help government agencies better understand the potential loopholes in 




4.2 Agent-Centric Perspectives 
Here we show how each agent (a) views the rest of the system and (b) makes 
decisions. These characteristics and relations were presented earlier in the class diagrams 
of the conceptual model introduced in Chapter 3 (Figures 3-4 and 3-7).  
It is of particular importance that some agents may represent different components 
of the system at different stages of the evolution of the system. For example, the “Property” 
agent may be a “house” or a “public area;” and, depending on the definition of the 
“Property” agent, the “Owner” agent may be a “homeowner” or the “local community,” 
respectively; similarly, the “Repair fund” agent may represent the national flood insurance 
program (NFIP) or the federal government, respectively. This is because, as illustrated in 
the activity diagrams in the previous chapter (see Figures 3-1 to 3-3, and 3-7), there are a 
series of similar actions taken by different components of the system. For example, when 
a house gets damaged, the homeowner receives repair funds from the NFIP and repairs the 
property. Similarly, when a public area gets damaged as a result of a flood event, the local 
community, which is responsible for the public areas, applies to get repair funds in the form 
of hazard mitigation grants from federal government. Both of these series of actions follow 
the pattern shown in Figure (3-1). A property gets damaged, then the agent responsible for 
that property obtains repair funds from the appropriate organization and repairs the 
property. It is common in computer programming to write the code as briefly as possible 
and shorten the length of the code and the number of commands as much as possible to 
increase efficiency and reduce the run time of the code. This is often done by introducing 
loops to perform repetitive actions. In our model, we have applied this general coding rule 
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by giving multiple interchangeable roles to some of the agents. More description is 
provided below for each of the agents. 
 
4.2.1 Property 
Property may refer to a “house” or a “public area.” This agent is not considered a 
stakeholder of the model as it does not make any decisions. However, depending on the 
type of the property, the role of other agents will be defined, e.g., if the “Property” is a 
“house,” the “Owner” agent will be the “homeowner;” when “Property” refers to a “public 
area,” the “Owner” agent is the “local community” in charge of the public areas.  
 
4.2.2 Owner 
This agent may represent the “homeowner” where the “Property” agent is a 
“house,” or the “local community” where the “Property” agent is a “public area.” The 
characteristics listed below are common to both homeowners and local communities. The 
homeowners and local communities each also have their own specific properties that are 
listed later under their own names. Here is a list of how this agent (a) views the rest of the 
system and (b) makes decisions. 
(a.1) Has knowledge of the state of the property. This knowledge is defined as a 
variable in the model and must be updated after each storm and each repair. 
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(a.2) Is responsible for the property, i.e., after the property is damaged by a flood 
event, the owner is responsible for repairing the property. 
(a.3) Has knowledge about the repair fund annual fees and repair fund payments if 
the property is damaged. These are also defined in the model as variables that are updated 
regularly.  
(a.4) Has some assets or savings which we call “funds” in our model. These funds 
will fluctuate as a result of actions that the owner takes, i.e., paying repair fund fees 
decreases these funds and collecting repair funds from the “Repair fund” agent will 
increase these funds. 
 (b.1) Every year, decides whether or not to pay repair fund fees. 
As mentioned earlier, the “Owner” could be a “homeowner” or the “local 
community.” If the “Owner” is a “homeowner,” every year they will decide to either pay 
repair fund fees (in the form of flood insurance premiums) or to not purchase flood 
insurance. It should be noted that “not having flood insurance coverage” is only an option 
in case that there is no mortgage or loan on the house located in the special flood hazard 
area (SFHA). If a property is located in the SFHA, lending institutes are required by federal 
law to make flood insurance coverage a condition for the loan. The “homeowners” who 
decide to purchase flood insurance pay flood insurance premiums to the National Flood 
Insurance Program (NFIP). Noticeably, when the “Owner” agent is a “homeowner,” and 
the fees refer to flood insurance premiums, the “Repair fund” agent in the model appears 
as the NFIP. However, “homeowners” also pay taxes to the government in which case the 
“Repair fund” agent of the model would be the “local and federal government.” 
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On the other hand, if the “Owner” agent is a “local community,” then the “Repair 
fund” agent would be the “federal government” and the payments would be in the form of 
federal taxes. Of course in this case, the “Owner” has no choice but to pay the tax to the 
government. 
(b.2) After flood damage, decides to repair the property, or repair and upgrade the 
property to be more resilient towards future flood events. The latter would be an investment 
that will cost the owner in the short run. In the long run, it helps the owner save money by 
reducing the risk of flooding in the future which would lower flood insurance premium 
rates.  
To be more specific, we explain here what “upgrading” means for each type of 
“Owner.” If the “Owner” is a “homeowner”, they can retrofit, flood-proof, or elevate the 
house to reduce their exposure to flood risk. Then they can request a lower flood insurance 
rate from the NFIP by submitting a letter of map revision (LOMR) and providing technical 
evidence that their house has a lower risk of damage after the upgrade. 
Conversely, if the “Owner” is a “local community,” they can make the community 
setting more resilient by adding structural or non-structural flood protection measures. 
Similar to the case of homeowners, the community can also request an update of the flood 
risk maps and lower the rate of insurance premiums for its residents through a letter of map 
revision (LOMR), conditional letter of map revision (CLOMR), or by participating in the 
community rating system (CRS), which is a voluntary program for NFIP-participating 
communities. The NFIP uses the CRS to figure out the insurance discounts, and they give 
special attention to communities that, on their own, try to go beyond NFIP minimum 
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criteria for protection from flood events or in increasing the number of flood insurance 
policies [King 2005].  
4.2.3 Owner (homeowner) 
When the “Owner” agent represents a “homeowner,” it has the following 
characteristics listed below that are specific to the “homeowner” and, unlike the previous 
list, are not shared between the “homeowner” and the “local community” agents. 
(b.3) After flood damage, decides to relocate and move to a new location with 
smaller flood risk, or stay in the same location and repair the damaged house.  
(b.4) If the homeowner decides to stay and repair the damaged house, and if the 
house has flood insurance coverage, then the homeowner submits an insurance claim and 
collects repair funds from the insurer who is defined as the “Repair fund” in the model. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, after flood damage, repetitive loss properties (RL) 
which are prone to repeated storm damage are required by the NFIP to repair and upgrade 
to a minimum of 100-year flood event resistance. This is referenced as “repair and upgrade” 
in the activity diagrams in the previous chapter (See Figure 3-6). 
(b.5) Pays tax. Every year, homeowners pay tax to the federal and local 
government, which is one of the main sources of the government’s income. This act is 
classified as “collect fee” by the “Repair fund” agent in the class diagram in Chapter 3 (see 
Figures 3-4 and 3-7).  
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4.2.4 Repair fund 
This agent may represent the “NFIP,” or the “federal government” if the “owner” 
agent is a “homeowner” or the “local community,” respectively. Regardless, it has the 
following characteristics. 
(a.5) Has funds, which will increase by collecting fees from the “Owner” or 
decrease when the “Owner” agent, whether it is the homeowner or the local community, 
“collects funds” to repair damaged properties after a flood event.  
“NFIP” pays repair funds to the homeowners through insurance claims and the 
“federal government” normally provides local communities with repair funds through the 
Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP).  
It should be noted that there are several other grant programs offered by different 
government organizations that provide “repair funds” to the “Owners,” including 
homeowners and local communities; in this study, to save time and for the sake of 
simplicity of our model, we only consider the programs mentioned above. It would be 
straightforward, yet time-consuming, to revise the model to include other existing grant 
programs. This can be done as future work by interested researchers.  
(b.6) Sets the fees. The “Repair fund” agent is responsible for setting the rates of 
fees and payments for the ‘Owner” agent.  
When the “Repair fund” agent is the federal government, it sets the tax rates for the 
communities as well as individuals (i.e., homeowners or renters). 
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However, when the “Repair fund” agent is the NFIP, it defines the flood insurance 
rates for the “homeowners” by means of the digital flood insurance rate maps (DFIRMs) 
which divide the community setting into different flood zones and show the risk of flooding 
for each flood zone. The rate of flood insurance premiums for each property is defined 
based on the flood zone in which the property is located. This act is referred to as “read 
map” and the DFIRMs are categorized under the “Flood risk” agent in our model as shown 
in the class diagrams (Figures 3-4 and 3-7) of Chapter 3. These insurance premium rates 
can be adjusted if a homeowner decides to upgrade the property by elevating or flood-
proofing. Likewise, when a community implements a flood control measure, the insurance 
rates of the residents will change due to the change in flood zones and the update of the 
DFIRMs after the measure is in place. Another way that a community may decrease the 
flood insurance rates for its residents is through participating in a community rating system 
program (CRS), as mentioned earlier.  
 (b.7) Collects the fees. After the “Repair fund” sets the fee rates, this agent then 
collects the fees from the “Owner” agents. “NFIP” collects fees in the form of insurance 
premiums from the “homeowners;” the “federal government” collects fees in the form of 
tax from “homeowners /residents” and “local communities.”  
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4.2.5 Repair Fund (NFIP) 
The characteristics listed above are shared by both the “NFIP” and the “federal 
government.” Here we describe some actions that are specific to the “NFIP” only. 
(b.8) Reads maps. As mentioned in (b.6), the “NFIP” sets flood insurance premium 
rates for each resident based on the flood zone in which their property is located. Flood 
zones are delineated in digital flood insurance rate maps (DFIRMs) that show the risk of 
flooding for the community location.  
(b.9) Modifies the maps. If a homeowner or community upgrades its property 
through one of the methods described earlier (e.g., elevating, flood-proofing, or adding a 
flood control measure) such that it decreases the risk of flooding of the property enough so 
that it is reassigned to a different flood zone, then a letter of map revision (LOMR), 
accompanied with appropriate technical evidence, may be submitted to NFIP. Upon the 
acceptance of the map revision request, the DFIRMs get updated to show the referred 
properties in the correct flood zone. This will automatically decrease the flood insurance 
premium rates for those homeowners.  
 
4.2.6 Risk Map 
This agent may represent “DFIRMs” or the “community upgrade maps” in our 
model. As mentioned in (b.6) and (b.8), DFIRMs define the flood zones in a community 
map and are used to define the flood insurance premium rates for each property. They may 
get updated if the “Property” agent gets upgraded.  
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The “Community upgrade map” agent in our model refers to the case when the 
flood insurance premium rates change as a result of the community participating in the 
community rating system (CRS) program. As mentioned earlier, this program offers lower 
insurance rates to the residents of the participating communities when they go above and 
beyond the minimum required NFIP standards to protect their community against flooding. 
In this case, although the flood zones may not change and the DFRIMs do not necessarily 
get updated, the insurance premiums change according to the CRS principles.  
Since both “Community upgrade map” and the “DFIRMs” are used to define flood 
insurance premium rates for the residents of a community, we categorized them together 
in one group as the “Risk map” agent.  
 
4.3 ABM Controller Parameters 
As mentioned earlier, our primary goal in developing an ABM is to understand the 
interactions between the players of the system and their mutual impacts on one another. 
One way in which this goal can be achieved is by changing model inputs and studying the 
model results after each input modification. In the section we introduce a number of 
controller parameters that could be used in a computational form of this ABM. These 
variables allow the user to define the input to the model and investigate the influence of 
each one of the system components by studying the model results after changing each one 
of the parameters indicated below.   
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4.3.1 Storm Intensity  
This parameter is used to vary the intensity of the storm in the ABM. The storm 
intensity is associated with a return period and a probability of occurrence as noted earlier. 
In equation (4-1), we show the standard binomial distribution result of the probability Pe 
of at least one T-year storm happening during a period of n years, where T is the return 
period of the storm. For instance, during the typical 30-year length of a mortgage, there is 
26.03% chance of at least one 100-year storm event occurring. 
Pe = 1-[1-(1/T)]n        (4-1) 
The intensity for a T-year storm is determined by the geographic location of the 
property and is quantified by flood level maps. Here are the consequences of increasing the 
intensity of the storm: 
Short-term effects: 
(a) The probability of damage for each property increases. 
(b) The size of the flood risk region increases. 
(c) There will be more owners with damaged houses. 
(d) There will be more owners with severely damaged houses. 
(e) The “Repair fund” agent will need to pay more claims. 
Long-term effects: 
(a) The “Repair fund” agent may increase its fees. 
(b) More owners may decide to upgrade their properties. 
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(c) More owners may decide to sell their properties and relocate. 
(d) The community may decide to add a flood control measure. 
(e) The community may decide to encourage its residents to upgrade their homes 
and to participate in the community rating system (CRS). 
 
4.3.2 Insurance fees 
This is related to the annual cost of flood insurance for each homeowner. In our 
model, we set the initial value to be 1.0 so that, for example, if this is set to 1.1 in any future 
year, then the cost will increase by 10%. Here are the consequences of increasing this 
parameter above 1: 
Short-term effects: 
(a) The homeowner may decide not to purchase flood insurance (in case there is no 
loan on their property). 
Long-term effects: 
(a) The homeowners may not be able to afford an upgrade due to an increase in 
their total annual costs (higher insurance fees). 
(b) The homeowner may decide to upgrade to obtain a discount on their insurance 
fee. 
(c) The homeowner may decide to move and relocate.  
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4.3.3 Insurance Discount  
The NFIP uses the community rating system (CRS) to figure out discounts to 
communities that go beyond NFIP minimum standards. These communities earn points 
based on their hazard mitigation actions, with more points leading to more discounts. These 
communities use their number of their points to apply for different levels of ratings. These 
ratings range from Class 1 (highest number of possible points; 45% premium reduction) to 
Class 10 (no points; 0% premium reduction).  
Previously, we described the CRS as a non-structural measure that local 
communities may use to improve their overall coastal resiliency. The community can also 
apply for a flood control measure; furthermore, such a measure and the CRS can be added 
to the system simultaneously, to increase resilience as well as the insurance discount. Here 
are the consequences of increasing the discount: 
Short-term effects: 
(a) The community may decide to set some regulations (e.g., mandatory upgrade 
of the private properties to some level of flood-resistance) to become eligible 
for the premium discount. 
(b) There will be an increase in the homeowners’ costs (for upgrades). 
(c) There will be a decrease in NFIP income due to reduced flood insurance 




(a) The homeowner’s average cost of flood insurance will decrease after an 
upgrade. 
(b) The homeowner’s total cost of repair + insurance will decrease due reduced risk 
of flood damage to their house after the upgrade. 
(c) The average and total costs of NFIP will decrease as a result of an increase in 
the number of more resilient properties and fewer insurance claims. 
 
4.3.4 Pre-disaster Mitigating Grant (PDM) 
Pre-disaster mitigating grants are provided by the government every year to assist 
local communities in upgrading their community settings and becoming more resilient. 
Local communities submit their grant application along with their local mitigation plan 
proposal to receive this grant. Since this budget is limited, many community applications 
get rejected every year. The communities who receive the grant will need to contribute in 
part from their own funds to the cost of building the proposed flood control measures. 
Greater availability of funds can lead to the building of stronger measures, which provides 
more protection and decreases the amount of loss. Increasing the amount of the PDM grant 
by the government may motivate more communities to apply for the grant and enables 
them to make better mitigation plans. A parameter for this grant can be introduced to 
investigate how this grant may affect the community behavior. The grant funds are 
typically covered by the taxes collected from the homeowners of the community; therefore, 




(a) The communities may be more encouraged to apply for the grant. 
(b) Stronger measures may be constructed leading to more resilient communities. 
(c) There will be a short-term increase in the costs of the local communities for 
partially participating in the costs of the measure construction. 
(d) There will be an increase in the costs to the federal government as a result of 
offering more grant funds to the communities. 
(e) The homeowners may not be able to afford an upgrade of their own residence 
due to an increase in their annual costs (due to the associated rise in taxes). 
Long-term effects: 
(a) The number of HMGP requests will decrease as a result of more resilient coasts 
and less flood damage to public areas. 
(b) Flood damage will be reduced due to communities being more flood-resistant. 
 
4.3.5 Flood Control Measure 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, there are many different types of flood 
control measures available. Engineers and planners decide on appropriate types of measure 
for each community based on several characteristics of the community site, e.g., shore type, 
slope, topography and bathymetry of the coast, beach size, etc. Here, for the sake of 
simplicity, we introduce a few representative options for the measure variable: 
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(A) No measure 
(B) Floodwalls 
(C) Beach restoration 
(D) Breakwaters and Groins 
A more complete list of possible options for the measure is provided in Table (3-1) 
of Chapter 3. The measure parameter can also include an option to control the strength of 
the measure, total cost of building and maintenance of the measure, and the level of 
protection offered by the measure (e.g., protection against 100-, 200-, or 500-year flood). 
 
4.3.6 Homeowner upgrade strategy 
It may be useful to introduce a parameter that quantifies the level of homeowner 
behavior in response to insurance premium reductions offered by NFIP to homeowners 
who upgrade their property. Basically, this parameter would be related to the probability 
that a homeowner will upgrade as a function of the insurance discount – for instance, if the 
insurance discount is 10%, then the probability that the homeowner will upgrade is 20% if 
the parameter is set to 2, and the probability of upgrade is 30% if the parameter is set to 3. 
An alternate approach is to use basic economics concepts to determine the upgrade-
related reactions of the homeowner in response to an insurance discount. This approach is 
followed in the ABM developed in Chapter 5.  
 
81 
4.3.7 Other Possible Controller Parameters 
Here are some other controller parameters one can potentially add to the model for 
future model improvements: 
- Parameters of the fragility curves of the buildings that relate the probability of 
damage with the severity of the flood; 
- Availability of homeowner funds (to be used for upgrades); 
- Cost, type, and spatial coverage of possible protective measures; 
- Local community upgrade strategy (in response to the PDM parameter); 
- Propensity of homeowners to move to a different flood zone; 
- Propensity of the entire community to move to a less flood-prone location; 
- Availability of extra repair funds beyond Federal assistance that might be in the 
form of a loan or may be outright gifts, and may be at the individual or community 
level.   
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4.4 ABM User Needs 
Here we explain how an ABM can inform the actors in the system to make better 
decisions. We present scenarios on how each agent may use the model features to obtain 
an understanding of their roles, behaviors and consequences. 
 
4.4.1 Homeowner 
As described earlier, the homeowner has multiple roles and decision-making 
responsibilities: 
(a) As an insurance payer the homeowner: 
(a.1) Decides to pay or not pay insurance (required only if they are in the 
1% flood zone or if they have a loan on their property) 
(b) As the agent responsible for repair/upgrade of the property: 
(b.1) Decides on the level of repair/upgrade of the property 
(b.2) Decides whether to stay or sell and move (relocate) 
(c) As a community representative: 
(c.1) Votes on possible community flood control measures 
The ABM can help inform these decisions in the following ways: 
(A) Estimates of short-term costs for a single storm event 
a. Input: parameters showing decisions on 
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i. The level of the flood insurance coverage on the property 
ii. Last level of repair/upgrade of the property 
iii. The severity of the storm event 
b. Output:  
i. Total costs of: repair + insurance 
ii. Level of damage to the house 
(B) Estimates of long-term costs for multiple events 
a. Input: 
i. Upgrade strategy (e.g., after every event, if there is damage, then the 
house is repaired to 1% flood resistance or the house is repaired to 
the next higher level of resistance) 
ii. Move and relocation strategy (e.g., never move, move after 
damaged twice, etc.) 
iii. Voting on flood control measure options  
b. Output: 
i. Total cumulative cost over time 
ii. Average cost over time 
iii. Cost versus severity of event. (Cost for every event, grouped 
according to severity.) 
iv. Effects of each measure option on the property (access to the beach, 
potential blockage of scenic views, etc.)  
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4.4.2 Local community 
The roles and decision-making responsibilities of the local communities can be 
summarized as the following: 
(a) As an NFIP participating community the local community: 
(a.1) Decides whether or not to participate in the community rating 
system program (CRS) 
(b) As the agent responsible for repair/upgrade of the community setting: 
(b.1) Decides on the level of repair/upgrade of the public areas and 
infrastructure after storm damage; and/or upgrade of the entire community 
by implementing flood control measures 
(b.2) Decides whether or not to apply for the FEMA pre-disaster 
mitigation grant program (PDM) for implementing a flood control measure 
The ABM can help inform local communities in the following ways: 
(A) Estimates of short-term costs for a single storm event for the local community. 
a. Input: 
i. The severity of the storm event 
ii. Last level of repair/upgrade of the public areas 
b. Output: 
i. Total cost of repair 
ii. Level of damage to the public areas 




i. Repair and upgrade strategy for the public areas (e.g., after every 
flood damage, repair the public areas to 1% flood resistance or to 
the next higher level of resistance) 
ii. Flood control measure options (including community participation 
in the CRS program as a non-structural flood control measure) 
b. Output: 
i. Total cumulative cost over time (including the cost of 
implementing flood control measures, as well as the cost of repair 
and upgrade of public areas after flood damage)  
ii. Average cost over time 
iii. Cost versus severity of event (cost for every event, grouped 
according to severity) 
iv. Effects of each measure option on the community (level of 
protection offered by each measure, change in flood zones and 
insurance premium rates for the community residents, social 




The insurer needs to keep premiums affordable, but cannot lose money. Their 
responsibility and decision-making roles are as follows: 
(a) Control homeowner behavior 
(a.1) Encourage policy holders to upgrade their properties and lower the 
risk of flood damage and potential number of claims by setting insurance 
premium rates according to the level of resistance of the homes.  
(b) Stay solvent 
(b.1) Set rates to offset repair costs. 
A computational ABM should combine the influences of the two roles (a) and (b) 
to help design efficient rates. As the discount on the insurance rate increases, then the ABM 
should show a greater number of homeowners proceeding with residential upgrades in 
response to the more attractive discount. This would lead to a decrease in the cost of claims. 
This relationship between the insurance discount and claims cost is plotted in Figure (4-1) 
with the x-axis for the discount and the y-axis for the claim cost. If this relationship is 
concave, and if the total cost for the insurer is linearly increasing with respect to both the 
discount and claims cost, as indicated by the parallel contour lines in this figure, then there 
would be a unique value for the discount where the insurer can minimize cost (maximize 
revenue). This unique value corresponds to the point of tangency indicated in the figure. 
Clearly there is a trade-off between offering more attractive insurance discounts to induce 
homeowner to upgrade, versus the loss of revenue associated with this discount. It is this 
trade-off, quantified by the parallel lines in the figure, along with the homeowner reaction 
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to the discount, quantified by the concave curve that determines the final value for the 
discount. 
The ABM can help inform insurers by investigating different scenarios of 




Fig. (4-1): Diagram of the insurer’s expected costs with respect to discounts. The diagram 
implicitly includes homeowners’ behavior as described in the main text. 
 
(A) Simulation of the number and degree of residential upgrades 
a. Input:  
i. Discount parameter (e.g., 10% discount for each higher level of 








Insurance discounts (more upgraded homes) 
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ii. Homeowner upgrade strategies (e.g., a parameter showing the 
probability that a homeowner will upgrade in response to the 
amount of discount).  
b. Output:  
i. Average amount of residential upgrades 
ii. Total claims, compared with the baseline premiums (no discount) 
 
(B) Solvency calculations 
a. Input:  
i. Insurance premium rates (baseline) 
b. Output:  
i. Difference between premiums collected and output claims over a 
long duration 
 
4.4.4 Federal government 
The federal government has similar roles and responsibilities as the “Insurer” agent 
(NFIP). This means the government needs to keep taxes and fees affordable for the payers; 
at the same time it can exercise control over the “Owner” agent’s behavior by setting the 
fee and discount rates. It is noted that the federal government has other sources of income 
and, hence, solvency is not an issue; nevertheless we will assume that it will be a zero-cost, 
zero-revenue generating entity as we assumed for the insurers. The responsibility and 
decision-making roles for the federal government are as follows: 
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(a) Control owner behavior 
(a.1) Encourage local communities to upgrade their properties and make 
their communities more resilient by offering pre-disaster mitigation grant 
programs (PDM) to help them implement flood control measures. This will 
decrease the potential number of hazard mitigation grant (HMGP) requests 
in the future.  
 
(b) Stay solvent 
(b.1) Set rates to offset repair costs. 
 
As for the analysis of the roles of the insurer, the computational ABM should show 
how the influences of the two roles (a) and (b) can be combined to determine cost-efficient 
rates and the number of pre-disaster mitigation grants (PDM) offered to the communities 




Fig. (4-2): Diagram of the federal government’s expected costs with respect to the number of 
PDM grants. The diagram implicitly includes the behavior of the communities as described in the 
main text. 
 
Figure (4-2) shows the expected cost diagram for the federal government, which 
follows the same pattern as the diagram for insurer’s costs in Figure (4-1). The x-axis shows 
the number of pre-disaster mitigation grants (PDM) offered to the communities to build 
flood control measures and the y-axis shows the number of hazard mitigation grant 
(HMGP) applications after flood damage. The higher number of PDMs offered to upgraded 
communities leads to a higher degree of coastal resiliency and fewer HMGP requests for 
the repair of damaged public areas by local communities, as indicated by the curve in the 
figure. The parallel lines represent the total cost to the federal government, which is 
assumed to increase linearly with respect to both HMGPs and PDMs. The optimal number 
















Number of PDM grants (more measures) 
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The ABM can help inform federal policymakers by investigating different 
scenarios of community behavior while monitoring cash flows and coastal resiliency: 
(A) Simulation of the coastal resiliency of communities 
a. Input:  
i. PDM parameter which governs the number and amount of pre-
disaster mitigation grants offered to the local communities each year 
ii. Community upgrade strategy (e.g., parameter showing the 
probability that a community will upgrade as related to the amount 
of PDM grant – for instance, if there is a 10% increase in the 
amount or number of PDM grants in (i), then the probability that 
the local community will upgrade and add a flood control measure 
is 20%). 
b. Output:  
i. Average degree of coastal resiliency (number of, and the protection 
level offered by, the flood control measures). 
ii. Total number of HMGP requests (for the repair of damaged areas), 
compared with the baseline (in which there are no PDMs and 
therefore no flood control measures) 
 
(B) Solvency 
a. Input:  
i. Budget allocation for coastal resilience 
ii. The number and cost of PDMs offered 
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b. Output:  
i. Difference between budget allocation and output HMGP 







Computational Agent-Based Model for 
Storm-Surge Resilience 
5.1 Introduction 
The purpose of developing the conceptual agent-based model in Chapters 3 and 4 
is to provide the foundation for constructing computational ABMs for storm-surge 
resilience. As noted in the introduction, it is possible to proceed with two types of ABMs: 
(1) a highly detailed model that incorporates all of the agent behaviors and interactions and 
environmental influences that were described in the previous chapters or (2) a simplified 
model with assumptions that reduce complexity and with behaviors and interactions that 
are aggregated to limit the number of agent decision rules. While it may appear that the 
first option would produce the most realistic model, this is arguable because the accuracy 
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of such a model depends highly on data availability. In fact, much of the information 
needed for agent behaviors, such as those that would inform upgrade, retrofit and relocation 
decisions are not available. There is a separate data collection effort within the Hazard 
SEES NSF project to estimate possible behavioral rules; this effort, combined with the 
conceptual ABM presented in Chapters 3 and 4, will lead to the development of a detailed 
computational ABM. 
A simplified ABM would be useful only if it provided insights that would be 
difficult to obtain from a highly detailed ABM. These insights should be valuable by 
themselves, and should also be helpful in future model development. 
In this chapter, we explain how the concepts in the previous two chapters can be 
distilled into a simplified ABM; we then demonstrate the insights that it can provide 
through a series of graphs and results in this and in the following chapter. The equations 
that govern agent behavior provide some of this insight, but the most interesting aggregate 
behavior can be seen through a series of plots that are similar in character as those used in 
economics. It is shown that some insights are possible even before running the 
computational model. In Chapter 7, it is shown how the simplified ABM can be integrated 
into two other models for community resilience, one based on sociology theory and the 
other based on a high-level system dynamics approach. 
The mathematics in this chapter is quite basic: we only need to rely on basic 
decision theory, using expected values (mean values) to handle uncertainties [Benjamin 
2014]. The equations from this theory are used by the agents of the system to determine 
the best choice from each agent’s perspective. Clearly there will be interactions between 
the agents with each decision of each agent affecting the other agents in the system.  
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The chapter begins with a set of assumptions and aggregations needed to simplify 
the conceptual ABM developed in the previous two chapters. Then, the uncertainties 
associated with storm intensity, structural damage and agent characteristics are described 
and used as input into the decision theory equations for agent behaviors. The behavior of 
the insurer is the most complex. While this behavior is determined numerically by 
minimizing costs, it is shown how this behavior can be explained in terms of a contour plot 
that maps insurer cost over household behavior. In Chapter 6, a set of example runs is 
presented to illustrate various possible scenarios of community resilience in the form of 
infrastructure upgrades and building. It is shown how these scenarios develop in response 
to the degree of storm surge hazard, infrastructure cost, and other parameters of the system. 
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5.2 Model Simplifying Assumptions and 
Aggregations 
As noted in the preceding subsection, the first step in building the simplified 
computational ABM is in setting the assumptions of the system and describing the 
aggregation of behaviors and interactions of the conceptual ABM. These are described in 
the following: 
1. Storm 
a. Only a few discrete levels of storm intensities are possible. 
b. Each level of storm is modeled as a T-year event using Bernoulli 
sequence theory. 
c. Each storm subjects all residences with the same hazard risk (i.e., all 
residences experience the same storm hazard). 
2. Residences 
a. Only a few discrete levels of residential damage are possible. 
b. All residential structures have identical: 
i. Cost of repair for each level of damage. 
ii. Cost for upgrade. 
iii. Probabilities of damage for a given storm level intensity, 
level of damage, upgrade status (upgrade or no upgrade) and 




a. All homeowners have identical cost of suffering for each level of 
damage that is not covered by insurance. 
b. Each homeowner has a different cost of risk (cost of worry): 
i. This cost is zero if the residence is upgraded. 
ii. This cost is included in the decision rule for considering an 
upgrade. 
c. Each homeowner has a different level of affordability: 
i. Affordability is quantified by a budget allocation for 
insurance, residential upgrade and tax (if any) for a 
community measure. It is not related to cost of suffering or 
cost of risk. 
ii. Homeowners will always pay the insurance and tax, even if 
the sum is above their budget allocations. 
iii. Homeowners will consider the upgrade only if they can 
afford it. These homeowners will follow a separate decision 
rule on the upgrade that is related to expected costs. 
4. Insurer 
a. There is only a single insurer that will serve as an aggregated entity 
that will perform the following services: 
i. Collect the identical insurance fee from all homeowners. 
ii. Pay the complete cost of repairs (i.e., no deductible), but 
none of the cost of suffering. 
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iii. Provide the same insurance fee discount to any homeowner 
who has upgraded their residence. 
iv. Collect (on behalf of the community) a tax to pay for a 
community measure if the homeowners decide to build the 
measure. This tax is the same for all homeowners and is 
simply added to the insurance fee. 
b. The insurer adjusts the discount and insurance fee in the following 
manner: 
i. The discount rate is set to minimize loss. 
ii. The fee is set so that there is no net profit or loss. 
5. System timeline 
a. The cost of upgrades and the cost of any measure are distributed 
over a fixed number of years at a constant monetary discount rate. 
b. All upgrades and any measure are built at the following time: 
i. Time 0 before expected costs are computed. 
ii. No further upgrades or measure is considered until after the 
time period in 5a. 
c. The time period in 5a is sufficiently short so that it is not necessary 
to consider inflation, depreciation, or structural degradation. 
While these simplifications are quite broad, it will be shown in the following how 
a computational ABM that is based on the above exhibits complex behaviors and can 
provide useful insights into the system characteristics. It is noted that items 3b and 3c give 
homeowners a distribution of risk aversion and purchasing power behaviors that we will 
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be able to explore in several ways using simple visualization tools. Items 4a and b govern 
market behavior that results in feedback wherein an individual homeowner’s decision on 
upgrading indirectly affects other homeowners’ decisions. Finally, item 2b on the costs of 
improvements do not produce linear effects on the system due to the reactive adjustments 
in homeowner decisions on upgrades and insurer decisions on fees and discounts. 
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5.3 Homeowner’s Decision Tree 
We begin the development of the computational ABM with the decision tree of the 
homeowner, which governs most of the behavior of this class of agents. Figure (5-1) shows 
a decision tree and the pathways and outcomes associated with the various possible 
decisions and states [Clemen 2000]. In this case, the decision is to upgrade or not upgrade 
the homeowner’s property. Once this decision is made, there are two states to consider: the 
possibility of a storm and the possibility of damage due to the storm. According to 
assumptions 5a and b, the decision is only made once at the beginning of an X-year interval 
with cost evenly distributed over every year of this time interval. According to assumption 
5c, we do not have to consider variations in costs due to inflation or depreciation or 
variations in the residential structural strength due to degradation. Taken together, this 
implies that we can perform the analysis of the decision tree by considering only a single 
year during the X-year interval. Finally, with assumption 1b on the Bernoulli sequence 
property of storms, we only need to consider either zero or one storm during this single 
year. Assumption 1a indicates that several types of storms are possible. We only consider 
one level of storm intensity in the diagram; it is straightforward to extend this to multiple 
levels, and this is done in by inserting summations in the equations associated with this 
decision tree. 
With assumption 1c, we can consider all houses of the community to be located in 
a single flood zone, sharing the same risk of flooding. We assumption 2b, we can consider 
all houses to be at the same level of flood resiliency, meaning they all have the same risk 






Fig. (5-1): Rational homeowner’s decision tree. 
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Following standard analysis procedures for decision trees, we determine the cost 
associated with each pathway in the tree. This is done simply by adding any fixed costs 
associated with the decision and the costs associated with the states. This is explained in 
more detail in the following. 
The decision tree in Figure (5-1) starts on the left side of the figure indicating the 
initial state of the property and the initial insurance premium for the property. Moving to 
the right there are two main branches for the two possible decisions made by the 
homeowner. In the top branch the homeowner decides not to upgrade. This decision has no 
additional cost to the homeowner. The insurance premium remains unchanged. 
In the bottom branch, the homeowner decides to upgrade the house. This decision 
adds the annual cost of upgrade to the total costs but also causes a reduction in the insurance 
premium. To compute the annual cost of the upgrade, we use assumptions 5a and c as 
follows: begin with the total cost of the upgrade; add this cost to the value of the house at 
the end of the X-year analysis period with no loss due to degradation or inflation; discount 
to the current value using the discount rate in assumption 5a; and divide the difference 
between current and discounted future costs by the number of years X during which the 
costs are distributed to arrive at the final result. 
The insurance discount (or reduced insurance premium) is used in the model 
because, as noted in Chapters 3 and 4, the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) 
encourages homeowners to upgrade their properties by offering reduced insurance 
premiums to those homeowners who upgrade their houses.  
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Moving to the right on either branch of the tree, there are two possible states: 
whether or not there is a storm event in one year during which the expected costs of the 
homeowner are being evaluated. These possible states divide each one of the main branches 
of the decision tree into a secondary division with labels “storm” or “no storm.” 
Each storm has a return period and associated probability of occurrence during one 
year. According to Bernoulli sequence theory, a T-year storm has a probability of 1/T of 
occurring each year. This probability is indicated in Figure (5-1) as P [storm]; the 
complement event of no storm has probability of occurrence 1 – P [storm]. If there is no 
storm, there will be no damage; therefore, there are no additional costs to be considered in 
the total costs shown at the right of the figure. If there is a storm, there will be one more 
division of branches with two possible states after the occurrence of a storm: “damage” or 
“no damage.” The probability of “damage” as a result of a storm is shown as P 
[damage│storm] in Figure (5-1) and the probability of “no damage” is shown as  
1 – P [damage│storm].  
If there is no damage to the property, there will be no additional costs for the 
homeowner; thus, the total cost at the end of each branch will be the same as the case where 
there was no storm. When damage occurs, however, there will be the cost of repair plus 
the cost of suffering from flooding (including the clean up after flooding, emotional effects, 
etc.) minus the repair funds provided by the insurance company through insurance claims. 
The total cost associated with each sequence of decision and states is shown at the 
end of each branch of the decision tree in Figure (5-1). To calculate the expected cost for 
each decision, we use the utility function as shown in equation (5-1): 
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E [C] = Cstate_1 * P [state_1] + …+ Cstate_n * P [state_n]    (5-1) 
Where E [C] is the expected value of cost C, Cstate_j is the cost associated with state_j, 
and P [state_j] is the probability of state_j. For the decision tree of Figure (5-1) the expected 
cost of each decision is determined by considering all possible storms and possible levels 
of storm damages is calculated in equations (5-2) through (5-6) below.  
E [C│upgrade] =        (5-2) 
     (Insurance premium + Cupgrade – insurance discount) * (100%) +  
     P [storm] * P [damage│storm, upgrade] * (Crepair – insurance claim + Csuffering) 
 
Here, E [C│upgrade] is the total expected cost of an upgraded property, Cupgrade is the 
annual cost of the upgrade, Crepair is the cost of repair, and Csuffering is the cost of suffering.  
As noted under assumption 4a.ii, the entire repair cost of the house after flood 
damage is covered by insurance claim funds, i.e., Crepair = insurance claim. Hence, the only 
remaining cost associated with storm damage is Csuffering. We simplify equation (5-2) with 
this assumption, and then include N levels of storm intensities and M levels of damage as 
specified in assumptions 1a and 2a to arrive at the following: 
E [C│upgrade] = (Insurance premium + Cupgrade – insurance discount) + 
     ∑ ∑ P [storm]  ∗  P [damage│storm, upgrade]  ∗ C    (5-3) 
Here, damage  corresponds to damage level_k, storm corresponds to storm level_j. The 
summation, which is the expected cost associated with suffering from storm damage, 
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appears frequently in the analysis that follows. So we introduce the following notation for 
this important quantity: 
ESupgrade = ∑ ∑ P [storm]  ∗  P [damage│storm, upgrade]  ∗ C   (5-4) 
The expected cost associated with the “no upgrade” decision is similar with two 
modifications. First, the only fixed cost is the insurance premium. Second, the conditional 
probability of damage given a storm is changed with the upgrade condition replaced by the 
no upgrade condition. Numerically, this would result in an increased conditional 
probability of damage. The result is written as follows: 
E [C│no upgrade] = Insurance premium + ESno upgrade      (5-5) 
ESno upgrade = 
  ∑ ∑ P [storm]  ∗  P [damage│storm, no upgrade]  ∗ C     (5-6) 
Here, ESno upgrade is the expected cost of suffering in case of no upgrade in the property. 
5.4 Rational Homeowners 
At this point we have determined the total cost of each branch of the decision tree; 
hence, it should be relatively easy to predict the expected behavior of the homeowners. 
Indeed, this would be the case if all homeowners are rational decision makers who will 
upgrade their property when the expected cost of the upgrade is less than or equal to the 
expected cost of no upgrade: 
E [C│upgrade] ≤ E [C│no upgrade]      (5-7) 
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If we substitute the expressions for the expected costs from equations (5-3) to (5-6) and 
solve for insurance discount, we will have the following result, written in terms of the 
expected costs of suffering: 
Insurance discount ≥ Cupgrade – (ESno upgrade – ESupgrade)   (5-8) 
On the right side of the equation, the difference of terms in parentheses is the reduction in 
the expected cost of suffering due to the upgrade; it is the benefit associated with the 
upgrade. If this benefit exceeds the cost of the upgrade, then the rational homeowner should 
proceed with the upgrade, even without any insurance discount. If, on the other hand, this 
benefit is less than the cost of upgrade, then the rational homeowner would proceed with 
the upgrade only if the discount covers the difference in costs, which is what is shown in 
equation (5-8). From the point of view of the insurer, the quantity on the right is a 
fundamental quantity because it defines the minimum discount at which the rational 
homeowner would consider the upgrade decision. Hereafter, we call this quantity the 
“Rational discount rate:” 
Rational discount rate = Cupgrade – (ESno upgrade – ESupgrade)   (5-9) 
It is straightforward to show the above relations graphically. In Figure (5-2), we 
plot proportion of homeowners who choose not to upgrade as a function of the insurance 
discount rate. According to the preceding discussion, the rational discount rate is the critical 
value of interest. If the insurer offers a discount that is less than this critical value, then no 
one will upgrade; alternatively, if the insurer offers a discount rate that is greater than this 




Fig. (5-2): Rational homeowner’s behavior in response to the rate of insurance discount. 
 
This binary all-or-nothing homeowner response scenario will occur because at 
present, all homeowners are modeled with identical behaviors. We have not yet included 
two important factors: risk aversion and affordability of the homeowner. In the real world, 
different people have different levels of risk aversion, and different levels of available 
financial resources for upgrading their property. Risk aversion is the behavior of humans 
exposed to uncertainty that seeks to reduce that uncertainty. Here, the behavioral option 
for the homeowners is to upgrade their properties to reduce the risk of flooding. 
Affordability is an important constraint that can prevent a homeowner to even consider an 
upgrade, even if an upgrade would lead to lower expected costs. The assumptions 
underlying risk aversion and affordability, briefly described under assumptions 3b and c, 
will be examined in detail in the following sections.  
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5.5 Effects of Risk Aversion 
In the previous section we generated a decision tree, calculated expected costs, and 
determined the condition for which a homeowner would choose to upgrade under the 
assumption that every homeowner is rational (with no risk aversion) and can afford to 
upgrade. In this section we analyze the effect of risk aversion on decision making. 
Affordability is analyzed in the next subsection. 
 
5.5.1 Decision Tree for Risk Averse Owners 
Figure (5-3) shows the decision tree with addition of the cost of risk. The risk 
aversion cost is added to the top main branch where the homeowner decides not to upgrade 
the house and the house is at a higher risk of flooding compared to the upgraded house. In 
the bottom branch, the homeowner upgrades the house, and there is no cost of risk 
associated with this decision. It is noted that if there were two costs of risk, one associated 
with the no upgrade decision and the other associated with the upgrade decision, we can 
simply subtract the latter from the former to arrive at a modified cost of risk for the no 
upgrade decision and zero cost of risk for the upgrade decision. Hence, assumption 3b.i 
that assigns no cost of risk to the upgrade decision is not limiting. 
It follows that the costs associated with the (lower) upgrade branch of the decision 
tree are identical to those of the decision tree of the rational homeowner in the preceding 
subsection. Hence, the expected cost given the upgrade decision is also unchanged. 
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The expected cost given a no upgrade decision differs from the rational homeowner 
result only by the addition of the cost of risk, denoted as Crisk. Hence the result is a slight 
modification of equation (5-5): 
E [C│no upgrade] = Insurance premium + Crisk + ESno upgrade  (5-10) 
As noted in assumption 3a, the value of Crisk is different for each homeowner. Hence, the 
uniform behavior that was noted for the rational homeowner case in the preceding 
subsection will no longer hold. A special case to note is the when the cost of risk exceeds 
the cost of upgrade, Crisk > Cupgrade. In this case, the homeowner would choose to upgrade, 
regardless of any insurance discount, the cost of risk and the expected cost of suffering 
associated with no upgrade would exceed the cost of upgrade and the reduced expected 






Fig. (5-3): Risk averse homeowners’ decision tree. 
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5.5.2 Effects of the Cost of Risk on Insurance 
Discounts 
We have utilized a log-normal distribution function for the cost of risk of the 
homeowners. Before we can analyze the effects of the cost of risk on homeowner decision-
making with respect to the insurance discount rate, it is necessary to quantify the variability 
in the costs of risk. This is done by using a cumulative distribution function (CDF). Figure 
(5-4) shows the diagram of the CDF, F (Crisk), for the cost of risk for risk-averse 
homeowners. The diagram shows the proportion of homeowners with cost of risk ≤ C (e.g., 
as indicated on the diagram, 80% of homeowners have cost of risk ≤ Crisk 1). The cumulative 
distribution function is simply the normalized integral of the histogram of Crisk for all 
homeowners. 
A variety of parametric models can be used for this CDF; the only restriction is that 
the cost of risk should always be positive. (We do not allow homeowners to prefer higher 




Fig. (5-4): Cumulative distribution function (CDF) of cost of risk for risk-averse homeowners. 
 
If we substitute equation (5-10) into equation (5-7), we will have the following 
condition for homeowners choosing the upgrade option: 
Insurance discount + Crisk ≥  Cupgrade – (ESno upgrade – ESupgrade) 
= Rational discount rate   (5-11) 
Compared with the inequality in equation (5-9) for the rational homeowner, it can be seen 
that the required discount needed to induce homeowners to upgrade is lower than before, 
by the amount Crisk. In other words, the cost of risk acts as a supplement to the insurance 
discount. If the sum of these two quantities is equal to the rational discount rate, then the 
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homeowner is indifferent with respect to the upgrade decision; when it is smaller, the 
homeowner will not upgrade, otherwise the homeowner will upgrade. 
Since the cost of risk is different for each homeowner, we will need to determine 
the proportion of homeowners who will choose to upgrade or not upgrade. It is simpler to 
consider the latter because it is compatible with the definition of the CDF: 
Proportion of homeowners who will not upgrade    (5-12) 
     = Proportion of homeowners with Crisk  Rational discount rate – Discount 
     = F (Rational discount rate – Discount) 
Figure (5-2) needs to be modified to include this CDF. This is done by introducing 
the CDF of the cost of risk into the figure, as shown in Figure (5-5) and as explained in the 
following. The dashed line is taken from Figure (5-2); it represents the proportional of 
rational homeowners who do not choose the upgrade option. This corresponds to the case 
when Crisk = 0, with a vertical line to 100% at the rational insurance discount rate. Below 
the horizontal axis, there are two braces indicating a discount and Crisk that add up to the 
rational insurance discount. As noted after equation (5-11): 
 If Insurance discount + Crisk = rational insurance discount, then the homeowner is 
indifferent to the upgrade decision. 
 For smaller values of Crisk, the homeowner will not upgrade. Hence, in the figure, the 
proportion of homeowners who will not upgrade should correspond to the CDF of Crisk. 
This implies that the large vertical arrow shown in the figure should be equal to F (Crisk) 
and should be placed at a distance Crisk to the left of the rational insurance discount. 
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Hence, the CDF is plotted in the reverse direction, with F (0) plotted at the rational 
insurance discount, as shown. 
 The height of this curve is the proportion of households that choose not to upgrade, and 
the distance from the curve to the 100% level is the remaining proportion of households 
who do upgrade. 
This diagram shows that even when there is no insurance discount, a proportion of 
the homeowners with a high degree of risk aversion will decide to upgrade their house. As 
the discount rate increases, more homeowners find it reasonable to upgrade. When the rate 
of insurance discount reaches the rational insurance discount of equation (5-11), then all 
homeowners decide to upgrade their homes. This is expected because this point 
corresponds to Crisk = 0, which defines the rational homeowner; we already know that such 




Fig. (5-5): Risk-averse homeowner’s behavior in response to the rate of insurance discount. 
 
5.6 Effects of the Affordability Constraint 
In the analysis of the preceding subsection, we assumed that all homeowners can 
afford the upgrade. In reality, a proportion of homeowners may not be able to afford to 
upgrade even at high levels of insurance discounts. In the present section, we introduce 
affordability into the equations and discuss how it affects the decisions of homeowners. 
Figure (5-6) shows a sample CDF of affordability, plotted with respect to the 
insurance discount rate. It can be seen that when there is no discount, then only 20% of the 
homeowners have the resources to consider the upgrade option. When the discount is set 




Fig. (5-6): Cumulative distribution function (CDF) of homeowners’ affordability to upgrade. 
 
To be consistent with previous diagrams, it is convenient to show the proportion of 
homeowners who will not upgrade. This is simply the complement of the CDF, as shown 
in Figure (5-7), in which the vertical axis shows the proportion of homeowners who cannot 




Fig. (5-7): Complementary cumulative distribution function (CCFD) of homeowners’ 
affordability to upgrade. 
 
As noted in assumption 3c, the affordability constraint will affect the homeowners’ 
decisions to upgrade regardless of the expected costs associated with upgrading and not 
upgrading. Hence, even the most risk averse homeowner will not be able to upgrade if this 
option is unaffordable. Figure (5-13) is a modification of Figure (5-5) that accounts for this 
effect of affordability. The dashed line curve is the proportion of homeowners who will not 
upgrade, when affordability is not accounted for, i.e., it is the curve shown in Figure (5-5). 
The solid curve is the proportion in which the affordability constraint is included. The 
difference between these curves is related to the proportion of homeowners who cannot 




Fig. (5-8): Risk-averse homeowner behavior in response to the rate of insurance discount and 
accounting for upgrade affordability. 
 
5.7 Optimal Flood Insurance Discount 
Figure (5-8) of the previous section shows the proportions of homeowners who will 
upgrade or not upgrade their homes in response to the insurer discount rates. The insurer 
can use this information to adjust their discount rate to minimize loss, thereby satisfying 
assumption 4b.i. The insurer would also use this same information to set insurance 
premium rates so that they would not experience any net profit or loss, to satisfy assumption 
4b.ii. The two conditions, minimized and zero loss, are actually coupled through this 
diagram, as explained in the following. 
To begin, we compute total loss. First, we define the expected costs of repair of a 
single residence, given that the residence is upgraded and not upgraded: 
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ERupgrade = ∑ ∑ P [storm] ∗ P [damage│storm, upgrade] ∗ Crepair,k 
           (5-13) 
ERno upgrade = ∑ ∑ P [storm] ∗ P [damage│storm, no upgrade] ∗ Crepair,k 
           (5-14) 
Then, for every discount and for every proportion of non-upgrading households, the loss is 
given by scaling the above expected costs by the proportion of households that opt to 
upgrade (Pupgrade) and not upgrade (Pno upgrade), summing the results along with the discount, 
which also must be scaled by Pupgrade, and subtracting the insurance premium fee, which 
offsets the loss: 
 Loss = ERupgrade * Pupgrade + ERno upgrade * Pno upgrade – fee + discount * Pupgrade  
           (5-15) 
In Figure (5-9) the contours of loss are shown along with the curve, from Figure (5-8) of 
the proportion of non-upgrading homeowners. The general trend in the insurer’s loss is 
indicated in the figure: losses increase in the upward direction because there is a larger 
proportion of households that do not upgrade, leading to an increase in the expected cost 
of repair. Losses also increase in the rightward direction because of the larger rates of 
discounted premiums for upgraded properties. The optimum discount rate is where the 
household indifference curve and the loss contours meet at the lowest expected cost for the 
insurance company. This point is marked by r*discount in Figure (5-9) and is the point of 




Fig. (5-9): Insurance losses and the optimal discount rate. 
5.8 Time Series 
It is customary to view costs using a time-series plot, in which the horizontal axis 
is time and the vertical axis is some measure of cumulative cost. This would be for a 
particular realization of the computational ABM, as described in the following: 
 Each year is characterized by either no storms or a storm at a particular intensity, as 
determined by the Bernoulli sequence model for the storms. 
 If there is a storm in any given year, then each residence is characterized by some level 
of damage (including the possibility of no damage), as determined by the conditional 
probabilities of damage given the upgrade or no upgrade status of the residence. 
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 Once these damage states are determined, then the repair costs are computed for each 
residence and summed. 
 The insurer’s reserve is computed by summing all collected insurance fees (minus any 
discounts) and subtracting the costs of repair. 
Figure (5-10) is an illustration of how these results can be shown with time-series plots. 
The solid line in the upper plot of the figure shows the gradual accumulation of the insurer’s 
reserves with time due to the yearly collection of fees. The slope of this line is equal to the 
sum of all household insurance premium fees minus any discounts. Sharp drops in the 
reserves occur with each storm because of the cost of repairs of residences damaged by the 
storm. The magnitude of each drop is equal to the total cost of repair for each storm. 
If we include changes in the insurance fees and the discount rate, which are plotted 
in the middle and lower plots of the figure, then the slope of the insurance reserves plot 
would change. An increase in fees may be needed if the repair costs and/or storm frequency 
are higher than expected, and an increase in the discount rate may be needed if the number 
of upgrades is lower than expected. The growth of insurers’ reserves after increasing the 
rate of discount is illustrated with a dotted line in Figure (5-10). As expected, the dotted 
line has a smaller slope due to the reduced rates. However, the drop in reserves during a 
storm event is expected to be smaller in magnitude due to an increase in the number of 
upgrades and the associated lower cost of repair. If the insurers increase the insurance 
premiums, the insurance reserves will grow more rapidly and the slope of the line will 
increase as shown with a dashed line in Figure (5-10). These changes in the insurance fees 
and discount are shown here for illustrative purposes only; while they would be 
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straightforward to implement, they are not considered any further in this thesis until the 






Fig. (5-10): Time series of the insurance company reserves, and the associated fees and discount rates.
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5.9 Community Upgrade: Flood Control 
Measure 
Implementing a flood control measure can have a significant impact on improving 
coastal resiliency and reducing the risk of coastal flooding. After the addition of a flood 
control measure, the probability of damage after a storm event decreases for both upgraded 
and not upgraded properties. Furthermore, a measure may lead to a change in the flood 
zones, which will decrease the flood insurance premiums for the residents of the 
community. In our computational ABM, we assume that all of the houses are in the same 
flood zone with similar risk of flooding (assumption 1b) and all homeowners pay the same 
flood insurance premiums with the same discount if the residence is upgraded (assumption 
4a). We also assume the addition of a flood control measure offers the same reduced 
probability of damage for each storm intensity for all non-upgraded residences, with a 
similar statement also applying for all upgraded residences (assumption 2b). 
It may appear that a measure, with its protective capabilities, would automatically 
result in decreased cost savings for everyone in the community. This is not necessarily true. 
There are several feedback mechanisms within the system that cause the improved 
resilience of the community to be less than what may be expected from a community 
measure. To understand this more fully, we examine the impacts of a community measure 
on costs and homeowner decision-making in more detail in the following sections. 
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5.9.1 Cost of Community Upgrade 
In the conceptual model develop in Chapter 3, we noted that the cost of building 
flood control measures are often partially covered by Pre-Disaster Mitigation grants (PDM) 
provided to the local communities by the government, with the local community covering 
any remaining costs. We also noted that community residents pay taxes to the community 
as well as to the government. For the computational ABM, we simplify these relations 
consider the cost of building a measure to be equally divided between the homeowners of 
the coastal community in which the measure is to be built (assumption 4a.iv). The cost is 
collected from the homeowners as an additional fee, which we call a “measure fee.” This 
measure fee will be added to the insurance fee and will result in an increase the total costs 
to the homeowners; hence this fee may affect their financial ability to upgrade their 
property, as determined by each homeowner’s affordability (assumption 3c). Building the 
measure, however, will decrease the probability of flood damage and associated costs of 
damage, which will lead to two counteracting effects: First the reduced cost of damage 
would lead to a decrease in the insurance fee. Since the reduced costs would apply to both 
houses with and without upgrade, then, according to equation (5-12), there may be more 
homeowners who opt not to pay for an upgrade, which would tend to increase expected 
costs of repair, leading to an increase in the insurance fee. Clearly there are many 
interacting effects that will occur with the introduction of a community flood-protection 
measure. These multiple effects are more easily understood through a series of diagrams 
and examples, which are presented in section 5.10.   
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5.10 Utility of the Measure at the Homeowner 
and Community Levels 
The computational ABM handles the decision rules of the homeowners who must 
choose between upgrading and not upgrading as well as the insurer who must set fees and 
discounts. The decision of proceeding with a community measure is more subtle. We will 
not be able to address this topic until Chapter 7, where we bring in tools of quantitative 
sociology. To prepare for this analysis, we will need a measure of utility. 
We express the utility for homeowner i in the form of a Cobb-Douglas utility 
function that contains a term associated with the homeowner as an individual and the 
homeowner as a member of the community: 
 = ,
 
        (5-16) 
Here, ,  is the utility of the homeowner as an individual expressed in 
terms of some level of resource  minus all net costs associated with storm hazards: 
, =  − E[│upgrade status , no measure]   (5-17) 
′, =  − E[│upgrade status , measure]  
We use the prime to indicate a community with a protective storm measure. 
Upgrade status  refers to either upgrade or no upgrade, which is determined for 
homeowner i through the computational ABM. 
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The utility of the homeowner as a member of the community is expressed in one of 
two ways. The first is simply by using the average of the above: 
 =  − E[│upgrade status, no measure]
   (5-18) 
′ =  − E[│upgrade status, measure]
  
The other way is to use the average monetary of the households to pay for the 
insurance, any measure and any upgrade. This includes the insurance fee minus the 
discount, in which the discount is only for households that upgrade and the fee includes 
any cost of the measure. These are the monetary cost that are not related to suffering and 
risk, and would correspond to the first few terms of equations (5-3) and (5-5): 
 =  − Insurance fee − (, − dıscount)  (5-19) 
′ =  − Insurance fee − (, − dıscount)  
With our computational ABM, we are able to obtain values for all of the above 
terms that are needed to find the utilities in equation (5-16), given the values of the 
individual resources  and the exponents . In the results presented herein, we use a 
common value for the resource  that is sufficiently high so that the utilities are always 
positive. The exponent  represents the degree of interest of homeowner i in supporting 
community activities such as the financing and construction of a storm-protective measure. 
This exponent has the following interpretation:  
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 = 1:  utility based only on community welfare, with no interest in self 
 = 0:  utility based only on self, with no interest in community welfare 
0 <  < 1: utility that includes both self and community interests.  
As  increases from 0 to 1, then the homeowner utility  varies from ,  
to  . Hence, this exponent can be viewed as the degree to which the homeowner 
acts in the interest of the community. In the next section, the behavior of the homeowner 
utility  as a function of the exponent  will be illustrated through a series of numerical 
examples.  
5.11 Summary 
In this chapter we utilized decision theory in our agent-based model (ABM) and 
modeled several scenarios to provide an understanding into different aspects of community 
resilience. We were able to derive mathematical relationships for the key economic 
quantities that govern individual and insurer decisions, including the fees to set for 
insurance, discounts to offer for those that upgrade their homes, and the decisions for the 
homeowners regarding residential upgrades and the financial support of a community 
flood-mitigation measure. We were also able to describe the emergent economic behaviors 
of the actors through a sequence of level-plots. In the next chapter, we present a parameter 







Parameter Study of Storm-Surge Resilience 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we present a series of results generated by the computational ABM 
described in Chapter 5. These results illustrate how the ABM can be used to assess the 
impact of the effectiveness and cost of the upgrades and measure and the costs associated 
with repair and suffering. 
An outline of the ABM runs is given the following: 
1. Baseline. Here we describe the parameters of the ABM in detail and explain 
the meaning of the plots generated by the model. In this and all other cases 
below, we begin with a model run in which there is no community measure 
before proceeding to the case where there is a measure. 
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2. Less costly property upgrades. 
a. No change in upgrade effectiveness. In this case, we decrease the 
cost of residential upgrades by 30%, as compared with the baseline 
runs. The effectiveness of the upgrades is unchanged. 
b. More effective property upgrades. The difference between this case 
and the preceding case is that we consider more effective upgrades, 
in which the probability of damage given a storm is reduced by 40%. 
c. More effective property upgrades with a more costly measure. Here, 
we increase the cost of the measure by a factor of two, while keeping 
all of the other parameters of the preceding case the same. 
3. More effective measure. This case differs from the baseline case in that the 
measure is twice as effective, in which the probability of damage given a 
storm is reduced by 50%. 
4. Higher cost of repair. Here, the difference from baseline is in the cost of 
repair: this cost is doubled. 
5. Higher cost of suffering. The cost of suffering is increased by 60% while all 
other parameters are the same as the baseline case.  
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6.2 Baseline without the community measure 
We begin the description of the baseline case by briefly summarizing the 
computational procedure in the ABM. In our ABM we have considered a fairly uniform 
community in which all homes have a similar risk of flooding, insurance premium rates, 
cost of upgrade, and probability of damage. The cost of risk and affordability are not equal 
for all homeowners in our model and are distributed using lognormal, and normal 
distribution functions, respectively. The model is run with no flood control measure and 
again after adding a flood control measure.  
The ABM generates intermediate results for a range of values for the insurance 
premium rates. For each value of the premium, the ABM calculates the rational discount 
rate, plots the indifference curve and solves the equations to calculate the expected costs 
of repair and suffering. The ABM then determines the contours of the insurer's cost and 
finds the optimal discount rate by finding the point where the indifference curve intersects 
the contour of the insurer’s cost with the lowest cost. The ABM then determines what 
proportion of the community is upgraded.  
We have assumed the insurers are not-for-profit and operate so that they do not 
incur long-term expected losses. To achieve these goals, the intermediate results with 
varying insurance premiums are used to determine, by linear interpolation, the insurance 
premium rates that lead to no profit; we call this the “optimal premium rate,” hereafter. The 
ABM is then run once again at the optimal premium rate to determine the optimal discount 
rate, the upgrade status and expected costs of each homeowner, and checks that the insurer 
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profit is close to zero. In the following, we only show the results corresponding to the 
optimal premium rate. 
We have showed expected costs of intangibles such as suffering and risk in terms 
of US Dollars (USD) on the plots to make the results easier to interpret. In this manner, we 
can see how the model outputs depend on input variables, such as the insurance premiums 
and upgrade costs, with the same units of value. 
The ABM results are presented in the following sections for all cases listed in the 
introduction with and without a community flood control measure. We begin with the 
baseline case with input variables as shown in the Table (6-1) below; then, we changed the 
input variables one by one or in combinations to model different scenarios and see how 
they affect the ABM outcome.  
It should be noted that for each house, whether upgraded or not upgraded, two 
levels of damage have been considered in the model: low- or high-level damage. The 
probabilities of damage for upgraded houses have been considered to be six times smaller 
than those of non-upgraded houses. Hence, we have used a probability reduction factor to 
create the matrix of probability of damage for upgraded houses. 
P [damagek | stormj, upgrade] = P [damagek | stormj, no-upgrade] / 6  (6-1) 
Similarly, after adding a measure to the community, the probabilities of damage 
after each possible storm event will decrease. This decrease in probability of damage is 
calculated by a matrix factor as shown in Table (6-1). 
In Table (6-1), the time period for distributing the cost of upgrades and any measure 
is 10 years; this is the time period in assumption 5a, Chapter 5. An upgrade is assumed to 
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raise the value of the house; hence the net cost is the difference between the present cost 
of the upgrade and the discounted future value, distributed over 10 years. In this 
calculations, we used a monetary discount value of 5%. Like all other model input 
variables, the value for the monetary discount rate can be modified; for instance, this value 
may be as high as 20%. The cost of construction and maintenance of a flood control 
measure is added to the total annual costs for all homeowners.  
Table (6-1): Parameter values for the baseline case. 
Description Values 
Insurance premium rate 
Intermediate runs: $0, $1K, $2K, $3K, $4K, or 
$5K/year; final result obtained using the no 
profit/no loss condition. 
Yearly probability of storm 
0.005, 0.01, and 0.02 (for the 200-, 100-, and 
50-year storms) 
P [damage low | storm, no upgrade] 
0.09, 0.15, 0.40 (for the 200-, 100-, and 50-
year storms) 
P [damage high | storm, no upgrade] 
0.90, 0.45, 0.15 (for the 200-, 100-, and 50-
year storms) 
Reduction in the probabilities of damage for 
upgraded residences 0.17 
Reduction in the probabilities of damage after 
adding a community protection measure 
0.7, 0.3, 0.1 (for the 200-, 100-, and 50-year 
storms) 
Cost of suffering 80K, 20K (for high and low damage) 
Cost of repair 90K, 20K (for high and low damage) 
Time period for distributing the cost of the 
upgrade and measure 10 years 
Monetary discount rate 5% 
Cost of upgrade 40K 
Cost of upgrade – discounted future value, 
distributed over the above time period. 1.5K/year 
Cost of measure per house $500/year 




Figure (6-1) shows the probability density function (PDF) and the cumulative 
distribution function (CDF) for the cost of risk of the community residents. The CDF values 
generated by the ABM are plotted as red dots. The blue lines show the theoretical values 
for the PDF and CDF. The graphs shown in Figure (6-1) remain the same for all cases in 













Table (6-2) shows a summary of the results from the baseline model when there is 
no flood control measure. 
Table (6-2): ABM results for the baseline case without community measure. 
Description Values 
ESno upgrade $1159/year 
ESupgrade $197/year 
ERno upgrade $1279/year 
ERupgrade $217/year 
Rational discount rate $582 
Optimal annual insurance premium rate $821 
Optimal annual discount $338 
Homeowners’ expected annual cost per house $2335 
Proportion of homeowners who don’t upgrade 36% 
 
Figure (6-2) shows the probability density function (PDF) and the complementary 
cumulative distribution function (CCDF) for the affordability of the community residents 
to upgrade, as a function of the insurance discounts. The values generated by the ABM are 
plotted as red dots. The blue lines show the theoretical values for the PDF and the CCDF. 
We have plotted the CCDF rather than the CDF to follow the analysis process described 
earlier for determining the optimal discount rate (as shown in Figures 6-6 and 6-7). 
The total annual costs for the homeowners will depend on the base insurance 
premium, tax associated with any measure which is added to the premium, and the level of 
discount for upgrades. Figure (6-3), which is nearly identical to Figure (6-2), shows how 
the affordability of homeowners changes according to the level of discount in insurance 
premiums. As expected, a higher proportion of homeowners can afford an upgrade as the 
 
137 
insurance discount increases. The only difference in Figure (6-3) is the addition of a vertical 
line showing the rational discount rate as calculated in equation (5-9). 
 
 












Fig. (6-3): Proportion of homeowners who cannot afford to upgrade as a function of the insurance 
discount, plotted along with the rational discount rate. 
 
The top graph in Figure (6-4) shows the indifference curve before (blue line) and 
after (red line) considering the affordability of the homeowners. The vertical dashed line 
shows the rational discount rate; these curves correspond to those shown in the theoretical 
development in Figures (5-5) and (5-8). In the bottom graph of Figure (6-4), the 
indifference curve is plotted over a contour plot. The contours correspond to various levels 
of the costs for the insurer that were used in Figure (5-9) and are computed using equation 
(5-15). It was noted that the tangent point of intersection of the indifference curve with the 
contour of the lowest cost for the insurer determines the optimal discount rate and the 
proportion of households that choose not to upgrade. This point is indicated by a red circle 
in Figure (6-4); it can be seen that the value of the cost for the insurer is close to zero. This 
is expected because the insurer is non-profit. The figure shows that the optimal discount 
rate is $338 per house and about 64% of homeowners will upgrade their house (36% will 
not upgrade). These results are also shown in Table (6-2).  












Fig. (6-4): Indifference curve and contour plot of the insurer’s costs for the baseline case. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the levels for the contour plot are calculated from equation 
(5-15): 











































With a few simple steps, we can find the slope of these contour lines. For convenience, we 
define: 
X =  insurance discount  
Y =  proportion of homeowners who don’t upgrade (Pno upgrade) 
Ifee =  insurance premium fee 
Icost =  cost for the insurer (loss) 
C =  difference in expected repair costs with and without upgrade 
 =  ERupgrade – ERno upgrade 
Then, according to equation (5-15), we have 
Icost =  ERupgrade (1 – Y) + ERno upgrade Y – Ifee + X (1 – Y)  
 =  ERupgrade – Y (C + X) – Ifee + X     (6-2) 
Since each curve of the contour plot for the cost of the insurer corresponds to a constant 
value of Icost, the derivative of the last equation must be zero. Hence, to find the slopes of 
the contour lines, we solve the equation below: 
dIcost / dX  =  0  =  –dY / dX (C + X) – Y  + 1 = 0 
The final result for the slopes of the contour lines for insurer cost is obtained by solving 
for dY / dX: 
dY / dX  =  (1 – Y) / (C + X)  
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One immediate conclusion of this result is that the contour lines for the insurer’s 
cost will be vertical when: 
X = – C         (6-3) 
This is where the cost to the insurer due to the discount (X) equals the amount of saving 
due to the reduced cost of repair of an upgraded home (C). This is illustrated in Figure 
(6-4) and the results in Table (6-2). The annual reduced cost of repair is 
 C  =  ERupgrade – ERno upgrade  =  $217 – $1279 = –$1062 
The corresponding discount in equation (6-3) is X = – C = $1062, which is where the 
contours become vertical in Figure (6-4). This exercise demonstrates some of the potential 
uses of the analytical results that are associated with computational ABM. 
In Figure (6-5) we show some of the intermediate results of the ABM, in which the 
horizontal axis show a range of possible values for the insurance premium (as given in the 
top row of Table 6-1) and the vertical axis is the net profit associated with each value of 
the premium. In determining the net profit, we use an analysis that is similar to that shown 
in Figure (6-4); the only difference is that the contour corresponding to the point of 
tangency is not necessarily associated with zero insurer cost. The value of this contour can 
be positive (net loss) or negative (net profit), and these values are plotted in Figure (6-5). 
As expected, the insurer’s profit increases with an increase in the premium rates. The 
relationship is surprisingly linear, considering the nonlinear characteristics of the problem 
that can be seen in Figure (6-4). The value of the insurance premium that leads to a profit 





Fig. (6-5): Relationship between insurer profit and premium, with optimal insurance premium 
rate leading to no profit or loss indicated by the red circle. 
 
The time series of the cumulative costs, revenue and change in reserves for the 
insurer are plotted in Figure (6-6). As noted in the previous chapter, this time series is not 
needed to determine any of the ABM results in Table (6-2), but are shown simply to 
indicate the randomness inherent in the theory. The top plot shows the reserve of the insurer 
per household, assuming that the insurer begins with zero reserves at time zero. For 
illustrative purposes only, the results are shown over a time period of 100 years. The middle 
plot is the cumulative amount of insurance premiums collected per household, and the 
bottom plot is the cumulative costs of repair per household. These plots have been 
calculated by taking the average of 120 iterations of the ABM. In the limit, as the number 
of iterations increases, the cumulative premium would equal to the cumulative cost and the 
result for the reserve would converge to zero. 













Fig. (6-6): Average time series of the reserve, cumulative premium and cumulative costs for the insurer per household.






















































6.3 Baseline with community measure 
Here, we consider a 100-year flood protection measure for our example community. 
The properties of damage for upgraded and not upgraded houses are updated after the 
addition of the measure to reflect the smaller risk of flooding associated with the protective 
features of the measure. The affordability of the homeowners to upgrade is impacted 
because of the addition of the yearly cost of the measure.  
Table (6-3) shows a summary of the model results for the baseline case after the 
addition of the flood control measure. By comparing these results with the corresponding 
results in Table (6-2) for a community without the measure, it can be seen that the measure 
significantly decreases the average costs of suffering and repairs. This is expected, given 
that the flood control measure decreases the probabilities of damage. 
Table (6-3): ABM results for the baseline case with community measure. 
Description Values 
ESno upgrade $415/year 
ESupgrade $71/year 
ERno upgrade $463/year 
ERupgrade $79/year 
Rational discount rate $1200 
Optimal annual insurance premium rate $446 
Optimal annual discount $95 
Homeowners’ expected annual cost per house $1962 




The optimal insurance premium, optimal discount rate, average expected annual 
cost for the homeowners, and the rational discount rates are also lower in the community 
with the measure. One important difference between the two cases is that the proportion of 
homeowners that upgrade was reduced from 64% to only 6% for the community with the 
measure. This is because the houses are being protected against the risk of flooding by the 
flood control measure, and the rational discount rate is much higher in a community with 
a measure. The rational discount rate is the critical value for the rate of insurance premiums 
discounts, above which it is financially justified for homeowners to upgrade their property 
(equation 5-9), and with a higher rational discount rate, there will be fewer homeowners 
who will need to upgrade. 
The affordability of the residents to upgrade will decrease due to the additional fee 
associated with the cost of the measure that has been added to the total annual costs for 
each homeowner. Figure (6-7) shows the decrease of affordability of the homeowners in 
the community with the measure, as compared with the corresponding plot in Figure  




Fig. (6-7): Proportion of homeowners who cannot afford to upgrade as a function of the insurance 
discount in a community with the measure. 












Fig. (6-8): Indifference curve and contour plot of the insurer’s costs for the baseline case with 
community measure. 
 
By comparing Figures (6-4) and (6-8), it can be seen how the indifference curve is 
lowered and how the majority of homeowners do not upgrade their houses after adding a 
measure to the community. 
Next, we take a closer look at the effects of adding a measure to the community by 














































amount.” Here, we are interested to see how the proportion of upgrades and other 
characteristics of the community change as we gradually add the protective effects and 
costs associated with the measure to the community. The measure amount ranges from zero 
(no measure) to one (measure). This is essentially a thought experiment of adding a 
measure gradually to the community, with cost and changes in probability of damage 
varying linearly with respect to this measure amount parameter. A subset of the ABM 






Fig. (6-9): ABM results for a variable measure (baseline case); K = 1000 USD per household.
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Figure (6-9-a) shows how the average annual costs for the homeowners are influenced by 
the measure. The solid red line is for monetary costs associated with upgraded properties; it 
includes the discounted insurance premiums, the cost of the measure fee, prorated by the measure 
amount, and the cost of upgrade. In the red dashed line, we also include the cost of suffering. The 
solid and dashed blue lines show similar results for properties that are not upgraded, in which there 
are no discounts and no cost of upgrade. In the dotted blue line, we also include the cost of risk 
that, as noted in Chapter 5, is associated only with households who do not upgrade. The total costs 
are higher for upgraded houses because of the cost of upgrade. The no upgrade houses, however, 
have a much higher expected cost of suffering because of a higher probability of damage, 
regardless of the measure amount. Increasing the measure amount, however, will decrease the 
expected costs of suffering for both upgraded and not upgraded properties. This drop in the cost 
of suffering is greater in the no upgrade case since the upgraded properties have a substantial level 
of protection even without a measure.  
In Figure (6-9-b), we show the average total costs of a community as a whole versus the 
measure amount. In the solid curve, we show only the total monetary costs, which consists of the 
prorated cost of the measure, average cost of upgrading houses, and average cost of repair. This 
cost decreases as the measure amount increases because of lower probabilities of damage and 
reduced proportion of upgrades. In the dashed curve, we include the average costs of risk and 
suffering. This result also decreases with the increase of measure, but this is primarily due to the 
reduced monetary costs. 
Figure (6-9-d) shows the proportion of upgraded and not upgraded houses for different 
values of the measure amount. As the measure amount increases, a higher proportion of households 
will upgrade; this is consistent with model results in Tables (6-2) and (6-3). 
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Figure (6-9-e) shows the average of the annual fees for the homeowners along with the 
average discount, plotted versus the measure amount. The results show that the average fee 
increases with the measure amount. This is because the cost associated with the measure does not 
entirely offset the savings due to reduced probability of damage. There is also the decrease in the 
number of upgraded houses, shown in Figure (6-9-d) that counteracts this reduced probability of 
damage. 
In Figure (6-9-c), we plot a scattergram of the total expected costs for each of the 9000 
homeowners. The vertical axis shows this cost before an upgrade (ECno upgrade) and the horizontal 
axis shows the homeowner’s budget. The vertical dashed line is the total yearly cost associated 
with the upgrade; hence, only those homeowners with budgets that are above this cost, indicated 
by the dots to the right of the line, can afford an upgrade. Out of these households who can afford 
the upgrade, only those who would pay higher costs if they did not upgrade would opt for the 
upgrade. The horizontal dashed line is the common yearly expected cost of any upgraded 
household (ECupgrade); households with higher costs without the upgrade, indicated by the dots 
above this line, would prefer to upgrade. Taking affordability and expected cost together, the 
subset of households who would upgrade would correspond to those points that are to the right of 
and above the two dashed lines. These points are shown in red. 
 Figure (6-9-f) is a similar plot, and the results differ from the plot above in Figure  
(6-9-c) in that the community has a protective measure. Here there are fewer dots on the right side 
of the vertical line compared to Figure (6-9-c). This is because the affordability of the homeowners 
decreases after adding a measure to the community, as the residents will have an additional annual 
fee associated with the cost of the measure. Although the total expected cost for the homeowners 
in Figure (6-9-f) is lower compared to the community with no measure, because of a smaller 
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probability of damage, a greater number of the dots fall below the horizontal line where it is more 
financially reasonable for them not to upgrade. This leads to a smaller number of red dots 
compared to Figure (6-9-c), which means when there is a measure in the community, a smaller 
proportion of the homeowners will ultimately upgrade. This is also consistent with the model 
outputs in Tables (6-2) and (6-3). 
Figure (6-10) shows a series of scattergrams of utilities of each of the 9,000 homeowners. 
The coordinates of each point are: ( , ′ ) = (utility of homeowner i for the community without 
a measure, utility of homeowner i for the community with the measure), in which the utilities are 
determined by equation (5-16). The exponent xi, representing the degree of interest of homeowner 
i in supporting the community and is assumed to be the same for all homeowners, xi = x. The 
special case where the utilities are equal, where the homeowners are indifferent with respect to the 
existence or non-existence of a measure, is indicated by the diagonal red line. Figure (6-10-a) is 
for the case where the exponent x = 0. Here, the utilities reduce to those of the homeowners as 
individuals in the community, ( , ) = (, , ,), which are computed using 
equation (5-17). Figure (6-10-d) is the same plot but with jitter to aid in visualizing the density and 
number of points. The blue dots are for homeowners who never upgrade, while the yellow dots are 
for those who always upgrade. The red dots are the properties that do not upgrade if there is a 
measure, but will upgrade if the measure is not built. The average utilities of each of these three 
group of homeowners is marked with a circle of the same color, and the average of all three groups 
is marked with a plus sign (+). 
The scattergrams in Figures (6-10-a) and (6-10-d) can be compared with those in Figures 
(6-10-c) and (6-10-f), which correspond to the case where the exponent x = 1. Here, the utilities 
become ( , ) = ( , ), representing homeowners whose utilities are 
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given by the average utilities of all of the members of the community, as given by equation  
(5-19). It can be seen that all of the points in the scattergram end up at a single point in Figure  
(6-10-c) and in a small cloud of points, because of the jitter, in Figure (6-10-f). It is noted that in 
Figure (6-10-c), the points are at the same location as the average utility represented by the plus 
sign, as expected. For other values of the exponent x, the points of the scattergrams would lie 
between these two extreme cases. This can be seen in Figures (6-10-b) and (6-10-e), which show 
the intermediate case, x = 1/2. 
In each of these scatterplots, when the data points falls above the diagonal line, then the 
utilities of the corresponding homeowners is higher after adding a measure to the community, 
otherwise the utilities are lower. The ABM results for the baseline case, as plotted in Figure  
(6-10), indicates that the average utilities of all the residents is higher after building a measure 
because the plus symbol falls above the diagonal line. This is also true for most of the individual 
homeowners for x = 0 and 1/2. In the next sections, we show the scattergram results of other cases 






Fig. (6-10): Available resource for each household in a community (baseline conditions).
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Figure (6-11) illustrates average of total utilities in a community before and after 
adding a measure for the baseline conditions versus the utility exponent x that represents 
the degree of community interest. We use the term “X community” for this exponent.  
The blue and red curves are the average utilities before and after a protective 
measure is added to the community, plotted with respect to the exponent x. In Figure  
(6-11), the red curve always falls above the blue curve, which indicates that for the baseline 
case, it is of greater utility to add the measure to the community regardless of the degree 
of interest in the community, x, of the residents of the community. 
 













6.4 Less Costly Property Upgrades 
In this section, we have decreased the average cost of individual house upgrades by 
30% compared to the baseline conditions to see whether a smaller cost of upgrade would 
encourage more upgrades in the community; and, to study how it affects the total utilities 
in the community. Table (6-4) includes the summary of ABM outputs for this scenario.  
Comparing this scenario with the baseline conditions (including the flood control 
measure), shows that a higher proportion of homeowners will upgrade when the cost to 
upgrade is smaller. The rational discount rate is also smaller than the baseline conditions 
while the value of optimal insurance premiums and the optimal discount rates remain close 
to the baseline conditions. 
Table (6-4): Summary of ABM output for less costly house upgrades. 
Description Values 
ESno upgrade $415/year 
ESupgrade $71/year 
ERno upgrade $463/year 
ERupgrade $79/year 
Rational discount rate $736 
Optimal annual insurance premium rate $378 
Optimal annual discount $74 
Homeowners’ expected annual cost per house $1836 
Proportion of homeowners who don’t upgrade 75% 
 
ABM output plots in Figure (6-12) also show how a higher proportion of the 
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Figures (6-13) and (6-14) show how the utilities change from the baseline conditions for 
this scenario. Comparing the plots of Figures (6-13) and (6-10) indicated that when the cost of 
upgrade is lower, the average utilities (plus sign in the Figures) is lower than the baseline 
conditions, but still falls above the diagonal line in all six subplots. 
This means that even after reducing the cost of upgrades for the homeowners, the average 
utilities for individual homeowners and the entire community are higher when there is a measure 
intact; and therefore, it is still worthwhile to build a measure. 
Average utilities of the homeowners are lower in this scenario because a higher proportion 
of the homeowners upgrade their properties when the cost of upgrade is lower than the baseline 






Fig. (6-13): Available resource for each household in a community (less costly property upgrades).
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Although the gap between the red and blue curves of Figure (6-14) is smaller than 
Figure (6-11), the red curve (measure intact) still falls above the blue curve (no measure) 
for all values of X community, which indicates the combined utilities are higher when there 
is a measure intact. 
 
 














6.5 Less Costly and More Effective Property 
Upgrades 
In this section, compared to the baseline conditions, we have decreased the costs of 
an upgrade for the homeowners by 30% and also increased the effect of an upgrade by 40% 
(40% smaller probability of damage for each storm) to see whether a more effective, less 
costly upgrade would encourage more upgrades in the community and/or how it affects the 
total utilities in the community. Table (6-5) includes the summary of ABM outputs for this 
scenario.  
As expected, even more people will upgrade their properties in this scenario 
compared with the previous scenario and the baseline conditions. The rational discount rate 
is slightly lower compared to the previous scenario and the average total annual costs for 
the homeowners are also slightly lower. 
Table (6-5): Summary of ABM output for more effective and less costly house upgrades. 
Description Values 
ESno upgrade $415/year 
ESupgrade $28/year 
ERno upgrade $463/year 
ERupgrade $32/year 
Rational discount rate $694 
Optimal annual insurance premium rate $362 
Optimal annual discount $110 
Homeowners’ expected annual cost per house $1793 
Proportion of homeowners who don’t upgrade 68% 
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ABM results are illustrated in Figures (6-15). Subplot (a) shows a higher proportion 
upgrading compared to the previous scenarios and subplot (c) shows how it is financially 
reasonable for almost all of the homeowners to upgrade before adding a measure, as almost 
all of the dots are above the horizontal line. Of course, a proportion of the homeowners on 
the left side of the vertical line will not be able to afford an upgrade and their properties 
remain not upgraded (the blue dots in Figure 6-15-c). After adding a measure, a smaller 
proportion of the homeowners will upgrade because their total expected costs will be lower 























































































The plus sign that shows the average utilities in Figures (6-16) falls below the diagonal line 
in subplots (a), (b) and (d); in this scenario this means that the average utilities of the individual 
homeowners (X community = 0), and the average utilities of the homeowners plus the community 
(X community = 0.5) are higher before adding a measure to the community. The plus sign falls 
only slightly above the diagonal line in subplots (c) and (f), indicating that after reducing the cost 
of upgrades for the homeowners and adding the efficiency of the upgrades, the average utilities of 
the community (X community = 1) are still higher after adding a measure and, from the perspective 
of the community as a whole system, it is still worthwhile to build a measure. 
If the residents of this community were to vote for or against building a measure, this would 
be an interesting scenario in which different agents of the system may have opposite opinions 
about whether or not a measure should be built. There are a group of homeowners whose average 
utilities are higher after adding a measure (blue dots in Figure 6-16). Other groups of homeowners 
would have higher average utilities before building a measure in the community (red and yellow 
dots). In scenarios like this, another important factor in the final decision towards building a 
measure would be the weight of the votes for different groups of residents. As an example, the 
number of residents in one group might be higher, but the opposite group might have higher 
influence on the ultimate decision making for the community. In our model, we have considered 
equal votes for all the residents. We also assume the only factor important to the voters is their 
expected utilities and monetary values in each scenario. In reality, there are other important factors 
involved in decision making towards building a measure to protect a community, such as adverse 
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In Figure (6-17) the red and blue curves cross. The combined utilities of the 
homeowners (X community = 0) are higher before adding a measure (blue curve). The 
utilities of the community as a whole (X community = 1), however, are slightly higher after 
building a flood control measure (red curve). 
 
 
Fig. (6-17): Average community utilities before and after adding a measure (more effective and 
less costly property upgrades). 
 
In the following section, we model a different scenario by changing the model 
controller parameters to see whether there is a situation in which everyone in the 













6.6 Less Costly and More Effective Property 
Upgrades Combined with Higher Cost of 
Measure 
In this section, compared to the baseline conditions, we have decreased the cost of 
upgrade for the homeowners by 30%, increased the effect of upgrade by 40% (40% smaller 
probability of damage for each storm), and also increased the cost of measure by 100% 
(twice as expensive) to see whether this scenario leads to a different outcome, e.g. would 
it be more cost effective to upgrade the individual houses instead of building the flood 
control measure. In this scenario, increasing the cost of measure will not change the 
effectiveness of the measure. In other words, the more costly measure in this community 
provides the same level of protection as the previous scenarios. Table (6-6) includes the 
summary of ABM outputs for this scenario.  
In this scenario, average homeowners’ expected annual costs are higher compared 
to the previous scenario because building a more costly measure means higher taxes 
(measure fee) for the residents of the community. A smaller proportion of homeowners 
will upgrade their properties compared to the previous scenario because a fewer number of 
homeowners can afford an upgrade due to an increase in their annual costs. The optimal 
annual insurance premium rate and optimal discount rates remain similar to the previous 
scenario because the higher cost of measure will not directly affect the costs for the 
insurance company.  
 
168 
Table (6-6): Summary of ABM output for more effective and less costly house upgrades and 
more costly flood control measure. 
Description Values 
ESno upgrade $415/year 
ESupgrade $28/year 
ERno upgrade $463/year 
ERupgrade $32/year 
Rational discount rate $694 
Optimal annual insurance premium rate $374 
Optimal annual discount $114 
Homeowners’ expected annual cost per house $2314 
Proportion of homeowners who don’t upgrade 72% 
 
Figures (6-18) shows ABM results for this scenario. Subplot (d) shows that a higher 
proportion of homeowners will upgrade in this scenario. Subplots (a), (b), and (e) show the 
higher annual costs for homeowners after adding a measure. The blue dotted line in subplot 
(a) shows the average expected costs for homeowners who do not upgrade, including cost 
of suffering and cost of risk. This line is higher than the dashed red line (total expected cost 
for the homeowners who upgrade) before adding a measure (measure amount = 0), which 
means for all the residents, it is financially reasonable to upgrade. This can also be seen in 
subplots (c) where all the dots fall above the horizontal line. The blue dots on the left side 
of the vertical line will not be able to afford an upgrade. After building a measure (measure 
amount = 1) the dotted line in subplot (a) is very close to the red dashed line which indicates 
that after a measure is built, the total costs for the homeowners who upgrade are only 
slightly higher than those who do not upgrade. This can also be seen in subplot (f) in which 
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The average utilities for all groups of the homeowners, and the community (plus 
sign and circles) fall below the diagonal line in all subplots of Figures (6-19). This indicates 
that after reducing the cost of upgrades for the homeowners, increasing the efficiency of 
the upgrades, and increasing the cost of measure, building a measure would not be cost 
effective and before building the measure, the average utilities would be higher for all 


































































Figure (6-20) shows that in this scenario, combined utilities for the homeowners (at 
X community = 0) and the community (at X community = 1) before adding the measure 
(blue curve) is much higher than it is after building a measure (red curve). 
 
 
Fig. (6-20): Average community utilities before and after adding a measure (more effective and 













6.7 More Effective Measure 
In this section, we have increased the measure efficiency by 100% (twice as 
effective) compared to the baseline conditions to study the effects of a stronger measure on 
the ABM results. To increase the measure efficiency we have decreased the probability of 
damage due to all possible storms for all properties by 50% compared to the baseline 
conditions shown in Table (6-1). The summary of ABM outputs for this scenario is 
presented in Table (6-7). 
Table (6-7): Summary of ABM output for stronger measure. 
Description Values 
ESno upgrade $208/year 
ESupgrade $35/year 
ERno upgrade $232/year 
ERupgrade $39/year 
Rational discount rate $1372 
Optimal annual insurance premium rate $227 
Optimal annual discount $0 
Homeowners’ expected annual cost per house $1548 
Proportion of homeowners who don’t upgrade 98% 
 
Compared to the ABM outputs for the baseline conditions with a measure (Table 
6-3), here we have much lower costs of suffering for upgraded or not upgraded houses due 
to a great reduction in the probability of damage. The rational discount rate is slightly 
higher in this case. Optimal insurance premiums are smaller in this case. A smaller 
proportion of the homeowners will upgrade. And the average of total annual expected costs 
of the homeowners is smaller when the measure is more effective due to a smaller number 
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of upgrades. Figure (6-21) shows how adding a strong measure can benefit all the 
homeowners and the community as a whole by a great increase in the utilities. 
 
 













6.8 Higher Cost of Repair 
In this section, we have increased the cost of repair by 100% (twice as costly) 
compared to the baseline conditions. We are interested to see how a higher cost of repair 
affects the ABM results. Although it would first appear that the cost of repair may not 
affect homeowners much because it is assumed to be covered by the insurer, it affects the 
optimal value of the insurance premium rate which is part of the costs for homeowners. 
The summary of ABM outputs for this scenario is presented in Table (6-8). 
Table (6-8): Summary of ABM output for higher cost of repair. 
Description Values 
ESno upgrade $415/year 
ESupgrade $71/year 
ERno upgrade $927/year 
ERupgrade $158/year 
Rational discount rate $1200 
Optimal annual insurance premium rate $873 
Optimal annual discount $468 
Homeowners’ expected annual cost per house $2349 
Proportion of homeowners who don’t upgrade 83% 
 
As expected, compared to the ABM outputs for the baseline conditions with a 
measure (Table 6-3), here we have much higher optimal insurance premium rates and also 
a higher optimal discount rate for the upgraded properties. When the repairs after flood 
damage are costly, it is reasonable for the insurer to increase the premiums and encourage 
more upgrades to prevent high flood damage in order to stay solvent. Higher insurance 
premiums lead to a higher average of total annual costs for homeowners compared to the 
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baseline conditions. The number of upgraded properties is also higher in this community 
compared to the baseline conditions. 
As shown in Figure (6-22), when the repairs are costly, protecting the community 
against flood damage by adding a flood control measure can greatly increase the utilities 
for the residents and the entire community. The large gap between the two curves in Figure 
(6-22) shows the important role of a measure in communities where repairs are costly. 
 













6.9 Higher Cost of Suffering 
In this section, we have increased the cost of suffering by 60% compared to the 
baseline conditions to study the effects of higher costs of suffering on the ABM results. 
The summary of ABM outputs for this scenario is presented in Table (6-9). 
 
Table (6-9): Summary of ABM output for higher cost of suffering. 
Description Values 
ESno upgrade $664/year 
ESupgrade $113/year 
ERno upgrade $463/year 
ERupgrade $79/year 
Rational discount rate $993 
Optimal annual insurance premium rate $443 
Optimal annual discount $89 
Homeowners’ expected annual cost per house $2180 
Proportion of homeowners who don’t upgrade 89% 
 
In this scenario, the rational discount rate is lower than the ABM outputs for the 
baseline conditions (Table 6-3). Optimal insurance premiums and optimal discount rate are 
similar to the baseline as the cost of suffering is covered by the homeowners and does not 
directly affect the insurer. The average of total annual expected costs for the homeowners 
are higher which makes it more reasonable for the homeowners to upgrade and, therefore, 
the rate of upgrade is higher in this scenario. 
As illustrated in Figure (6-23), adding a measure is quite beneficial to the residents 
and the community as there is a relatively large gap in between the two curves of total 
 
178 
utilities after adding a measure (red curve) and with no measure intact (blue curve), with 
red being higher. 
 
 















In this chapter, we demonstrated how the computational ABM can generate graphs 
of results that provide insights into the behaviors of the homeowners and insurer. It is 
shown how these behaviors are related to characteristics of the homeowners such as risk-
aversion and affordability and the characteristics of the physical infrastructure, such as 
cost-effectiveness. We began with the ABM for baseline conditions as the model input 
parameters. Next, we compared the ABM results for the modeled scenarios to evaluate the 
effects of each parameter on the entire system. In each scenario, we compared the ABM 
results for the case of no measure and after the measure is intact. The average costs and 
utilities for different agents of the model were compared to understand how the addition of 
a measure affects each agent. This last relationship between a community measure and 
community collective resistance to storm events is useful in the development of a 







Integration of Linear Systems Concepts 
from Sociology 
7.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we integrate quantitative methods from sociology to provide a 
theoretical basis for behaviors in community resilience that accounts for interactions at the 
individual and community levels. We draw upon the work by Coleman and Hao (1989), in 
which a mathematical framework is developed with micro-to-macro relations. Individual 
actors interact at the micro-level in a social exchange that is characterized by interest and 
control of resources. The resources are macro-level system components with systems-level 
properties such as values and constraints. The exchanges of and actor interests in resources 
are quantified using economic theory. 
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The intent of our work may have some differences from the original intent of 
Coleman and Hao’s framework. For instance, we have interest in engineering aspects of 
community resilience as well as the behavioral aspects. We will need several layers of 
micro-to-macro relations with interactions between these layers, to reflect the fact that 
engineering resilience may affect behaviors that affect resilience and vice-versa. 
Furthermore, the computational ABM, which we will be integrating with linear systems 
theory, uses a combination of infrastructural and economic analysis with significant 
nonlinearities. Therefore, our work should not be judged by how closely it follows the 
original work by Coleman and Hao, but rather, the work by Coleman and Hao should be 
credited for the sociologically based systems-level qualitative thinking and quantitative 




7.2 Application of Linear Systems Theory to 
Community Resilience 
We begin with a figure that shows the relationship between individual action and 
system functioning, which is the same as Figure (1) of Coleman and Hao: 
 
Fig. (7-1): Four basic relationships in describing macro- and micro-level system behavior. 
 
To make this less abstract, we show how community resilience can be represented 
with this figure using three aspects of the system: engineering infrastructure, community 
economics, and social cohesion. We use the term layers, because we will need three of the 
above figure, one for each aspect, which can be visualized as being layered upon each 
other. In each layer, the macro-level is the community while the micro-level represents the 
set of homeowners residing in the community. It is noted while there is economics thinking 
that underlies the analysis of all three layers, the economics layer is focused on funding 
choices for the community measure and residential upgrades.  
In Figure (7-2), the engineering infrastructure layer is shown. In the infrastructure 










measures of disaster can include sociological definitions of community dysfunction, 
quantified by community-wide descriptors of activity such as number of schools closed, 
number of hospital beds that must be abandoned, and number of power or water outages. 
An analysis of such types of disaster is beyond the scope of this thesis; nevertheless, we do 
indicate later in this chapter how the work herein can be developed further to incorporate 
such broader analyses. 
Our definition of disaster is first defined at the individual (micro) level as damage 
of residences and the subsequent suffering of the homeowners. At the community (macro) 
level, we simply take the sum of the individual losses to represent community dysfunction. 
(In future work, a more sociological perspective can be included by modeling residents of 
the community who are diverted from their work duties to repair their homes and assist in 
recovery efforts.) The interactions between the individual and community levels occurs 
through the two types of flood hazard mitigators, residential upgrades and community 
protective measures, and through the price adjustments made by the non-profit insurer. 
These interactions can be complex, because the measures will affect the effectiveness of 
the upgrades, the insurers will need to increase fees for any measures and will offer 
discounts to induce upgrading, and the homeowners will react, in a rational economic 
manner to maximize their utilities. It is shown in the following how a three-layered analysis 
of the micro- and macro-level systems behaviors can be used to explore these interactions. 
We begin the analysis of Figure (7-2) at the macro-level. Arrow 4 shows that 
community measures, such as levees, seawalls and storm surge barriers, will lead to a 
reduced risk of a disaster after a large storm. The community measure would also have 
significant impact at the micro-level, as indicated by arrow 1. In this case, the micro-level 
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of the infrastructure is described in terms of the residential structures. The community 
measure would serve to reduce risk of flooding in the community, which would 
immediately translate to reduced risk of damage for every residential structure in the 
community that is in a flood risk zone. Next, we look at the impact of action at the micro-
level on macro-level properties, shown as arrow 3. Here, upgrades of residential structures 
to better resist damage due to floods collectively leads to reduced risk of community 
dysfunction. 
 
Fig. (7-2): Macro- and micro-level relationships for the engineering infrastructure layer. 
 
The last relation, shown by arrow 2, is the most subtle from the system perspective. 
With the addition of flood-control measures at the community level, which leads to a 
reduced risk of damage at the individual residence level, there is less need for structural 
upgrade. Hence, the series of causal relations, 1, 2 and 3, will tend towards an increased 
risk of community dysfunction, which is the exact opposite of causal relation 4, which 
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of these contradicting effects. In a subsequent section, we will show how the computational 
ABM will provide the necessary quantitative relations. 
Next, we examine the behavior aspects of community preparedness for disasters. 
Here, we note the fact that large community projects, such as the construction of measures 
to protect an entire community from storm damage, are driven by behaviors at the 
individual level. We use the term social cohesion to describe this layer of analysis, 
emphasizing the importance of individual cooperation for community preparedness. The 
need to separate and delineate community and homeowner behaviors will become even 
more apparent when looking at the economic aspects of resilience and preparedness. 
Figure (7-3) shows the basic micro-to-macro relations for behaviors that are related 
to social cohesion. At the macro-level, arrow 4 indicates how a community that is unified 
and possesses a strong sense of identity will tend to promote actions, such as the 
construction of costly protective measures, to help ensure the function of the community 
after potentially damaging storms. While a community government would lead such 
efforts, the figure indicates that such an action would not be driven solely at this macro-
level. Going backward from the top right node, we see in arrow 3 that community actions 
requires the support of the individuals that make up that community. In Figure (7-3), we 
indicate that such individual support is not an exogenous factor, but arises from the strength 
of community identity and cohesiveness that promotes homeowners’ esprit de corps, 
shown in arrow 1, which then leads to individual support of community efforts, shown in 
arrow 2. It could be argued that arrow 1 should be bidirectional, since community 
cohesiveness is a characteristic of the aggregate behavior of individuals in the community. 
But we leave the arrow as leading from the macro-level to the micro-level at the start of 
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model development. The arrow in the opposite direction is a characteristic of emergent 
behavior; this may be apparent towards the end of our systems analysis, when we include 
the results of the computational ABM. 
 
Fig. (7-3): Macro- and micro-level relationships for the social cohesion layer. 
 
The behaviors of cohesiveness, esprit de corps, and the corresponding actions to 
support community resilience all have direct economic counterparts. In Figure (7-4), we 
show the economics layer in the context of funding for homeowner upgrades and 
community protective measures. We show this correspondence between behavioral and 
economic components of the system by comparing the corresponding nodes in Figures  
(7-3) and (7-4). Beginning with the top left node, we see that community cohesiveness and 
identity corresponds to the willingness and capacity for building community resilience. 
Proceeding to the right, we find that community actions correspond economically to 
funding these actions. The economic action implied by arrow 4, however, requires 




















taxation or other equivalent revenue collection methods. Continuing with identifying the 
correspondence between behavioral and economic aspects of building community 
resilience, we examine arrows 2 and 3. Here, homeowner’s esprit de corps and subsequent 
support of community efforts correspond to homeowners emphasizing community 
economic needs, leading to a de-emphasis of upgrades of their own residences and funding 
of community measures. 
 
Fig. (7-4): Macro- and micro-level relationships for the economics layer. 
 
It is noted that there is the negation of the characteristics at the micro-level. For 
instance, homeowners’ lack of esprit de corps would be a focus on protecting their own 
residences, and the negation of support of community efforts would be support of their 
residential upgrades. There are other alternatives as well, such as the lack of sufficient 
support, whether at the community or individual residence levels. This situation would 
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protective actions. In the figures we only illustrate the dominant behaviors; these other 
behaviors are included in the computational ABM. 
The main motivation for introducing this three-layered systems analysis is to 
examine how rational decision-making of the residents in a community at the micro-level 
will not always behave in a manner that leads to the optimal economic outcome at the 
macro-level. For instance, it may be advantageous for the residents, regarded collectively, 
to pay for a community measure and to spend less on their own individual residential 
upgrades. But this does not necessarily mean that this advantageous pathway will be 
followed. 
7.3 Resource Exchange Equations 
In this section, we will use concepts of linear systems theory from Coleman and 
Hao (1989) to develop a set of conditions needed for the pathways described above to 
occur. The central notion in linear systems theory is resource exchange. 
We use Figures (7-4) again, with highlights on the portions of these diagrams that 
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We begin at relation SC1 shown in the left side of the social cohesion layer. We 
begin explaining the resource exchange starting with the community. The community 
offers to each resident i a resource , associated with community cohesiveness 
and identity: 
, = ,       (7-1) 
Here,  quantifies the value of community identity that is not dependent on the 
homeowner, but is a constant parameter of the system. The coefficient , represent 
the fraction of   that is offered by the community to the resident. Since it is not 
necessary for all residents to be treated equally, , would vary with resident i. As 
noted earlier, this resource is not financially based, but is an intangible asset that is offered 
by the community. 
On the other side of the resource exchange is the contribution by each resident. A 
resident would need to consider two types of contributions to the community: as an 
individual homeowner and as an active member of the community: 
, = , + ,  (7-2) 
The value  of an individual homeowner is not necessarily zero because there is 
collective value of residents who take care of their home. When residents of a community 
do not take care of their homes, the entire community suffers. The value of active 
membership to the community  can take several forms, and in the social cohesion 
layer this value is expressed in an abstract form. Here, we expect  to be 
 
191 
significantly larger than . One of the fundamental relationships in linear 
systems theory is in the balanced exchange of resources: 
, = , + ,     (7-3) 
in which , is a term that reflects the gap that may exist between the community 
and resident exchange of resources. In parameter estimation, these terms are typically 
minimized. 
A community that seeks greater involvement of its residents would need to put 
resources into initiatives that would promote resident sense of membership. This may take 
many forms, ranging from supporting community activities to outreach efforts. The 
community would find ways to increase , for as many residents i as possible. If 
the community is successful, the homeowners would respond by increasing ,. The 
difference between the community contribution , and the homeowner response 
,, as reflected by the gap-term ,, would be reduced if the community 
efforts are tailored towards the residents preferences. 
Next, we explore alternate expressions of value of homeowners and community 
members in the economics and infrastructure layers. In the infrastructure level, we examine 
the exchange of resources between the insurer and the homeowners for individual (micro-
level) upgrades and community (macro-level) protective measures. We compare the cost 
of residential upgrades and community measures with the expected cost of damage from a 
natural hazard. We use the computational ABM to determine most of the key quantities, 




For the upgrades, we begin by examining the difference in the expected cost of 
repair when there is no measure. This is the monetary value of the upgrade in terms of 
structural protection: 
vupgrade =  ERno upgrade – ERupgrade      (7-4) 
Next, we assess the value of a measure by determining the reduction in the expected cost 
of repair due to the protective abilities of the measure. This value is dependent upon 
whether the residence was upgraded or not: 
vmeasure (upgrade)  =  ERupgrade       (7-5) 
vmeasure (no upgrade)  =  ERno upgrade       
and is computed in a straightforward manner: 
ERupgrade = ∑ ∑ P [storm] ∗ ∆P [damage│storm, upgrade] ∗ Crepair,k 
ERno upgrade = ∑ ∑ P [storm] ∗ ∆P [damage│storm, no upgrade] ∗ Crepair,k 
           (7-6) 
in which ∆P [damage│storm, upgrade] and ∆P [damage│storm, no upgrade] are 
the reductions in probability of damage due to the protective ability of the measure. 
The insurer provides a discount for an upgrade, and this can be considered as the 
value that takes into account the homeowners’ risk, affordability, suffering (which govern 
purchasing behavior) as well as the cost of repair (which is entirely borne by the insurer).  
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In this case the resource exchange is as follows: 
rinsurer   =  Insurance discount opt    (7-7) 
 =  Cupgrade –  (ESno upgrade – ESupgrade) – Crisk,opt 
=  Rational discount rate – Crisk,opt 
ri,upgrade   =  Rational discount rate – Crisk,i 
The insurer provides the insurance discount optimized with respect to all 
homeowners as explained in Chapter 5. This would correspond to a specific value of the 
cost of risk, which is denoted as Crisk,opt. Homeowner i, on the other hand, would have a 
their own value for the cost of risk, Crisk,i, which, in general, would be different from the 
optimal value. This would lead to the following resource exchange relation with an error 
given by the difference between the optimal cost of risk and homeowner’s cost of risk: 
rinsurer  =  ri,upgrade + ei,upgrade       (7-8) 
ei,upgrade  =  Crisk,opt – Crisk,i 
It is noted that the error is always non-negative. If it is negative, so that the homeowner’s 
cost of risk is greater than the optimal value, then the homeowner will upgrade their 
residence. When the error is positive, then it is not worthwhile for the homeowner to 
upgrade, and the resource exchange becomes: 
rinsurer  = ei,no upgrade        (7-9) 
in which the homeowner has zero contribution (no upgrade) and the error is simply given 
by the insurer’s discount. The preceding relation would also hold if the homeowner cannot 
afford the upgrade. 
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The above describe all of the resource exchanges that underlie the relationships, 
Inf1 – Inf4, in Figure (7-5); these exchanges are evaluated through the nonlinear 
computational ABM. 
In the economics layer, we examine the two relations, Econ2 and Econ3, which 
begin at the individual and ends at the community. Here, we consider the cost of risk and 
cost of suffering in addition to the costs of any upgrades and community protective 
measure. The decision here is not between an upgrade versus a community measure: these 
are not mutually exclusive choices. The complex, economic-based decision making that 
involves upgrades, measure and insurer fees has already been analyzed by the 
computational ABM. Instead, the decision is between individual homeowners assessing 
their own economic situation versus the collective economic status of their community. 
The homeowner assessment is at the micro-level while the collective status is at the 
macro-level. Coleman and Hao use utility theory in the analysis of micro- and macro-level 
decisions, and we follow this approach here. There are some departures from their original 
mathematical formulation, primarily because we use our computational ABM results to 
help us compute some of the terms in the utility function, but we believe we retain their 
essential ideas. 
We have already introduced the notion of homeowner utility, , in equation  
(5-16) and repeated below, in terms of the utility of a homeowner as an individual, 
, , and the utility of a homeowner as a member of the community, . 
These two utilities correspond to the micro- and macro-levels, respectively.  
 = ,
 
        (5-16) 
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As noted in section 5.9, the exponent  is related to the degree to which the homeowner 
acts in the interest of the community. Hence, it is natural to expect a relationship between 
this exponent and the fraction , of membership value  that homeowner i 
contributes to the community. We express this in the following general form: 
 = , + ,      (7-10) 
In this manner, the community and economics layers are linked. The residual term 
, indicates that community membership does not always translate directly to 
support of community activities, which in the present case is the financing of a protective 
storm measure. The infrastructure layer is also linked to the economics layer through the 
computational analysis of the utilities , and .  
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7.4 Deciding on the Community Measure 
We are now ready for the final, and in many ways, most important decision in the 
model, which is to build or not build a community measure. This is a binary decision which 
proceed with the following steps: 
1. Building community support for the measure. 
2. Voting or other community process on deciding to build the measure. 
3. Taxation to fund the measure. 
4. Design and construction. 
5. Impact on community resilience to future storms. 
The computational ABM already incorporates taxation (step 3) through an increase in 
insurer fees, as well as the design, construction and subsequent future impact on resilience 
(steps 4 and 5) through decreases in probabilities of damage and expected costs of repairs. 
 With the sociology-based linear systems theory, we have shown, through the links 
between the social cohesion layer and economics layer, how it is possible to build support 
for the measure (step 1). We also have explained how the computational ABM and linear 
systems theory can be combined to determine the following utility functions: 
 = ,
 
 = utility for homeowner  (no measure) (7-11) 
′ = ′,
 ′
 = utility for homeowner  (with measure) 
If the community process for decision-making (step 2) was through voting, then 
we can determine the outcome of the vote by a simple count: 
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Proportion favoring a measure =      
   
  (7-12)  
While this is straightforward to determine using the computational ABM, and we 
can gain further insights by examining a few of the plots shown in Chapter 6. We will be 
able to identify resource exchange at various levels and the error terms in these exchange 
relationships. 
 We begin with Figure (7-6), which shows the scattergram of utilities, in which, as 
described earlier, the horizontal direction is for the utility without a community measure, 
the vertical direction is for the utility with the measure, and each point represents an 
individual homeowner. The 45-degree line represents the special case when the utilities 
with and without the measure are identical; we label this as the indifference line because 
homeowners that lie on this line would be not be affected by the measure and would be 
indifferent to the vote outcome. The points (with jitter to aid in visualizing the density of 
points) are nearly all for the case where the exponent x = 0, in which the homeowners 
assess utilities according to their own self-interest. There is one point, indicated in the 
figure, which corresponds to the case were the exponent x = 1, in which the homeowners 
all assess utilities according to the average utilities of every member of the community. For 
other values of the exponent x, the points would lie between these two extreme cases; this 
was explored in depth in the previous chapter. Equation (7-12) corresponds to the 
proportion of points above the indifference line. For the particular example shown here, it 




Fig. (7-6): Scattergram of household utilities with and without a community measure. 
 
This view of voting, however, is too simplistic, given the influences that a subset 
of voters can use to alter the process. These influences include advertising, political 
pressures, and many other activities. While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to explore 
these influences, we can still model a slightly different version of the voting process by 
using a weighted sum instead of a simple sum in equation (7-12). It is useful to define a 
binary indicator variable 
 = 
1, if ′ > 









utility coordinates at x = 1:
all homeowners act in the 
interest of the community
utility coordinates at x = 0:
all homeowners act in the their own self-interests
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Referring to Figure (7-6),  = 1 for all of the points above the 45-degree line and 
 = 0 for all of the points below the line. We also need to define an index set of influential 
homeowners 
 = {: homeowner  has extraordinary influence on the voting process} 
Then the weighted proportion is defined as follows: 
Weighted proportion favoring a measure =
∑ ∈ ∑ ∉
∑ ∈ ∑ ∉
  (7-14) 
Where  is the degree of influence of homeowner  ∈ , scaled so that  = 1 
would correspond to the weight of a non-influential homeowner  ∉ . If the influential 
homeowners were randomly scattered throughout the homeowners shown in Figure (7-6), 
then the weighted proportion would be approximately equal to the original unweighted 
proportion in equation (7-12). If, however, the influential homeowners were predominantly 
below the indifference line, then, with sufficiently high influence, as quantified by the 
weights , the proportion can change to above 50% to below 50%, resulting in a reversal 
of the vote outcome. 
It is worthwhile to explore the points in Figure (7-6) in more detail to determine the 
homeowner characteristics associated with location of the points with respect to the 
indifference line. We find that there are 5 groups of households, which are labeled in Figure 
(7-7). To interpret the characteristics of these groups, we use the scattergrams in Figure 
 (7-8) where were also shown in the preceding chapter. We recall that the points in these 
scattergrams show the affordability of each household in the horizontal direction and the 
total expected cost, including the insurance fee along with the costs associated with risk 
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and suffering, in the vertical direction. The points are shifted downward when there is a 





















Fig. (7-8): Scattergrams of household budgets and expected costs with respect to upgrades and 
measure. 
 
The horizontal dashed lines are the expected costs when there is an upgrade. This 
line may be higher for the community with a measure because any reduction in the expected 
cost of suffering may be offset by reductions in the insurer discount. The vertical dashed 
lines are the monetary cost of upgrade that includes the insurance fee and discount. This 
line is shifted to the right when the discount is reduced. 
We are now ready to show the relationship between the points in Figures (7-7) and 
(7-8). This relationship requires a detailed examination of the points in Figure (7-8) and 
their positions with respect to both pairs of dashed lines. To make this clear, we examine 
only one representative point for each of the 5 groups in Figure (7-7). We need to show 
each of these points twice: once without the community measure and again with the 
measure. These 5 pairs of points are shown schematically in Figure (7-9) along with the 
two pairs of dashed lines that were defined in Figure (7-8).  































expected cost | upgrade
monetary cost of upgrade




Fig. (7-9): Schematic diagram showing a representative household for each of the 5 groups 
indicated in Figure (7-7) plotted with respect to the horizontal dashed lines from Figure (7-8). 
 
We explain these pairs of points in sequence. It is noted that the diagram contains 
all of the information needed to explain the differences between each group of households, 
and the text below only provides some supplementary text to clarify these difference.  
1. Upgrade with and without the measure. These households are indicated as 
red points in both of the plots of Figure (7-8). These household can afford 
the cost of the upgrade, and will have lower expected cost if they choose 
the upgrade option, regardless of whether the community measure is built 
or not. Hence, the expected cost and utilities for this group of household are 
the same. Since the expected cost with the measure is higher than that 
without the measure, the point associated with this group of households will 

























































(7-9), we show a representative point for this group of households as point 
1 without the measure and point 1’ with the measure. As explained earlier, 
the point with the measure is below and to the right of the corresponding 
point without the measure. The red arrows to the dashed lines indicate that 
this household will choose to upgrade regardless of the status of the 
measure. Points 1 and 1’ are also shown in the left plot of Figure (7-10), 
where the total expected cost of this group is compared for the cases where 
there is no community measure (point 1) and when there is a measure (point 
1’). 
2. Upgrade without the measure, no upgrade with the measure. These 
households are indicated as red points in the left plot of Figure (7-8) and 
change to blue in the right plot. There are three subgroups to consider: 
a. Measure makes the upgrade unaffordable. The difference between 
this group and group 1 is that the expected cost with the measure is 
associated with no upgrade, which will be higher than that 
associated with upgrade. Hence the utility with the measure is lower 
than that for group 1. This is indicated in Figure (7-7), where the 
points associated with group 2a lie below those associated with 
group 1. 
b. No measure and upgrade is preferred to measure with no upgrade. 
In this case, the expected cost for the upgrade is higher than that 
without the upgrade, so the homeowner will opt not to upgrade. The 
 
204 
utility with the measure will be higher than that for group 1 but still 
below the indifference line. 
c. Measure and no upgrade is preferred to no measure with or without 
upgrade. Here, the measure increases the utility of no upgrade 
sufficiently high so that it is above the utilities associated with all 
other cases - upgrade with measure and upgrade or no upgrade 
without the measure. Hence, the utility with the measure is above 
the indifference line. 
3. No upgrade. This includes all cases where the homeowner does not upgrade, 
including unaffordability and higher expected costs associated with an 
upgrade. These households are indicated as blue points in both of the plots 
of Figure (7-8), Figure (7-7) and the right side of Figure (7-10). 
 
 
Fig. (7-10): Total expected cost given upgrade or no upgrade, plotted with respect to the measure, 






We also show representative points in the original scattergrams in Figure (7-11). 
 
 
Fig. (7-11): Representative points for each of the 5 groups of households. 
 
Returning to the weighted voting problem, it can be seen that the groups that 
prefer not to have the measure are groups 1, 2a and 2b. These groups tend to be wealthier 
because they all must be able to afford the cost of the upgrade. Furthermore, they tend to 
be towards the upper portion of the scatterplots in Figure (7-11), which are the ones with 








































































the highest costs of risk. These homeowners are most likely to upgrade their residences 
regardless of the status of the measure. 
There are two ways to reduce the sizes of these groups: 
1. Infrastructure level 
a. Increase the effectiveness of the measure. 
b. Reduce the cost of the measure. 
2. Social cohesion level: 
3. Increase the fraction , of membership value  that 
homeowner i contributes to the community, which would lead to an increase 
in the exponent x in the utility function.  
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7.5 Incorporating System Dynamics Concepts 
into the Linear Systems Framework 
We conclude our analysis of the linear systems framework by presenting an 
alternate view of the three-level processes of community infrastructure building. We use 
concepts from system dynamics, which is a branch of systems science that has found 
applications in many areas of social science [Meadows, 1999; Sterman, 2000; Forrester, 
2009] and public health [Hirsch, et al. 2007; Mabry, et al. 2008]. It has been argued that 
methods, such as system dynamics, that can show the complex feedback mechanisms in 
societal processes are vital for policy formulation [Warren, 2004] and for addressing 
implementation and sustainability issues [Stirman, et al., 2012]. Furthermore, these 
methods can be effective as communication tools that can engage stakeholders such as 
community groups and policy makers in systems thinking [Hovmand, 2013]. 
System dynamics is a subfield of systems science that encompasses a wide range 
of methods that are related primarily in the use of causal relationships that involve feedback 
loops. The most basic system dynamic method is the development of causal loop diagrams; 
here, the process of developing the diagram is as important or can even be more important 
than the diagram itself [Hovmand, 2013]. The most computational system dynamics 
method involves so-called stock-and-flow models [Forrester, 2009]. There are three types 
of variables in stock-and-flow models: stocks, which represent quantities that are 
accumulated or depleted over time; flows that increase or decrease the levels of the stocks; 
and auxiliary variables, which are constants that parameterize the model. These constructs 
are often related to exogenous influences, and can affect both the stocks and flows. The 
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relationships between the stocks and flows can be formalized using differential equations 
and other mathematical operations; however, as shown herein, diagrams of stocks and 
flows are informative even without the mathematical representation. We do not develop a 
computational stock-and-flow model because the ABM presented in Chapter 5 is far better 
suited to account for the multiple levels of interactions between the individual homeowners 
and the insurer. A series of conceptual stock-and-flow models are used as a visualization 
tool that can be helpful in communicating the complex processes in community resiliency 
towards storm surges. 
We begin with Figure (7-12), which shows the stocks and flows associated with the 
infrastructure layer. Here, damage is a stock that used as a measure of the expected amount 
of damage due to a storm surge. The other two stocks are upgrade decision and no upgrade 
decision, which are used as measures of the proportion of homeowner who are deciding to 
upgrade or not upgrade. It is noted that the stocks refer to expected events of the future: 
there is at present, no damage, and no finalized decision regarding upgrading. For instance, 
if the cost of upgrade is raised, then there would be a migration of homeowners from the 
upgrade decision stock to the no upgrade decision stock. This migration would not be 
possible if the upgrades were already built. 
The flows in this diagram are to or from these stocks. For instance, the migration 
that was just mentioned would be a flow through the double arrow at the bottom of the 
figure. The double triangle represents a value that regulates this flow. Continuing with the 
migration example, a rise in the cost of upgrade will cause the valve, supporting no upgrade 
decision, to open, resulting in a flow from the upgrade decision stock to the no upgrade 
decision stock. There are three other flows in the diagram. In the middle, there is a flow 
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from the no upgrade decision stock to the upgrade decision stock, which is in the exact 
opposite direction of the flow just described. An arrow is shown from the damage stock to 
the supporting upgrade decision valve. This implies that an increase in the damage stock 
would lead to an opening of this valve. This is expected because an increased expectation 
of future damage would cause an increase in the proportion of homeowners who will decide 
to upgrade. The damage stock has flows associated with increased and reduced risk of 
damage. The arrow from the upgrade decision stock to the reduced risk of damage valve 
indicates that when a larger proportion of homeowners choose to upgrade the extent of 
expected damage will reduce. 
A minus sign with a counter-clockwise arrow is also shown in the stock-and-flow 
diagram. This indicates the presence of a so-called balancing loop (Meadows, 1999). This 
balancing loop is represented by the series of connected arrows that begins at damage, 
proceeds to upgrade decision, and returns back to damage. It can be seen that increases in 
the damage stock will cause an increase in the upgrade stock, which then causes a decrease 
in the damage stock. It is a checks-and-balance loop in which an increase in the initial 
stock, which is damage in this case, causes the system to respond by decreasing this same 




Fig. (7-12): Stock-and-flow diagram of the infrastructure layer. 
 
Next, we provide a simplified representation of the economics layer by adding one 
more stock in the preceding diagram, as shown in Figure (7-13). This is the fees stock, 
which represents the total amount of insurer fees paid by the homeowners. There are two 
additional flows, which are simply associated with increases and decreases in the fees. The 
plus sign with the counter-clockwise arrow indicates the presence of a so-called reinforcing 
loop (Meadows, 1999). This reinforcing loop is easiest to understand if we begin with the 
flow associated with an increase in fees. This increase will cause some homeowners who 
had been considering the upgrade option to switch to the no upgrade option because of 
affordability constraints, as indicated by the arrow from the fees stock to the supporting no 
upgrade decision valve. With more homeowners in the no upgrade decision stock, the 
community as a whole will suffer with an increased risk of damage, as indicated by the 
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arrow to the valve with that same name. The insurer will need to pay for these damages, 
and since the insurer is not-for-profit, all costs must be passed on back to the homeowners, 
which is indicated by the arrow back to the increase in fees valve. All of these arrows are 
associated with positive causality, starting from increasing fees, which force more 
homeowners to opt for no upgrades, leading to greater expected damage, and resulting in 
an even further increase in fees. This is a spiraling effect that typically leads to exponential 
increases. It is noted that the exact opposite can also occur, with all influences reversing 
sign: A decrease in the fees can lead to fewer homeowners opting for no upgrades, which 
leads to reduced expected damage, resulting in an even further decrease in fees. This is also 
a spiraling effect that typically leads to an exponential decay towards zero. 
It is noted, however, that these spiraling effects, leading to exponential increases or 
decays, represent only one pair of tendencies of the system. The other balancing loop, 
shown in Figure (7-12), is also in effect and will serve to counteract the spiraling effects of 
the reinforcing loop of Figure (7-13). In Figure (7-14), we show the stock-and-flow 
diagram with both sets of loops. Figure (7-15) shows an additional reinforcing loop of the 
stock-and-flow diagram, which was not shown in Figure (7-14) to avoid overlapping of the 
loops. At this point, some of the limitations of the stock-and-flow diagram are noted. It is 
a simplification of the system, which can be useful in visualizing the co-existence of 
multiple processes, but does not account for other factors such as the cost of risk, the 
differences between cost of repair and cost of suffering, and the affordability constraint. 
Furthermore, the diagram can only represent behaviors at the aggregate level. It has been 
shown that there are many individual-level interactions that influence pricing and decision-
making at the household and community levels. Hence, it is not worthwhile to use the 
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diagram to develop a computational stock-and-flow model; it serves best as a visualization 
tool. Instead, the ABM is used for all of the computations in this part of the model, as 
explained later in this chapter. The flows, such as that of the households who switch from 
the “No Upgrade Decision” to “Upgrade Decision” stocks or of the funds that fill the 
“Fees” stock, would be computed by the ABM when a parameter, such as the cost of the 
upgrade, changes. System dynamics equations would not be used because the multiple 
interactions and resulting flows determined from the ABM cannot be easily expressed in 




Fig. (7-13): Stock-and-flow diagram of the infrastructure and economics layers showing only the 




Fig. (7-14): Stock-and-flow diagram of the infrastructure and economic layers with the 




Fig. (7-15): Stock-and-flow diagram of the infrastructure and economics layers showing only the 
reinforcing loop. 
 
We are now ready to add the social cohesion layer. In Figure (7-16), we show, at 
the top of the diagram, a social cohesion stock, that quantifies the degree of social cohesion 
in the community. We can use the linear systems theory constructs, with 


















in which , represents the contribution of homeowner i to the 
community in the form of active membership. The flow into the social cohesion (SC) stock 
has a valve labeled building SC. Continuing with the linear systems theory constructs, 
building SC flow =  ∑ , + other influences   (7-16) 
in which , are the resources offered by the community to homeowner i, 
and the coefficient k relates the sum of these resources to the rate of flow. Figure (7-15) 
also show the one and only auxiliary variable shown in our stock and flow diagram, the 
community protective measure. This is a binary variable indicating the presence or lack of 
a measure. The arrows pointing towards this variable shows that both social cohesion and 
high levels of expected damage would tend to promote the construction of the measure. 




        (5-16) 
and the expected damage effect is represented by both utilities, , and 
 in the expression above. The status of the community protective measure is 
determined by the sum of the above. 
One of the arrows emanating from the community protective measure variable 
indicates that the presence of a measure will lead to reduced risk of damage; this is 
quantified by the system value of the measure with respect to upgraded and non-upgraded 
residences described earlier in this chapter: 
vmeasure (upgrade)  =  ERupgrade       (7-5) 
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vmeasure (no upgrade)  =  ERno upgrade 
Another arrow indicates an increase in the fees, since the cost of the measure is 
passed to the homeowners through the insurer fees. This increase is determined by the 
computational ABM. Finally, there is an arrow indicating an increase in social cohesion 
because of the symbolic nature of a community-sponsored measure representing the 
cohesiveness of a community. This influence would be included on the right side of 




Fig. (7-16): Stock-and-flow diagram showing the addition of the social cohesion layer. 
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The complete stock-and-flow diagram showing all of the simplified relationships 
for the social cohesion, infrastructure and economic layers is shown in Figure (7-17). 
 
Fig. (7-17): Complete stock-and-flow diagram for community resilience showing, in a simplified 
representation, the social cohesion layer at the top, the infrastructure layer in the middle and the 






Fig. (7-18): Complete stock-and-flow diagram for community resilience showing, in a simplified representation, the social cohesion layer at the 
top, the infrastructure layer in the middle and the economic layer at the bottom.  
COPEWELL 
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It is noted that in a separate CDC-funded effort, known as the COPEWELL project, 
a stock-and-flow model has been being developed for community resilience. Social 
cohesion is one of the stocks of this model and the definition of social cohesion is 
compatible with that used herein. Hence, in the future, it will be possible to link the 
COPEWELL system dynamics model with the ABM model developed in Chapter 5 and 
the Linear Systems Analysis as explained earlier in the present chapter. This is illustrated 
in in Figure (7-18). COPEWELL also includes wider measures of disaster that include 








8.1 Summary and Conclusion 
In this thesis we have shown how a systems approach can be used to describe 
infrastructure-building scenarios in flood-prone coastal communities. We have shown how 
short-term decisions at the individual homeowner level can interact with long-term 
decisions at the community level. We showed how several systems methods can provide 
understanding into different aspects of community resilience. UML was particularly useful 
in diagramming the complex time-evolution of processes associated with damage, repair 
and upgrade that interact at the homeowner and community levels. The behaviors that were 
conceptually described by the UML were programmed into economic-driven action in an 
ABM. The principal actors were a not-for-profit insurer, community government, and 
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individual homeowners who were also members of the community. While we assumed that 
the insurer would cover all costs associated with damage from flood events, we also 
assigned monetary values to risk aversion and to the cost of suffering associated with 
disaster recovery. We were able to derive mathematical relationships for the key economic 
quantities that govern individual and insurer decisions, including the fees to set for 
insurance, discounts to offer for those that upgrade their homes, and the decisions for the 
homeowners regarding residential upgrades and the financial support of a community 
flood-mitigation measure. We were also able to describe the emergent economic behaviors 
of the actors through a sequence of level-plots.  
It is shown how linear systems theory from sociology [Coleman and Hao 1987] can 
be used to quantify the interactions between community members and the community as a 
whole in terms of exchanges of resource contributions. Three types of exchanges are shown 
using closely interacting layers. The top layer is related to the notion of social cohesion; 
the second focused on economics at the individual and community levels; and the third 
layer is purely in terms of infrastructure capabilities, again at the individual household and 
community levels. While most of the analyses of resource exchanges require the use of the 
computational ABM, it was shown how a conceptual SD model can be used to illustrate 
the feedback mechanisms acting through all three layers in a format that can be used to 
communicate more effectively with policy makers and community representatives. This 
combination of approaches brings greater transparency to the multiple dimensions of 
human interactions in building community resilience.  
We also developed a model for rapidly assessing hurricane-associated surge risks 
in the mid-Atlantic. We built on previous work by Irish et al. (2009) to construct a 
 
224 
mathematical model of surge risk, and applied the maximum likelihood principle to 
estimate the parameters. This model was trained and cross-validated using a set of 1,380 
surge heights (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 2015) that were generated by the ADCIRC 
surge model and SWAN wave model. We were able to rapidly compute flood elevation 
predictions from storms characteristics using only a few parameters: hurricane landfall 
location (xo), heading direction (θ), central pressure deficit (ΔP), radius of maximum winds 
(Rmax), and translational speed (Vt). The accuracy was suitable for classification 
applications in which storms with high risk potential would be selected for future study 
with more computationally intensive models. 
Some of the key results of the computational agent-based model are as follows: 
a. The model calculates the expected costs associated with storm resilience and 
recovery in terms of the probability distributions of the intensity of the storms, 
damage, at different levels, given the storm intensity, protective capabilities of 
residential upgrades and community measures, and homeowners’ costs of 
suffering and risk-aversion. 
b. The model calculates the indifference curve for the residents of a coastal 
community located in SFHA. This curve shows the potential behavior of the 
residents with regard to affordability and willingness to upgrade. 
c. The model computes optimal flood insurance premium rates for the community 
residents that minimizes costs, and leads to zero net profit or loss for the insurer. 
d. The model determines the proportion of the homeowners who will upgrade their 
properties, and determines changes in this proportion that will occur if the 
community decides to build a measure. 
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e. The behavior of the agents is shown through multiple plots. This visual 
representation can be used to identify trends associated with the costs and 
effectiveness of upgrades and community measures and can also be used to 
analyze voting patterns that may influence the decision to build or not build a 
community measure in a manner that is not optimal for the community. 
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8.2 Recommendations for Future Research 
In this section, a list of recommended future work is proposed to build on the work 
herein.  
The storm surge prediction model, can be improved as follows: 
- Model can be extended to predict surge levels in coastal bay areas. 
- An interpolating feature can be added to so that the model can provide predictions 
at locations other than the specific stations of the NACCS study. 
- Near-miss analysis. It is important to be able to predict the probability that an 
approaching storm makes landfall or bypasses the coasts; and predict the resulting 
surge elevations from each scenario. 
The computational ABM can be extended to include:  
- Different flood zones (geographically defined risk levels) with varying flood 
insurance premium rates, probabilities of damage, costs of repair, and costs of 
suffering.  
- Different degrees of resiliency of each structure against a flood event in the same 
flood zone, including aging of the properties over time.  




- Move and relocation strategies for individual homeowners or the entire 
community to move out of the flood zone (e.g., never move, move after damaged 
twice, etc.)  
- Alternatives for the measure type, size, location, and flood protection level. 
- Costs associated with various effects of each measure option on individual 
properties and the entire community (e.g., access to the beach, potential blockage 
of scenic views)  
- A graphic user-interface (GUI) with controller buttons or sliders to change the 
model input values for more comprehensible visualization of the characteristics of 
the system, including the interactions between system components.  
- Additional scenarios of storm damage and more options for the cost of repair. 
- More complicated scenarios for grant applications that are needed to build 
federally sponsored measures. Different types of grants can be considered for repair 
of damaged properties after a flood event. For instance, a community may receive 
extra repair funds after a flood event if the president of the U.S. declares it as a 
major disaster. These funds include individual assistance and public assistance, 
though these funds often are in the form of interest-bearing loans. 
- More realistic distribution functions for affordability and cost of risk (risk 
aversion) that are based on socio-economic studies. 
- Bayes theory can be used to modify probabilities after each storm event. In the 
current model, we have assumed the homeowners have perfect knowledge of the 
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probabilities and know the exact outcome of their decisions. In reality however, the 
probabilities will evolve in a process that resembles a learning curve. The initial 
homeowner probabilities are approximate and get updated after each storm as the 
homeowners observe the damage arising from each storm. 
- Near misses. An important application of the Bayes extension described above is 
in modeling homeowner decisions after a near miss event. Under this condition, 
homeowners would tend to underestimate the hazards of future storms, and this 
would be reflected by a lowering of the homeowners’ probabilities of damage. 
- A reinsurance program to protect the insurer against severe losses. Given the 
extents of the risks and costs of major disasters, reinsurance programs can help the 
flood insurance companies remain solvent after such hurricane events. 
- Non-stationarity (e.g., climate change effects). The current study is conducted 
using stationary stochastic processes in which the joint probability distributions do 
not change over time; the value of storm parameters such as severity and probability 
of occurance remain constant in time. Future studies can take account of increasing 
probabilities of severe events that are due to climate change. 
- Catastrophic losses. The ABM can include very large, unexpected events that can 
overwhelm standard upgrades and flood control measures, resulting in catastrophic 
losses for every homeowner in the community. 
- For-profit insurer and subsidizing insurer. The model can be modified to include 
these two cases to account for the ability of homeowners to pay for insurance. With 
such a model, it will be possible to examine the effects of profits/subsidies on the 
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solvency of the insurer, the upgrade decisions made by the community residents, 
votes for or against addition of a community flood control measure, and ultimately, 
their effects on flood resiliency of the entire coastal community. 
- Negative cost of risk. In this study we have only considered non-negative values 
for the cost of risk. The probability density function of the cost of risk used as an 
input to the ABM can be modified to include negative values of cost of risk for 
homeowners who do not understand or underestimate the risk of damage. 
- Visualization over time of the system dynamics model. The ABM can be modified 
to keep track of and visualize the changes in the stocks and flows in the system 
dynamics model over time (e.g. the number of homeowners who plan to upgrade). 
The current model only shows the current state of the stocks and does not give 







NACCS Synthetic TC Parameters 
Table (A-1) provides a list of 348 of the total 1,050 synthetic tropical storms (TCs) 
that were developed for the NACCS study area. The storm track location, or the landfall 
location (for the landfalling storms), of these selected 348 synthetic storms are in the 
coastal regions of FEMA sub-region III (which includes DC, DE, MD, PA, VA, WV). 
Storm parameters assigned to each cyclone are heading direction (θ), central pressure 
deficit (ΔP), radius of maximum winds (Rmax), and translational speed (Vt). Table (A-1) is 
adopted from Appendix C of the “Coastal storm hazards from Virginia to Maine: 
ERDC/CHL TR-15-5” report of the NACCS study [NACCS 2015].   
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1 3 1 -60 88 39 18 
2 3 1 -60 78 108 29 
3 3 1 -60 68 62 42 
4 3 1 -60 58 47 32 
5 3 1 -60 48 64 12 
6 3 1 -60 38 72 19 
7 3 1 -60 28 26 39 
8 3 2 -60 88 114 25 
9 3 2 -60 78 51 30 
10 3 2 -60 68 26 31 
11 3 2 -60 58 37 12 
12 3 2 -60 48 77 44 
13 3 2 -60 38 72 13 
14 3 2 -60 28 39 39 
15 3 3 -60 88 105 24 
16 3 3 -60 78 50 30 
17 3 3 -60 68 39 12 
18 3 3 -60 58 26 29 
19 3 3 -60 48 82 44 
20 3 3 -60 38 68 15 
21 3 3 -60 28 42 40 
22 3 4 -60 88 50 40 
23 3 4 -60 78 51 29 
24 3 4 -60 68 107 26 
25 3 4 -60 58 65 12 
26 3 4 -60 48 28 34 
27 3 4 -60 38 37 13 
28 3 4 -60 28 75 38 
29 3 5 -60 88 77 37 
30 3 5 -60 78 35 26 
31 3 5 -60 68 62 12 
32 3 5 -60 58 109 25 
33 3 5 -60 48 49 25 
34 3 5 -60 38 58 40 
35 3 5 -60 28 25 35 
36 3 6 -60 88 72 31 
37 3 6 -60 78 38 27 



















39 3 6 -60 58 105 28 
40 3 6 -60 48 64 14 
41 3 6 -60 38 25 28 
42 3 6 -60 28 61 46 
43 3 7 -60 88 50 37 
44 3 7 -60 78 78 12 
45 3 7 -60 68 104 35 
46 3 7 -60 58 41 12 
47 3 7 -60 48 25 31 
48 3 7 -60 38 48 20 
49 3 7 -60 28 71 33 
50 3 8 -60 88 47 18 
51 3 8 -60 78 75 40 
52 3 8 -60 68 104 21 
53 3 8 -60 58 41 39 
54 3 8 -60 48 67 36 
55 3 8 -60 38 25 19 
56 3 8 -60 28 58 13 
57 3 25 -40 88 53 20 
58 3 25 -40 78 105 21 
59 3 25 -40 68 29 22 
60 3 25 -40 58 73 41 
61 3 25 -40 48 51 40 
62 3 25 -40 38 38 36 
63 3 25 -40 28 65 12 
64 3 26 -40 88 54 30 
65 3 26 -40 78 104 30 
66 3 26 -40 68 37 12 
67 3 26 -40 58 29 38 
68 3 26 -40 48 80 13 
69 3 26 -40 38 63 47 
70 3 26 -40 28 50 23 
71 3 27 -40 88 44 24 
72 3 27 -40 78 66 45 
73 3 27 -40 68 117 25 
74 3 27 -40 58 52 17 
75 3 27 -40 48 26 20 
76 3 27 -40 38 39 41 



















78 3 28 -40 88 69 43 
79 3 28 -40 78 53 16 
80 3 28 -40 68 37 42 
81 3 28 -40 58 103 23 
82 3 28 -40 48 29 19 
83 3 28 -40 38 62 38 
84 3 28 -40 28 60 25 
85 3 29 -40 88 53 35 
86 3 29 -40 78 79 22 
87 3 29 -40 68 32 22 
88 3 29 -40 58 105 28 
89 3 29 -40 48 55 12 
90 3 29 -40 38 31 47 
91 3 29 -40 28 59 39 
92 3 30 -40 88 53 21 
93 3 30 -40 78 42 22 
94 3 30 -40 68 115 40 
95 3 30 -40 58 25 33 
96 3 30 -40 48 83 24 
97 3 30 -40 38 50 45 
98 3 30 -40 28 46 13 
99 3 31 -40 88 65 16 
100 3 31 -40 78 54 44 
101 3 31 -40 68 104 31 
102 3 31 -40 58 44 17 
103 3 31 -40 48 27 32 
104 3 31 -40 38 46 25 
105 3 31 -40 28 74 21 
106 3 50 -20 98 66 38 
107 3 50 -20 88 76 12 
108 3 50 -20 78 42 21 
109 3 50 -20 68 113 32 
110 3 50 -20 58 25 23 
111 3 50 -20 48 37 49 
112 3 50 -20 38 62 30 
113 3 51 -20 98 48 26 
114 3 51 -20 88 117 29 
115 3 51 -20 78 68 42 



















117 3 51 -20 58 72 12 
118 3 51 -20 48 33 41 
119 3 51 -20 38 31 12 
120 3 52 -20 98 63 28 
121 3 52 -20 88 38 22 
122 3 52 -20 78 115 26 
123 3 52 -20 68 70 38 
124 3 52 -20 58 25 25 
125 3 52 -20 48 44 43 
126 3 52 -20 38 63 12 
127 3 53 -20 98 59 19 
128 3 53 -20 88 116 33 
129 3 53 -20 78 27 36 
130 3 53 -20 68 37 20 
131 3 53 -20 58 56 46 
132 3 53 -20 48 75 21 
133 3 53 -20 38 45 20 
134 3 54 -20 98 49 33 
135 3 54 -20 88 100 17 
136 3 54 -20 78 87 44 
137 3 54 -20 68 28 20 
138 3 54 -20 58 50 12 
139 3 54 -20 48 65 27 
140 3 54 -20 38 38 46 
141 3 72 0 88 42 31 
142 3 72 0 83 53 12 
143 3 72 0 78 77 35 
144 3 72 0 73 133 26 
145 3 72 0 68 40 16 
146 3 72 0 63 26 13 
147 3 72 0 58 29 38 
148 3 72 0 53 55 21 
149 3 72 0 48 51 48 
150 3 72 0 43 71 15 
151 3 72 0 38 59 39 
152 3 72 0 33 98 35 
153 3 72 0 28 33 20 
154 3 73 0 88 53 27 



















156 3 73 0 78 145 20 
157 3 73 0 73 49 46 
158 3 73 0 68 79 29 
159 3 73 0 63 27 28 
160 3 73 0 58 42 12 
161 3 73 0 53 87 12 
162 3 73 0 48 76 42 
163 3 73 0 43 39 33 
164 3 73 0 38 25 13 
165 3 73 0 33 50 12 
166 3 73 0 28 83 24 
167 3 74 0 88 93 28 
168 3 74 0 83 59 31 
169 3 74 0 78 41 31 
170 3 74 0 73 64 12 
171 3 74 0 68 40 16 
172 3 74 0 63 25 25 
173 3 74 0 58 69 47 
174 3 74 0 53 114 25 
175 3 74 0 48 78 21 
176 3 74 0 43 45 36 
177 3 74 0 38 67 26 
178 3 74 0 33 25 53 
179 3 74 0 28 53 16 
180 3 75 0 88 51 24 
181 3 75 0 83 29 38 
182 3 75 0 78 140 32 
183 3 75 0 73 64 25 
184 3 75 0 68 59 51 
185 3 75 0 63 73 12 
186 3 75 0 58 38 14 
187 3 75 0 53 42 40 
188 3 75 0 48 25 25 
189 3 75 0 43 52 22 
190 3 75 0 38 92 32 
191 3 75 0 33 71 21 
192 3 75 0 28 39 36 
193 3 107 20 88 63 29 



















195 3 107 20 78 140 29 
196 3 107 20 73 71 49 
197 3 107 20 68 60 12 
198 3 107 20 63 56 12 
199 3 107 20 58 73 28 
200 3 107 20 53 31 46 
201 3 107 20 48 35 48 
202 3 107 20 43 88 21 
203 3 107 20 38 25 17 
204 3 107 20 33 41 22 
205 3 107 20 28 59 35 
206 3 108 20 88 59 33 
207 3 108 20 83 104 35 
208 3 108 20 78 46 24 
209 3 108 20 73 53 12 
210 3 108 20 68 31 29 
211 3 108 20 63 47 37 
212 3 108 20 58 142 13 
213 3 108 20 53 69 17 
214 3 108 20 48 43 59 
215 3 108 20 43 27 12 
216 3 108 20 38 73 34 
217 3 108 20 33 25 27 
218 3 108 20 28 55 33 
219 3 109 20 88 40 27 
220 3 109 20 83 75 18 
221 3 109 20 78 106 50 
222 3 109 20 73 63 36 
223 3 109 20 68 135 21 
224 3 109 20 63 25 38 
225 3 109 20 58 48 12 
226 3 109 20 53 54 27 
227 3 109 20 48 38 45 
228 3 109 20 43 34 33 
229 3 109 20 38 79 34 
230 3 109 20 33 31 12 
231 3 109 20 28 40 29 
232 3 110 20 88 54 15 



















234 3 110 20 78 66 25 
235 3 110 20 73 56 44 
236 3 110 20 68 79 19 
237 3 110 20 63 29 18 
238 3 110 20 58 33 44 
239 3 110 20 53 33 19 
240 3 110 20 48 51 33 
241 3 110 20 43 100 35 
242 3 110 20 38 25 34 
243 3 110 20 33 74 12 
244 3 110 20 28 46 29 
245 3 111 20 88 44 18 
246 3 111 20 83 104 19 
247 3 111 20 78 25 42 
248 3 111 20 73 95 36 
249 3 111 20 68 55 19 
250 3 111 20 63 71 23 
251 3 111 20 58 86 52 
252 3 111 20 53 49 45 
253 3 111 20 48 67 12 
254 3 111 20 43 25 12 
255 3 111 20 38 41 29 
256 3 111 20 33 32 29 
257 3 111 20 28 71 27 
258 3 112 20 88 67 23 
259 3 112 20 83 85 16 
260 3 112 20 78 44 16 
261 3 112 20 73 62 49 
262 3 112 20 68 44 38 
263 3 112 20 63 137 33 
264 3 112 20 58 28 31 
265 3 112 20 53 27 26 
266 3 112 20 48 47 28 
267 3 112 20 43 79 27 
268 3 112 20 38 60 12 
269 3 112 20 33 38 49 
270 3 112 20 28 45 19 
271 3 125 40 98 76 28 



















273 3 125 40 88 68 46 
274 3 125 40 83 89 20 
275 3 125 40 78 139 30 
276 3 125 40 73 26 20 
277 3 125 40 68 55 12 
278 3 125 40 63 41 28 
279 3 125 40 58 35 35 
280 3 125 40 53 25 34 
281 3 125 40 48 61 35 
282 3 125 40 43 79 21 
283 3 125 40 38 47 27 
284 3 126 40 98 92 33 
285 3 126 40 93 45 35 
286 3 126 40 88 34 27 
287 3 126 40 83 125 23 
288 3 126 40 78 62 26 
289 3 126 40 73 61 30 
290 3 126 40 68 74 15 
291 3 126 40 63 25 31 
292 3 126 40 58 25 31 
293 3 126 40 53 83 44 
294 3 126 40 48 42 59 
295 3 126 40 43 35 12 
296 3 126 40 38 63 47 
297 3 127 40 98 68 20 
298 3 127 40 93 132 22 
299 3 127 40 88 55 37 
300 3 127 40 83 50 12 
301 3 127 40 78 40 50 
302 3 127 40 73 30 27 
303 3 127 40 68 98 31 
304 3 127 40 63 60 17 
305 3 127 40 58 90 21 
306 3 127 40 53 34 13 
307 3 127 40 48 43 12 
308 3 127 40 43 38 21 
309 3 127 40 38 26 40 
310 3 128 40 98 92 40 



















312 3 128 40 88 60 42 
313 3 128 40 83 75 18 
314 3 128 40 78 67 39 
315 3 128 40 73 126 30 
316 3 128 40 68 62 12 
317 3 128 40 63 30 39 
318 3 128 40 58 26 42 
319 3 128 40 53 58 51 
320 3 128 40 48 25 15 
321 3 128 40 43 39 17 
322 3 128 40 38 73 26 
323 3 129 40 98 61 27 
324 3 129 40 93 71 46 
325 3 129 40 88 121 22 
326 3 129 40 83 46 22 
327 3 129 40 78 25 34 
328 3 129 40 73 70 15 
329 3 129 40 68 50 54 
330 3 129 40 63 42 12 
331 3 129 40 58 48 38 
332 3 129 40 53 27 16 
333 3 129 40 48 88 34 
334 3 129 40 43 64 33 
335 3 129 40 38 57 12 
336 3 130 40 98 104 12 
337 3 130 40 93 87 31 
338 3 130 40 88 46 12 
339 3 130 40 83 40 25 
340 3 130 40 78 61 36 
341 3 130 40 73 79 12 
342 3 130 40 68 28 35 
343 3 130 40 63 103 31 
344 3 130 40 58 56 19 
345 3 130 40 53 42 33 
346 3 130 40 48 45 57 
347 3 130 40 43 53 32 
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